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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
This research aims to investigate the earnings management of acquiring firms 
prior to a merger announcement as well as the effect of board connections and 
the characteristics of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on earnings management 
prior to the merger announcement. Beside the use of both versions of the Jones 
models to detect accrual-based earnings management and the models 
developed by Roychowdhury (2006) to detect real earnings management, the 
research also uses the deviation between the distribution of the first digits of 
figures reported on financial statement and the theoretical distribution predicted 
by Benford’s Law. The empirical research is based on secondary data for firms 
in the United Kingdom (UK) over the period from 2007 to 2012.  
The thesis firstly revisits the issue earnings management prior to the merger 
announcement of both share-financed and cash-financed acquirers. Using a 
sample of 295 observations of UK public acquirers from 2007 to 2012, the study 
finds that share-financed acquirers exhibit significantly high abnormal accruals 
and abnormal real earnings activities in the first year prior to a merger 
announcement. The results are in line with existing evidence (Louis 2004; Botsari 
and Meeks 2008; Zhu and Lu 2013). However, despite the amount of evidence 
suggesting share-financed acquirers manage earnings prior to announcing the 
deals, the evidence still attracts criticism because of the pitfalls of the empirical 
models to capture earnings management, especially the most popularly-used 
Jones’ accruals model and the Roychowdhury’s (2006) real earnings 
management (Dechow et al. 2010a; Ball 2013). A large body of the literature on 
earnings management in the context of mergers and acquisitions has been 
developed assuming the Jones and Roychowdhury’s models are capable of 
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capturing earnings management, hence the serious criticisms of those models 
present a big question mark over what we actually know about the issues of 
earnings management prior to share-financed mergers. Addressing that concern 
is not only topical, but also will make an important contribution to the literature. 
The thesis significantly strengthens the evidence suggesting share-financed 
acquirers do indeed manage earnings prior to the merger announcement by using 
the deviation between the distribution of the first digits of reported figures of 
financial statement and the theoretical distribution from Benford’s Law as an 
alternative proxy for earnings management. Given the importance of a thorough 
understanding of the behaviour of acquirers in the building up to a merger, the 
contribution of this first empirical chapter cannot be overstated. 
Secondly, the thesis investigates whether and how board connections between 
the acquiring and target firms affect the earnings management behaviour of 
share-financed acquirers prior to a merger announcement. It compares abnormal 
accruals and real activities prior to the merger announcement between acquirers 
with board connections to targets and acquirers without board connections to 
targets. Under cash-financed mergers and acquisitions (M&A), no significant 
difference is found in accrual earnings management between these two types of 
firm. The analysis, however, shows that share-financed acquirers with board 
connections increase accrual earnings significantly in the first and second years 
prior to the merger announcement, while those without board connections 
manipulate real activities in the first year prior to the merger announcement. The 
findings suggest that lower uncertainty about the M&A deal and a stronger 
bargaining position in the negotiations held by acquirers with board connections 
allow the firms to time the acquisition strategically and confidently inflate their 
accruals, while acquirers without board connections shift from accrual-based 
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earnings management to real earnings management to avoid the legislation risk. 
The documented behaviour of share-financed acquirers to time the earnings 
management prior to the merger announcement is both original and important, 
while the evidence on the choice of earnings management strategies also add 
significantly to the growing literature looking at the trade-off between accrual-
based and real earnings management. 
Finally, the thesis extends prior studies by examining the relationships between 
CEO characteristics and accrual-based and real earnings management among 
share-financed acquirers before the merger announcement. The study finds that 
share-financed acquirers led by CEOs with financial expertise, long tenure and 
high reputation are associated with lower abnormal accruals and real activities. 
The correlations are statistically significant and are consistently found in the first 
year before the merger announcement. The findings are robust as abnormal 
accruals and real activities are measured in different ways and different models 
are employed. The evidence suggests that CEO characteristics have an impact 
on earnings management in the contexts of M&A and have some implications for 
practitioners. 
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1 CHAPTER 1: THESIS INTRODUCTION 
This chapter first explains the background of the study which shows what 
earnings management is, how to manage earnings and the earnings 
management in the context of M&A. Second, this chapter presents the problems 
that the thesis tries to tackle and methodologies used. Third, the chapter also 
describes the contributions of the thesis. Finally, the chapter summarises main 
components of the thesis.  
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Blair (1995) stated that “Maximizing shareholder wealth has increasingly become 
the most important objective of corporate management, especially in an age of 
aggressive corporate acquisitions and the rising power of institutional investors”. 
Thus, managers of companies have a motivation to present financial statements 
as favourable as possible for shareholder value. Potential investors and creditors 
base the decision on whether or not to become an investor or lend the company 
money on the financial statements. Therefore, in order to achieve their financial 
targets, the company managers may manage corporate earnings to make 
financial statements look better than what would represent the ‘complete’ and 
‘real’ picture of the company. A number of techniques are used to manage 
earnings, such as revenue and expense recognition, changing accounting 
methods and policies, one-time charges, or manipulating real earnings activities. 
Earnings, also called profit, comprise revenue minus expenses. Managers can 
manage earnings upwards by recognizing future revenue to increase earnings in 
the current period or delay recognizing expenses. In contrast, managers can 
manage earnings downwards or shift earnings in the current period to the next 
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period by recognizing expenses prematurely or delaying the recognition of 
revenue (Healy 1985; Teoh et al. 1998a).  
Companies are also allowed by accounting standards to choose among the 
permitted reporting methods that works best for them. For example, companies 
can decrease (or increase) the cost of goods sold by changing the method of 
stock valuation (e.g. first-in and first-out [FIFO] to last-in and first-out [LIFO]) to 
increase (or decrease) companies’ earnings. When the company changes from 
one accounting method to another to affect earnings, it engages in earnings 
management (Teoh et al. 1998a). In many cases, the change in accounting 
methods may be undetected by investors or creditors. As a result, the investor 
and creditors cannot determine whether the company is performing well or the 
financial statement is manipulated (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Another way to manage earnings is to time the writing off of the cost of a failed 
project which is a particularly large one-time expense. For example, the company 
may engage in earnings management by writing off major assets in periods when 
profits are high and the reduction in value of those assets will not make the 
financial statement look too poor (Healy 1985; Roychowdhury 2006).  
Apart from managing earnings via changing accounting methods and 
estimations, companies can also influence reported earnings by making changes 
to real activities, such as sales policies, production volume etc. Manipulating real 
earnings activities occurs, for example, when companies provide a greater price 
discount to increase sales, or increase the number of units produced to reduce 
the cost per unit sold, or reduce research and development (R&D), advertising 
and selling, general and administrative expenses to decrease costs 
(Roychowdhury 2006). 
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In the methods outlined above, managers might not be violating any accounting 
standards or regulations. Hence, earnings manipulation is not necessarily 
fraudulent. It is common that managers would take advantage of how accounting 
rules are applied to report a profit that looks like they are achieving their financial 
targets, such as: avoiding reporting decreases in earnings; avoiding reporting 
losses; or meeting analysts’ forecasts. In other words, managers often manage 
earnings because they have a motive to do so. 
In a stock swap M&A deal, it is sensible to ask: “Do acquiring firms inflate their 
earnings?”. If the price of acquiring firms’ share prior to a merger announcement 
is higher, the acquirer will need to issue fewer shares to pay for the deal, which 
means the cost of the deal is cheaper from the acquirer’s point of view (Louis 
2004; Botsari and Meeks 2008). Therefore, the acquirer will have a financial 
motive to engage in earnings management for boosting their share price prior to 
the takeover. It is also sensible to ask questions such as “Do acquirers with board 
connections or CEOs with different characteristics inflate their earnings 
differently?” because connections with the target and CEO personal traits might 
affect the underlying motive managers have while trying to manipulate earnings 
prior to the deal announcement. This thesis attempts to make contributions to 
those issues.  
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS 
This thesis investigates whether and how share-financed acquirers manage 
earnings prior to M&A deals. The problem has been investigated extensively in 
the extant literature, the thesis aims to contribute further to this trend of literature 
by several ways. First, the thesis revisits the earnings management of share-
financed acquirers prior to M&A deals using Benford Law because there is the 
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issue of limitations to the effectiveness of models such as the Jones and modified 
Jones models to detect accruals earnings management and Roychowdhury 
models to detect real earnings management. Second, the thesis attempts to 
explain the strategies of earnings management used by acquirers with and 
without board connections prior to a merger announcement in the UK because 
previous research shows that the firms’ connections can affect corporate’s 
financial decision. Third, the thesis brings in CEO characteristics as a new 
dimension in detect earnings management of acquirers prior to M&A deals. 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research methodology is applied in this PhD research to deal with the problem 
mentioned in Section 1.2 are as followings: 
- The first investigation of this research is to revisit how earnings management 
is employed by both share- and cash-financed acquirers prior to a merger 
announcement in the UK using the Jones and modified Jones models to 
estimate accrual-based earnings management1, the models developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate real earnings management2 and the 
deviation between the distribution of the first digits of figures reported in 
financial statement and the theoretical distribution predicted by Benford’s Law 
as an alternative proxy for earnings management to mitigate concerns regarding 
possible errors in measuring accrual-based and real earnings management. 
- The second investigation of this research is to investigate the strategies of 
earnings management used by acquirers with and without board connections 
                                                 
1 Accrual-based earnings management represents accounting choices of accounting methods, application 
of accounting methods, an accounting method timing (Teoh et al. 1998a). 
2 Real earnings activities are not only accounting implications but also economic implications. They are 
“real” business activities, such as: price discounts, choice or timing of investment (Teoh et al. 1998a; Weil 
et al. 1998). 
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prior to a merger announcement in the UK by using Jones’s models to detect 
accruals earnings management and Roychowdhury’s models to detect real 
earnings management. 
- The third investigation of this research is to investigate the effect of CEO 
characteristics on earnings management prior to a merger announcement in 
the UK by using Jones’s models to detect accruals earnings management and 
Roychowdhury’s models to detect real earnings management. 
-  
1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The main contributions of the study are summarized as follows. 
This study fully reviews previous studies in the literature on earnings 
management. This review summarizes, clarifies and evaluates theories 
concerning earnings management, motivations for such behaviour and proxies 
for earnings management. This literature review also summarizes and evaluates 
the models constructed to estimate earnings management proxies.  
This study is the first to document whether acquirers inflate their earnings prior to 
a merger announcement by examining both abnormal accruals under the Jones 
and modified Jones models and real earnings activities under the models 
developed by (Roychowdhury 2006) as well as assessing the likelihood of errors 
in financial reports using Benford’s Law. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the 
earnings management literature by (1) reinforcing the efficiency of Jones and 
modified John models in estimating accrual-based earnings management and the 
models developed by (Roychowdhury 2006), (2) confirming Benford’s Law as a 
reliable indicator of earnings management, which provides investors and 
regulators with an easily implementable approach for assessing errors in the 
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financial reports, and (3) strengthening the important evidence that share-
financed acquirers inflate earnings prior to a merger announcement. 
Previous studies (Renneboog and Zhao 2011, 2014; Ishii and Xuan 2014) have 
paid attention to investigating value creation and destruction post mergers to 
examine the effect of board connections on corporate investments. This study 
extends previous research by investigating the effect of board connections on 
earnings management prior to a merger announcement. The evidence provided 
from this investigation is original and makes significant contribution to our 
understanding of how the network of board directors affect corporate decisions. 
This study also provides evidence of the effect of CEO characteristics on earnings 
management prior to the merger announcement. The findings can be useful for 
practitioners such as investors and auditors. They suggest that investors should 
be cautious when using information related to M&A announcements from 
acquirers with CEOs without financial expertise, with short tenure and with low 
reputation because earnings are more likely to be manipulated in such cases in 
the first year before the merger announcement. The reason is that inflated 
earnings can be reversed in subsequent periods, which in turn reduces abnormal 
returns from investments in the stocks of acquirers. Similarly, when auditing 
financial statements, auditors could particularly pay attention to firms with such 
CEOs because the risks of earnings management are high in the first year before 
M&A. 
1.5 MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis aims to make contributions to the growing literature on earnings 
management. The main components of the thesis comprise four chapters (2, 3, 
4 and 5). Chapter 2 provides a general understanding of earnings management 
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and M&A, the theoretical perspectives of earnings management, earnings 
management measurement, motivations for earnings management and M&A. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are empirical studies, each of which contributes significantly 
to an important topic within the earnings management and M&A themes. This 
following sub-sections are devoted to introducing the topic investigated in each 
of the empirical chapters and highlight the main contributions. 
1.5.1 Chapter 2: Earnings management and mergers and acquisitions 
Earnings management can be undertaken in numerous ways and through various 
actions. There are many different motivations encouraging firms and managers 
to engage in earnings management activities. Moreover, earnings management 
activities have been detected by many proxies which also are estimated by 
numerous models. First, chapter 2 provides a general understanding of earnings 
management and the theoretical perspectives. Second, it discusses the 
approaches used to detect earnings management. These approaches estimate 
abnormal total accruals, sets of accruals or specific accruals, investigate earnings 
distribution and estimate real earnings management. Third, the chapter provides 
an in-depth review of the motivations for earnings management. Finally, Chapter 
2 discusses the definition of M&A and the methods of payment. It also provides 
a literature review on the motivations for M&A. 
1.5.2 Chapter 3: Revisiting the evidence of earnings of management prior 
to merger announcement: An application of Benford’s Law. 
Having reviewed in Chapter 2 the inflation of accounting earnings by share-
financed acquiring firms prior to a merger announcement, this chapter aims at 
revisiting the issue using a new earnings management detection model. For 
detecting earnings management by acquirers, previous research employs the 
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Jones and modified Jones models to estimate accrual-based earnings 
management and the models developed by (Roychowdhury 2006) to estimate 
real earnings management. Chapter 3 goes on to investigate the engagement of 
acquiring firms in earnings management prior to a merger announcement and 
reinforce the existing evidence by introducing Benford’s Law, which represents a 
recent methodology used to detect earnings management by assessing errors in 
financial statements. To examine errors in financial reports, the study follows 
Amiram et al. (2015) to (1) estimate FSD_SCORE, which is the mean absolute 
deviation between the distribution of the first digits of figures reported on financial 
statement and the theoretical distribution predicted by Benford’s Law and (2) 
estimate KSMAX, which is maximum of cumulative absolute deviations between 
the distribution of the first digits of figures reported on financial statement and the 
theoretical distribution predicted by Benford’s Law.  
1.5.3 Chapter 4: The timing and strategies of earnings management by 
share-financed acquirers prior to merger announcements: 
Connection pays? 
Chapter 3 explains the motivation for acquiring firms to engage in earnings 
management prior to a merger announcement. Chapter 4 extends on this by 
investigating the effect of board connections on earnings management prior to 
the merger announcement. This chapter tries to answer the question as to 
whether or not an acquirer with board connections to the target firm may engage 
in earnings management in a different manner from an acquirer without board 
connections to the target firm.   
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1.5.4 Chapter 5: Earnings management by share-financed acquirers prior 
to merger announcements: the roles of financial expertise, tenure 
and reputation. 
Chapter 5 also extends Chapter 3 by investigating the effect of CEO 
characteristics on earnings management prior to a merger announcement. The 
study argues that CEO characteristics could affect earnings management prior to 
the merger announcement because CEO characteristics are demonstrated to 
affect M&A activities (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Walters et al. 2007; Malmendier 
and Tate 2008; Custódio and Metzger 2013). This study investigates CEOs’ 
financial expertise, tenure and reputation as proxies of CEO characteristics to 
examine the influence of CEOs’ characteristics on earnings management prior to 
the merger announcement. 
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2 CHAPTER 2: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND MERGER AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
2.1 DEFINITION OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Over the past few decades, there has been a dramatic increase in research on 
earnings management. However, the prior literature has not provided a 
consensual definition of earnings management. There have been numerous 
ways in which the idea of earnings management has been described, especially 
concerning different research purposes.   
One of the definitions most used is that of Healy and Wahlen (1999): 
“…managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers.” 
The first feature of this definition is that managers could exercise judgement in 
financial reporting in many ways, commonly known as accrual-based earnings 
management, as follows: 
(1) Estimating economic events in future such as losses from bad debts and 
asset impairments, deferred taxes, obligations other post-employment 
benefits. 
(2) Choosing among accepted accounting methods to report an economic 
transaction, which used a different accounting method for the transaction 
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in previous period, such as FIFO or LIFO, and accelerated depreciation 
methods or straight-line depreciation methods. 
The second feature of this definition is that there are some ways in which 
managers can use real business transactions, commonly known as real earnings 
management, for example: undertaking or deferring expenditure, such as on 
advertising, R&D or maintenance. 
Consistent with the definition of earnings management of Healy and Wahlen 
(1999), later research finds evidence that managers avoid debt covenant 
violations by manipulating earnings upward (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Jaggi 
and Lee 2002). 
Based on the information perspective of accounting numbers, Schipper (1989) 
bases on private gain motivations to describes earnings management. Earnings 
management is thus defined as constituting: 
“a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with 
the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely 
facilitating the neutral operation of the process).” 
The limitations of earnings management as defined by Schipper (1989) are that 
only the external reporting function is included, not other types of earnings 
management. Moreover, he does not consider whether or not manipulation 
through intervening in the financial reporting process violates generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). However, the author shows that managers can 
access information that is not available to outside shareholders so that they take 
advantages of the information asymmetry by engaging in earnings management 
to achieve private gains. Later research shares the same view as Schipper (1989) 
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on earnings management. Beneish (2001) provides evidence that managers 
mislead shareholders concerning the underlying economic performance of the 
firm by engaging in earnings management for private gains.  
Unlike the earnings management definitions of Schipper (1989) and Healy and 
Wahlen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000) offer a clear conceptual difference 
between accounting fraud and earnings management activities (see Figure 2-1). 
They differentiate between accounting practices that are within GAAP, such as 
“conservative accounting, neutral accounting or aggressive accounting” (Dechow 
and Skinner 2000) are earnings management, which is within GAAP, and 
fraudulent accounting, which violates GAAP. Under earnings management within 
GAAP, the authors classify accrual earnings management (accounting choices) 
and real earnings management (real cash flow choices). 
 
Figure 2-1: Distinction between earnings management and fraud 
Focusing on real earnings management, Roychowdhury (2006) discusses 
several mechanisms by which managers may manipulate actual business 
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transactions to affect reported earnings. The author explains that managers may 
structure business transactions to affect reported earnings by providing a lower 
price of their products, timing asset sales, or reducing R&D expenses. 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines earnings management as follows: 
 “…management actions that deviate from normal business practices, 
undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings 
thresholds.” 
Roychowdhury (2006) provides evidence that managers avoid reporting annual 
losses by employing structuring business transactions to manipulate earnings 
upward. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006)’s definition of real earnings 
management, some research has reported that companies attempt to achieve 
their financial goals be engaging in real earnings management (Cohen et al. 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012). 
Thus far, most earnings management definitions have argued that managers are 
motivated either by gaining private benefits or achieving firms’ financial targets. 
However, earnings management is not always bad. Some judgements can 
provide positive information for investors. Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that if 
the financial report is audited by reputable companies and the auditing result is 
reliable, the income estimated by managers will be considered as a credible 
forecast of income in future. Indeed, Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that 
“decisions to use accounting judgement to make financial reports more 
informative for users do not fall within our definition of earnings management”. 
Consistent with Healy and Wahlen (1999), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) show 
that managers could also engage in earnings management to provide positive 
information for investors. The standpoint of Healy and Wahlen (1999) and 
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Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) on earnings management, however, focuses 
only on the positive aspect of engaging in earnings management. Ronen and 
Yaari (2008) present a more comprehensive description of earnings 
management, as follows: 
“Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that result 
in not reporting the true short-term, value-maximizing earnings as known 
to management. Earnings management can be beneficial (it signals long-
term value); pernicious (it conceals short- or long-term value) or neutral (it 
reveals the true short-term performance).” 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) classified the description of earnings management as 
beneficial, pernicious or neutral earnings managements. Beneficial earnings 
management is using flexible accounting methods to give a sign to investors on 
cash flows in next period. Pernicious earnings management is actions reduce 
transparency or misrepresent of the financial statement by using tricks. Finally, 
neutral earnings management is manipulation of the report, which is either 
economically efficient or opportunistic. This definition is a comprehensive 
earnings management definition, which includes both accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities-based earnings management. Both positive and 
negative aspects are mentioned in the definition. Therefore, it is the one adopted 
in this thesis. 
2.2 THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
2.2.1 Theoretical background 
Analyzing the definition of earnings in the previous section shows that managers 
can manage their earnings in a number of ways to achieve their firms' financial 
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targets or private benefit. To understand why managers having different purposes 
in earnings management, we need to find theories which explain these financial 
activities. There are some fundamental theories can explain the purposes of 
managers when managers engage in earnings management such as shareholder 
theory, stakeholder theory or agency theory. 
The shareholder theory was introduced by Friedman (1970) in the early 20th 
century. The author said that the main duty of firm is to maximize wealth for its 
shareholders in a way that does not violate the law or social values. It means that 
all business activities and financial decisions of the management team have to 
maximize shareholders' interests and do not maximize managers' interests. 
The stakeholder theory was first introduced in 1988 by Evan and Freeman (1988) 
in his book “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach." It argues that there 
are many people involve and have interests in firm besides shareholders. The 
authors said anyone involves and invests in and is affected by the firm is 
stakeholder such as employee, customer, supplier, governmental agency, 
community, shareholder and more. It means that a firm’s real success is to satisfy 
all its stakeholders, not just shareholders. 
The agency theory was posited by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The authors 
argue that the managers are agents while the owners (shareholders) are 
principals, and they have conflicts of interests. Managers typically have an 
information advantage and more power compared to shareholders.  They tend to 
take these advantages to benefit themselves rather than maximizing 
shareholders' interest. 
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2.2.2 Earnings management and theories 
Understanding why earnings management can be pernicious, beneficial or 
neutral (Ronen and Yaari 2008) which are mentioned in the definition of earnings 
management section and the motivation for earnings management is important. 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, Agency theory could well explain the pernicious 
aspect of earnings management. This theory states that there are different 
interests between shareholders (owners) and managers (employees) (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976) and managers tend to be self-serving, especially in firms with 
weak boards. Consistent to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Goergen and 
Renneboog (2011) shows that managers attempt to increase their benefit rather 
than maximize shareholders’ wealth. In particular, Laux and Laux (2009) show 
evidence that managers manipulate earnings management when the firms use 
stock-based compensation scheme or Healy (1985) reveals that managers use 
accounting method choices to maximize their bonus awards. Consequently, 
engagement in earnings management may lead to a reduction in shareholder 
wealth (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Thus, agency theory argues that it is 
necessary to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests. 
Earnings management could be beneficial or neutral because managers could 
use earnings management to give a positive sign of firm’s inside information to 
investors. The motivation for this is explained well by shareholder and 
stakeholder theories which explain that managers attempt to maximize 
shareholders and stakeholders. The activities of managers in beneficial and 
neutral earnings management are also explained by signalling theory, which 
suggests that “it could be the optimal solution that one party with information 
advantage (i.e. insiders) signals some private information to the other party (i.e. 
outsiders)” (Myers and Majluf 1984). Some research supports signalling theory. 
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Healy and Palepu (1993) show that the financial signalling policy of firms can 
affect stock prices. Arya et al. (2003) investigate the value of transparency in 
financial reporting and corporate governance for shareholders. They find that 
even when earnings management conceals information, shareholders can still 
gain some benefits.  
2.3 MEASURES OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
2.3.1 Accruals earnings management 
What are accruals? Under accounting standards, accruals are used to help firms 
record income or expenses at the time those income or expenses are incurred 
rather than at the time cash is collected or paid. Therefore, the fundamental 
objective of accruals is to disclose the real output of the company in the financial 
statements. 
However, accruals can also be used as a mechanism to manipulate reported 
earnings. Reported earnings can be manipulated when managers delay asset 
write-offs, make inadequate provision for bad debts or opportunistically select 
accounting methods (Roychowdhury 2006). If these judgements are biased to 
affect the true performance of the firm, the manager has engaged in earnings 
management through accruals (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
To detect accrual-based earnings management, researchers need to differentiate 
normal accruals from abnormal accruals. Normal accruals (non-discretionary 
accruals) are needed under accounting standards to help financial statements 
reflect true performance, while abnormal accruals (discretionary accruals) are 
managed by managers (McNichols 2000). Thus, abnormal accruals are 
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employed as a proxy for detecting accrual earnings management (DeAngelo 
1986; Beneish 2001). 
There are several methodologies to measure abnormal accruals appropriately. 
The literature documents accrual-based models and non-accrual-based models 
to detect accrual-based earnings management. 
2.3.1.1 Accruals models before the Jones model 
2.3.1.1.1 The Healy Model 
Healy (1985) offers an early model to detect earnings management by managers 
to increase their compensation. 
Author scales total accruals by lagged total assets and calculates the mean of 
this ratio. In order to detect earnings management, Healy (1985) builds the model 
compares the mean ratio across the earnings management partitioning variables. 
Compared to previous studies on earnings management, Healy (1985) focuses 
on predicting the existence of earnings management in every financial year. The 
model is applied to calculate non-discretionary accruals as follows: 
Equation 2-1 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 
where: NAi,τ denotes the estimated normal accruals of firm i. TAi,t is total accruals 
of firm i in year t. Ai,t−1  is total assets of firm i in year t-1. The abnormal accruals 
component in the event period is the difference between the estimated normal 
accruals and total accruals in that period. 
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2.3.1.1.2 DeAngelo model 
In a similar approach, DeAngelo (1986) uses the first differences in total accruals 
as a measure of earnings management, with the assumption that the expectation 
value of that first difference is equal to zero. DeAngelo (1986) measures normal 
accruals in this model by using the last period’s total accruals. Therefore, 
DeAngelo proposes the model for estimating normal accruals as follows: 
Equation 2-2 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 
The Healy model and DeAngelo model calculate total accruals in a period and 
use the total accruals to expect normal accruals in next period. The measure of 
normal accruals in both models will have no error if the normal accruals remain 
over periods and are constant. However, there are some criticisms of the view 
that normal accruals are constant (Kaplan 1985; Dechow 1994). Also, Kaplan 
(1985) argues that the normal accruals could be different over periods cause of 
changing of economic conditions. Failure to recognize changes of the normal 
accruals may inflate standard errors and lead to biased estimates of the 
coefficient. 
2.3.1.1.3 Industry model 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) introduced the industry model, which supposes that 
normal accruals remain unchanged in different periods. The innovation is that this 
model supposes that the changes in normal accruals in the same industry are 
common across companies. Therefore, the industry model estimates the normal 
accruals as follows: 
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Equation 2-3 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) 
where: median(TAi,t) is the median total accruals of industry of firm i in year t.  
Two factors help this model reduce measurement error in estimating abnormal 
accruals. The first factor is the same variations in normal accrual of firms in the 
same industry is removed (Dechow et al. 1995). Second, the model removes the 
correlated variations in abnormal accruals over firms of an industry which would 
potentially cause a problem (Ronen and Yaari 2008). 
2.3.1.2 The Jones model 
Jones (1991) makes an effort to control the influences of changes in economics 
situations of firms on the non-discretionary accruals, but still supposes that 
normal accruals are unchanged. The model calculates the normal accruals as 
follows in the first stage: 
Equation 2-4 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where: ΔREV𝑖,𝑡 is the change in revenue (total sales) of firm i in event year t. PPE𝑖,𝑡 
is the gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of event year t; 
In the second stage, the estimated coefficients from Equation 2-4 represented as 
α̂, 𝛽1̂ and 𝛽2̂, are used to calculate abnormal accruals for all firms: 
Equation 2-5 
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𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + 𝛽1̂
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2̂
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
] 
where: AA𝑖,𝑡 denotes the abnormal accruals of firm i in event year t. Jones (1991) 
supposes that all turnover are normal.  
2.3.1.3 Modifications to the Jones model 
2.3.1.3.1 The modified Jones model 
Dechow et al. (1995) point out the limitation of the Jones model in the ability to 
detect the influence of sales-based inflation supposing that difference in sales 
cause an increase in normal accruals. In the first stage, the modified Jones and 
Jones models are similar, when total accruals are regressed on ∆REV and PPE. 
However, the modified Jones model eliminates changes in receivables (∆REC) 
from changes in sales in the second stage. The modified Jones model assumes 
earnings management results from changes in credit sales. The reason is that it 
is more challenging to engage in earnings management through cash sales than 
credit sales. Therefore, abnormal accruals generated by the modified Jones 
model should no longer to be too small when revenues are managed.  
Using the modified Jones model, the parameters ?̂?, 𝛽1̂ and 𝛽2̂ are estimated by 
Equation 2-4 as specified by the Jones model. Then, the estimated coefficients 
are employed to measure the abnormal accruals (AA) as follows: 
Equation 2-6 
𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + 𝛽1̂
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2̂
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
] 
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Dechow et al. (1995) compare the Jones model and the Jones modified version 
and find that the latter gives a significantly better result. However, the 
effectiveness of neither model can be guaranteed. The tests these models 
perform have low power to detect earnings management, because these models 
have high standard errors (Dechow et al. 1995). Moreover, they appear to be 
poorly specified in the measurement of earnings management in cases of 
extreme financial performance (Dechow et al. 1995).  
2.3.1.3.2 The Forward-Looking model 
Dechow et al. (1995) take the view that current sales growth is positively 
correlated with discretionary accruals by assuming that all credit sales in each 
period are abnormal. Dechow et al. (2003) modify the modified Jones model by 
adjusting the expected change in credit sales. They run the following model for 
each industry year: 
Equation 2-7 
∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑘∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
where: ∆REC denotes changes in receivables and ∆REV changes in revenues. k 
is the coefficient of changes in revenues, capturing the expected changes in 
accounts receivable. 
To apply the modified Jones model, they include the unexpected changes in 
receivable in abnormal accruals. The forward-looking Jones model is as follows: 
Equation 2-8 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1((1 + 𝑘)∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑅_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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where: GR_Sales is the sales growth in next period, which is the difference in sales 
from the current period to the next period scaled by current sales; i is firm and t 
is year; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the residual term, which is treated as abnormal accruals. 
2.3.1.3.3 Performance-adjusted models 
There are several studies showing evidence that firm performance is correlated 
with discretionary accruals (Jeter and Shivakumar 1999; Kasznik 1999; Kothari 
et al. 2005). It has been demostrated that firms have positive (negative) shocks 
to earnings, which lead to positive (negative) discretionary accruals (McNichols 
2000). Therefore, research measuring earnings management needs to take into 
consideration unusual performance because it will significantly affect earnings 
management. 
2.3.1.3.3.1 Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) extend the methodological boundaries by 
proposing an instrumental variables approach to develop an accruals model. 
They develop an accruals model which uses not only sales but also operating 
expenses and cost of goods sold as regressors to mitigate the omitted variables 
problem. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) show that expenses are more likely 
to be related to current liabilities, while revenues are less likely related to be 
related to current liabilities. Consequently, if expenses are omitted, it will lead to 
large positive abnormal accruals. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995)’s model is 
as follows: 
Equation 2-9 
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𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = ∅0 + ∅1(
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + ∅2(
𝐴𝑃𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + ∅3(
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where: ABi,t is the accruals balance of firm i in year t, for which ABi,t= ARi,t + INVi,t 
+ OCAi,t - CLi,t - DEPi,t; ARi,t−1 denotes the receivables of firm i in year t-1; APBi,t−1 
is the aggregated accruals of firm i in year t-1, with APBi,t−1= INVi,t−1 + OCAi,t−1 - 
CLi,t−1; INVi,t−1 is the inventory accruals of firm i at the end of year t-1; OCAi,t−1 is 
other non-cash current asset accruals of firm i in year t-1; CLi,t−1 is current liability 
accruals of firm i at the end of year t-1; EXPi,t−1 denotes the operating expenses 
of firm i in year t-1; GPPEi,t−1 is gross PPE of firm i at the end of year t-1; DEPi,t−1 
is the depreciation expenses of firm i in year t-1. 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) argue that Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995)’s model 
take a different approach compared with previous models by separating 
expenses, revenues and assets. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) also match 
transactions of these variables to the working capital accruals. Compared to the 
modified Jones model, Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995)’s approach is more 
capable of dealing with omitted variables, measurement error and simultaneity 
problems. However, there is limitation in this model related to problems on 
applications designed for the simultaneous equations approach, which restricts 
the ability of other researchers to apply it (Fields et al. 2001). 
2.3.1.3.3.2 The cash-flow model 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that working capital which generally occurs 
within one year is related to cash flow realizations. Therefore, they introduce the 
cash-flow model which focuses on working capital accruals by regressing working 
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capital accruals with past, current and future cash from operations. The cash-flow 
model is presented as follows: 
Equation 2-10 
∆𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 (
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
) + 𝑏2 (
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
) + 𝑏3 (
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where ∆WCi,t is the change in working capital of firm i in year t; CFi,t−1 is cash flow 
from operations of firm i in year t-1; CFi,t cash flow from operations of firm i in year 
t; and CFi,t+1 are cash flow from operations of firm i in year t+1; 
The unknown changes of working capital accruals (residuals) in the cash flow 
model is a proxy of earnings quality, which means a greater unknown changes 
indicates lower earnings quality (Francis and Wang 2008). The cash flow model 
is based on the logic that the level of accuracy in predicting cash flows relates to 
accruals quality (Ronen and Yaari 2008). Therefore, Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
argue that firms will face higher accrual estimation errors if they have high 
variability in cash flows. 
2.3.1.3.3.3 The performance modified model 
Previous research shows evidence that a firm’s past and contemporaneous 
performance are correlated with accruals (Dechow et al. 1995; Guay et al. 1996; 
Healy 1996; Barth et al. 2001), but performance is not controlled in the Jones and 
modified-Jones models. Therefore, these models could be misspecified and 
biased in estimating discretionary accruals if firms experience extreme 
performance, leading to an increased likelihood that discretionary accruals are 
non-zero. Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that there is a need to control for the effect 
of past and current years’ performance (return on assets [ROA]) on estimated 
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discretionary accruals. Therefore, they develop the performance control model, 
using two different approaches employing ROA to further modify the modified 
Jones model. 
The first approach is to add current performance (ROA) or past performance 
(lagged ROA) to the modified Jones model as regressors for calculating normal 
accruals. The first approach is presented as follows: 
Equation 2-11 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: ROAi,t−1 is the profit before extraordinary items of firm i in year t-1 divided 
by the total assets of firm i in year t-1. 
The second approach in controlling for the impact of companies’ performance on 
abnormal accruals is to change the way to calculate companies’ abnormal 
accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) base on the closest ROA to match a target 
company with another company that is in the same year and industry, then 
subtract the target company’s abnormal accruals from the matched company’s 
abnormal accruals. Under this approach, abnormal accruals calculated by the 
modified Jones model, the performance matching model would mitigate 
misspecification in the sample with extreme ROA (Dechow et al. 2010a). 
2.3.1.4 Alternative methodologies 
Previous research shows that aggregate accruals models are widely employed. 
However, there are alternative methodologies that can be employed to 
investigate earnings management (McNichols 2000). The first alternative 
methodology is used to detect managerial discretion through modelling the 
behaviour of a set of accruals or a specific accrual. The studies which engage 
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this methodology usually focus on a specific industry, such as banking (Wahlen 
1994; Cornett et al. 2009; Ahn and Choi 2009), or insurance and property (Beaver 
et al. 2003; Gaver and Paterson 2004). The second alternative methodology is 
called the non-accruals model, which detect earnings management by 
investigating the statistical properties of earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Kerstein and Rai 2007). 
This section discusses the earnings management measures used under such 
approaches. 
2.3.1.4.1 The single account approach 
There is a relatively small body of literature that focus on the single accrual 
approach (McNichols 2000; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Most of the research on 
earnings management relies on total accruals rather than single accruals to 
detect earnings management. However, the single accrual approach is still 
attractive because it shows us how managers engage in earnings management, 
while another approach speculates on how it was done (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Similar to the aggregate (total) accruals research, the specific accruals approach 
decomposes accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary components. 
Some research uses a specific accrual to examine earnings management, such 
as depreciation (Teoh et al. 1998c), deferred tax (Phillips et al. 2003), and bad 
debt provisions (McNichols and Wilson 1988). For example, with debt provision 
research, McNichols and Wilson (1988) examine whether companies with bad 
debts tend to smooth earnings through the provisioning for bad debts or whether 
companies take a bath if the companies have an extremely high or low earnings. 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) employ a regression that the expected provision 
for bad debts is the dependent variable and the independent variables include 
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the write-offs of the current and next periods and the allowance for bad debts. 
Their measure of manipulation accounting is the residual provision for bad debts, 
𝜀𝑡, generated from the following regression: 
Equation 2-12 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑔𝐵𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑊𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Provi,t is the provision for bad debt of firm i in year t; BgBli,t is the beginning 
balance in the allowance for bad debts of firm i in year t; Writeoffi,t is the write-
offs of firm i in year t; Writeoffi,t+1 is the write-offs of firm i in year t; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the 
error of firm i in year t. 
2.3.1.4.2 Set of accounts approach 
Beneish (1997) applies the set of accounts approach to assess the probability of 
earnings management. The author constructs a non-discretionary probit model 
which uses several financial variables, such as accounts payable, inventory and 
receivables. Beneish (1997) examines 15 companies the accounting of which 
was questioned by news media, and 49 companies violating generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), as identified by the United States (US) Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). He compares these companies with 
companies not identified as GAAP violators, but with increasing sales and large 
discretionary accruals. Beneish (1997) finds that the median value of earnings 
inflation on the part of the manipulators (0.099) is significantly higher than that of 
earnings manipulation by the non-manipulators (0.011). 
However, Beneish (1997) concludes that the set of accounts approach has some 
limitations in detecting earnings management. First, the explanatory power of the 
set of accounts approach is low because it is not clear which accruals are used 
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to manipulate earnings. Second, the number of firms among which accruals are 
manipulated is small, thus limiting the generalizability of the findings. 
2.3.1.4.3 Distribution approach 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) develop a non-parametric methodology to 
estimate the earnings’ distribution after engaging in earnings management 
activities. They analyse the earnings’ distribution to identify the occurrence of 
certain earnings numbers. They examine the discontinuities of the earnings 
distribution around three thresholds: a zero-earnings year, a year before earnings 
and analysts’ expectations of current year earnings. They find that, in a company 
with incentives to gain higher earnings than the benchmark, the distributions of 
earnings observations in the year after the earnings management year present 
that fewer observations with earnings are lower than the threshold, while more 
observations with earnings are higher than the threshold.  
However, this methodology still presents some concerns. First, it does not 
address the incentives for management which drive the way in which managers 
choose specific accruals to achieve earnings benchmarks and how they do so. 
Second, this design does not support researchers in isolating the accrual 
components and does not allow them to connect the discretionary component 
with other variables of interest. Finally, it is not applicable for small samples 
(McNichols 2000). 
2.3.2 Real earnings management activities 
There is a large volume of published studies providing the evidence of accrual-
based earnings management. However, recently, real earnings management is 
found to replace accrual-based earnings management by managers (Graham et 
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al. 2005; Bruns and Merchant 2006). There is a reason for this. Whereas, accrual 
earnings management could be easily detected by auditors (Cohen et al. 2008), 
real earnings management helps managers mitigate inspection from auditors and 
regulators. 
Real earnings activities are performed by various means, including: reduce costs  
by decreasing R&D expenses, advertising expenses, sale and administrative 
expenses; reducing the cost per unit sold by rising the numbers of products made; 
increase earnings through sales by reducing the product prices (Roychowdhury 
2006). The models used to detect real earnings activities are as follows. 
2.3.2.1 Discretionary expenses manipulation 
Expenses manipulation is related to unexpected reductions in R&D, advertising 
and selling, general and administrative expenses, etc., for increasing reported 
earnings. Roychowdhury (2006)’s model for estimating normal discretionary 
expenses is as follows: 
Equation 2-13 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where: DISEXP𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of R&D, selling, general and administrative (SG&A) 
and advertising expenses of firm i in year t. Abnormal discretionary expenses are 
the difference between the actual DISEXP𝑖,𝑡 and the normal DISEXP𝑖,𝑡 estimated 
using the coefficients calculated from Equation 2-13. 
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2.3.2.2 Sales manipulation 
Companies could engage in manipulating sales by providing a greater price 
discounts to inflate companies’ earnings. Sales manipulations may lead to 
abnormally low cash flows. The Roychowdhury (2006)’s model for estimating 
normal cash flows from operations is as follows: 
Equation 2-14 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where CF𝑖𝑡 denotes the net operating cash flows of firm i in event year t. Abnormal 
CF is the difference between the actual CF and the normal CF calculated using 
the coefficients calculated from Equation 2-14. 
2.3.2.3 Production cost manipulation 
Production cost manipulation is employed for inflating current earnings. 
Companies could manipulate production activities to rise product units produced 
and thus decrease the cost per unit sold, consequently manipulate earnings. 
Production costs is the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) and the change in 
inventory (∆INV) (Roychowdhury 2006). The equation used to calculate normal 
production costs are as follows: 
Equation 2-15 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where: PROD𝑖,𝑡 denotes the production costs of firm i in event year t, defined as 
the cost of goods sold plus change in inventory in year t;  Abnormal PROD is the 
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difference between the actual PROD and the normal PROD estimated using the 
coefficients calculated from Equation 2-15. 
2.3.3 Benefit and constraints of real and accruals earnings management 
The main benefit of accrual-based earnings management is its low cost of 
management as it occurs when companies exercise judgement in financial 
statement for increasing or reducing accruals, which indirectly affect the 
operating cash flow that the managers reserve for future use later. However, 
there are some constraints on engaging in accrual-based earnings management.  
First, accrual-based earnings management is constrained by observation from 
auditors and regulators (Becker et al. 1998; Graham et al. 2005; Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010). For example, Becker et al. 1998 find that the high quality auditing 
affects the reliability of financial reports and constrains accrual-based earnings 
management. Cohen et al. (2008) find that the level of accrual-based earnings 
management reduced after the period of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). SOX is an 
act that protects outside investors, issued following highly financial scandals. 
Therefore, companies have avoided engaging in accrual-based earnings 
management in the post-SOX period. Second, engaging in accrual-based 
earnings management is restricted by a firm’s accounting flexibility. For example, 
Barton and Simko (2002) find that the probability of firms inflate accrual-based 
earnings management is restricted by the extent to which has been used in 
previous years as the balance sheet accumulates the abnormal accrual from 
previous periods. 
With regard to real earnings management, the benefit is more difficult to track for 
outsiders because it is covered by daily transactions in companies’ business. For 
example, firms change the structuring or timing of a business transaction (Cohen 
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and Zarowin 2010). However, the manipulation of earnings through real activities 
is constrained by economic consequences (Gunny 2010). When a company 
engages in real earnings management, it will suffer long-term costs because real 
earnings management leads to a negative impact on cash flow in next years for 
current year income (Jensen 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010). For 
example, current income is reduced by R&D costs and these expenditures may 
not generate revenues in the current period. The firm may time incurring R&D 
expenditures in the later period to increase current income. Stein (1989) finds 
that managers boost near-term income to influence the firm’s value assessed by 
the market' s current assessment even though they sacrifice total cash flows. In 
a similar vein, Roychowdhury (2006) argues that firms boost total earnings by 
offering price discounts to meet some short-term target, which could lead to lower 
level of cash inflows from sales in next years because customers also expect the 
same low product price in next years. 
This section has attempted to provide a brief summary of the literature related to 
the benefits and constraints of engaging in accrual-based and real earnings 
managements. Recently, many researchers have shown consistent evidence of 
the substitution between accrual-based and real earnings managements, 
depending on the relative benefits and constraints (Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 
2012). Ferentinou and Anagnostopoulou (2016) investigate accrual-based and 
real earnings managements before and after the adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and find evidence that firms switch from 
accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management after IFRS 
adoption, suggesting that companies shift from accrual-based earnings 
management to real earnings management to avoid the legislation risk. In this 
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vein, Chi et al. (2011) find that firms with a low audit quality exhibit lower real 
earnings management than those with a high audit quality. 
In general, therefore, it seems that companies may choose to engage in one type 
of earnings management or both accrual-based and real earnings management 
to supplement each other depending on their circumstances. In the first case, if 
the company’s main concern is economic consequences of engaging in real 
earnings management, it may engage in accrual-based earnings management. 
In the second case, if the company’s main concern is scrutiny from auditors and 
regulators, it may switch from accrual-based earnings management to real 
earnings management. In the third case, if company balances between economic 
consequences of engaging in real earnings management and scrutiny from 
auditors and regulators, it may employ both earnings management to supplement 
each other. Probably, a study investigates only one type of earnings 
management, it could lead to a misconclusion. Therefore, this study will 
investigate both accrual-based and real earnings management. 
For investigating accrual-based earnings management, based on the literature 
review above, this study will employ both Jones and modified Jones models 
because these models are widely used in empirical research (Botsari 2014; 
Botsari and Meeks 2008; Chen et al. 2011b; Dechow et al. 1995; Healy 1985; 
Shivakumar 2000) and remained among the most efficient (Dechow et al. 1995; 
Peasnell et al. 2000). In term of investigating real earnings management, there 
are not many built models to detected real earnings management. The real 
earnings management models developed by (Roychowdhury 2006) to detect real 
earnings activities are widely used in recently empirical research (Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010; Kothari et al. 2012; Zhu and Lu 2013; Farooqi et al. 2017). Therefore, 
this study will employ real earnings management models developed by 
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(Roychowdhury 2006) to investigate whether or not acquirers engage in real 
earnings management prior to a merger announcement.  
2.4 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MOTIVATIONS 
2.4.1 Debt contracts 
Debt contracts are defined as agreements between debt holders and managers 
(Healy and Palepu 1990). Debt contracts are an essential topic in financial 
accounting research as debt-holders often use specific financial covenants to 
regulate companies’ activities. 
There are two main types of debt covenant limitations, which are affirmative 
covenants and negative covenants (Healy and Palepu 1990; Press and Weintrop 
1990; Sweeney 1994). Negative covenants, such as dividend restrictions, try to 
stop companies moving wealth from debtholders to shareholders. In contrast, 
affirmative covenants, such as net worth, interest coverage, and working capital 
covenants, can contain guarantees by borrowing companies. For instance: the 
borrowing companies have to agree to maintain financial ratios, pay taxes and 
insure and maintain assets. 
Debt contracts are motivated by positive accounting theory. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) review and assess positive accounting theory following their 
earlier papers published in 1978 and 1979. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
contributed to the positive accounting literature, bringing an accounting practice 
explanation related to the essentiality of contracting costs. The 1978 study also 
led to the identification of some previously unknown empirical regularities. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978) tried to eliminate some general misconceptions about the 
methodology that appeared in debates. The authors also provided ways of 
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developing positive research in accounting. The most essential of these 
developments comprises tighter connections between the literature and empirical 
studies. A second development is the improvement of models that verify the 
endogeneity among variables in regression analysis. A third development is 
reducing the errors in measurements in both the dependent and independent 
variables in regression models.  
Previous studies show that debt contracts motivate managers to choose an 
accounting method related to earnings manipulation (Holthausen 1981; Healy 
and Palepu 1990; Press and Weintrop 1990; Sweeney 1994; Peltier-Rivest 1999; 
Othman and Zeghal 2006). Othman and Zeghal (2006) examine elements that 
potentially affect earnings manipulation policy in the cases of Anglo-American 
and Euro-Continental accounting models. The researchers test earnings 
manipulation motives using a panel of 1,674 firm-year observations in Canada 
and 1,470 firm-year observations in France. Canada and France are examples 
of different socio-economic environments. The earnings manipulation discovered 
in these nations are impacted by the characteristics of the Euro-Continental and 
Anglo-American environments. They show that the earnings manipulation 
motivations by French companies are connected to tax rate and contractual debt. 
However, companies in Canada have incentives connected to an active capital 
market. In Canadian companies, companies are highly motivated to engage in 
earnings management when those companies issue new shares. 
Holthausen (1981) investigate the correlation between compensation contracts 
of management and the provisions of bond agreements to identify earnings 
management motivations of managers. The author perform empirical research 
focussing on examining the change in depreciation methods. He find the 
evidence that the changing in depreciation methods are related to compensation 
37 
 
contracts and bond covenants. Healy and Palepu (1990) investigate whether 
companies that are close to violating their lending covenants make accounting 
decisions that increase income for avoid cutting dividends. Authors proved that 
despite the accounting flexibility of management, debt covenants are useful tools 
for debtholders to limit companies’ dividend decisions. 
Press and Weintrop (1990) investigate accounting-based limitations in public and 
private debt agreements of 83 random companies in the US. The authors show 
ways of identifying significant accounting-based constraints. This study includes 
a comparison between companies that have accounting-based constraints and 
companies without, finding that these groups are of similar size and have similar 
systematic risk, but present large differences in leverage levels. In all, 83 
companies in the sample have a positive relationship between indicators for the 
existence of a leverage constraint and income strategies.  
Peltier-Rivest and Swirsky (2000) indicate that earnings manipulation is a 
favourite subject of positive accounting research due to its significance for a wide 
range of constituencies. The authors use multivariate regression analysis to 
investigate the determinants of earnings manipulation in 161 healthy companies, 
defined as firms that have not faced a loss for five years in a row. The results 
show that if a healthy company is closer to limitations of the firm’s debt covenant, 
its managers tend to inflate its accruals. Healthy companies also have motives to 
deflate its accruals when involved in negotiations related to labour with their 
unions. The results do not support earnings manipulation based on government 
lobbying or changes in the top executive. These results suggest that the benefits 
from these types of earnings manipulation for healthy companies are too low to 
affect the accounting choices of managers. 
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Beatty and Weber (2003) show the effects of debt contracts on the accounting 
choices of borrowers. They focus on analysing 125 firms that make material 
voluntary accounting method changes from 1995 to 2000. They find evidence 
that when the bank debt contracts allow changes in accounting methods, the 
borrowers are more likely to inflate accruals. They also find that borrowers 
permitted to use voluntary accounting method changes are more likely to engage 
in earnings management if their lending contracts restrict dividend. 
In summary, there is emerging evidence concerning the relationships between 
earnings management and debt contracts, which generally include accounting-
based debt covenants. Managers have motivations to engage in earnings 
management to avoid debt covenant violation or costs related to violating debt 
covenant, which indicates that earnings might be manipulated by company if the 
company has a significant amount of leverage (Houmes and Skantz 2010).  
2.4.2 Compensation 
A number of studies have examined the correlation between firms’ earnings 
management and CEO compensation, CEO compensation contracts or earning-
based bonus awards to identify CEO earnings management incentives. 
Holthausen et al. (1995) examine the present value of bonus payments and 
earnings management. This study expands the research of Healy (1985), 
examining executives’ managerial accounting decisions to increase their 
compensation. The results of Holthausen et al. (1995) are in line with Healy 
(1985), namely that executives deflate earnings if their bonuses reach a highest 
level. However, there is no evidence that executives deflate earnings if the 
earnings are less than the lowest level that executives have a bonus.  
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Guidry et al. (1999) investigate the bonus maximization hypothesis, according to 
which management makes abnormal accruals decisions to maximize short-term 
incentives. The authors use a database of the middle (business unit) 
management and financial reporting of giant conglomerates. Their results are 
consistent with prior research that middle management manipulates income to 
maximize short-term bonus plans.  
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) examine the correlation between earnings 
manipulation and CEO incentives. The “incentive” CEOs are those whose 
compensation is strongly related to firm’s stock prices. These CEOs may inflate 
their firms’ earnings. They use accruals measures with sample publicly held 
corporations and also include financial data based on public findings. The authors 
find that when the CEO compensation is associated with the value of holdings of 
stocks and options, CEOs may manipulate reported earnings. 
Denis et al. (2006) find a significant and positive relationship between securities 
fraud allegations and an executive stock option incentive measure. This 
connection is robust to the inclusion of other compensation structure components 
and other possible factors related to fraud allegations. Furthermore, the authors 
find that this relationship is stronger in companies with higher institutional 
ownership and higher outside block-holders. These results enhance the view that 
stock options motivate managers to choose fraudulent activity and that this 
incentive is motivated by institutional and block ownership. This research 
provides awareness of the complementarities of other corporate governance 
mechanisms. A new incentive problem can be realized by addressing the 
fundamental agency problem between managers and stockholders using stock 
options. These findings show that boards of directors need to balance the positive 
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and negative impacts of option incentives in building optimal compensation 
packages. 
Efendi et al. (2007) examine the motivation leading to the phenomenon of 
restating financial reports. The authors show that the probability of a misstated 
financial report is higher if the CEO holds high volumes of stock options or the 
CEO who is a chairman.  
In summary, the literature documents consistent evidence that CEO 
compensation, especially stock-based compensation, is a determinant of 
earnings management. 
2.4.3 Equity offering 
Firms deploy equity offerings through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) or issuing 
Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). By doing so, they can raise capital, increase 
the number of their shareholders and expand their operational activities in the 
capital markets (Brau and Fawcett 2006). There is a large volume of published 
studies on whether managers employ earnings management activities to create 
positive benefit in reported earnings around the time of equity offerings.  
Aharony et al. (1993) investigate whether firms manipulate earnings prior to 
taking their companies public by selecting accounting conventions. The research 
sample includes 229 industrial firms going public from 1985 to 1987 using both 
univariate and multivariate analyses. The authors use total accounting accruals 
following Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) as proxies for earnings 
management. The study shows that firms selecting reputable underwriters and 
high-quality auditors when going public may exhibit a lower degree of earnings 
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manipulation, while firms with large financial leverage and small firms may 
present a high degree of earnings manipulation.  
Friedlan (1994) investigates the accounting decisions of IPO issuers before 
issuing shares. The author argues that issuers’ wealth is impacted by the share 
price, which is set. Therefore, they have a motivation to maximize their offer price. 
To be able to do so, these issuers often make increasing discretionary accruals 
in their financial reporting to increase their net income prior to issuing shares. 
Friedlan (1994) analyses a sample of 155 IPO firms listed in the US, issuing 
shares with commitment contracts, not including firms in the financial, insurance 
or real estate sectors, from 1981 to 1984. The study finds that IPO issuers engage 
in earnings management before the offerings. Firms issuing interim financial 
reporting undertake income increases in the interim reporting rather than annual 
statements. The results, therefore, suggest that the information in financial 
statements affects IPO offering prices. 
Teoh et al. (1998c) examine the use of accruals earnings management at the 
time of IPO to increase earnings opportunistically. They employ a sample of 1,682 
IPO firms going public from 1980 to 1990 based on financial data available on 
Compustat. They use three proxies for earnings management and perform further 
robustness checks using alternative measures. The first two proxies are gained 
from accruals which measure some expected benchmarks on firms and 
characteristics of the industry. The last proxy uses a score for the probability of 
manipulation of firms using financial ratios. The results suggest that IPO firms 
often have higher positive earnings, returns on sales and abnormal accruals in 
the year of issue relative to non-issuers. In subsequent years, it is followed by 
underperformance of earnings in the long term and negative abnormal accruals. 
In addition, IPO firms tend to use more methods related to income increasing 
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depreciation, as well as providing significantly less for uncollectible account 
receivables in comparison with their matched non-issuers.  
Teoh et al. (1998a) examine the association between IPOs and long-term post-
IPO return underperformance. They use a sample of 1,649 IPO firms from 1980 
to 1992 with available Compustat financial data. They find that the issuers have 
a poor performance in stock return in three years Post-IPOs if they have a high 
level of earnings management. They categorize the issuers into two types. 
Accordingly, the IPO issuers with an aggressive quartile in managing earnings 
experience on average 15–30% worse performance in the three years after for 
reported earnings than those with a conservative quartile in managing earnings. 
These differences are economically and statistically significant for different types 
of specifications. Therefore, this indicates a potential benefit for less aggressive 
earnings management after IPO.  
Roosenboom et al. (2003) investigate the influence of current abnormal accruals 
for the Dutch IPO market. They argue that managers will manage the earnings of 
the company in the first year they go public and not in the first year prior to the 
IPO. The authors use a sample of 37 firms listed on the Parallel Market from 1984 
to 1994. They measure long-term share price performance and accruals before 
and after the IPOs in these companies. They find that when managers tend to 
engage in over-reporting in the first year of going public, in subsequent years the 
returns may be poor.  
Chen et al. (2005) seek to identify the correlation between the audit quality and 
earnings management of IPO firms in Taiwan. They use a sample of 367 new 
issues in the period 1999–2002 in the Taiwan Economic Journal Database. They 
estimate earnings manipulation of those firms using the modified Jones model. 
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Then, they go on to measure audit quality by using auditor type and industry 
specialist. They find that auditor size is related to earnings management. The use 
of big five auditors is negatively correlated to earnings management in the IPO 
year.  
Suzanne and Christine (2006) examine the influence of venture capitalists (VCs) 
on the decision to undertake earnings management in IPO. They analyse a 
sample of 2,630 domestic US IPOs. Their earnings manipulation proxies are 
abnormal accruals estimated and performance-matched accruals by using the 
modified Jones model and restatements. They find the evidence that IPO 
companies with the presence of VCs are linked with a low earnings manipulation. 
The performance of IPO firms monitored by VCs is better than that of firms without 
such monitoring.  
Using a sample of 393 UK IPOs from 1992 to 1999, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
show that IPO companies improve their financial reporting quality to deal with the 
requirement of high financial statement standard by regulators and investors. 
They explain that IPO companies could suffer higher costs for regulators if they 
engage in earnings management.  
Chang et al. (2010) investigate the relation between underwriter reputation and 
the nature of earnings management in IPO firms. They hypothesize that reputable 
underwriters will audit and certify the financial data of IPO firms more carefully to 
restrict any manipulation of earnings and thus protect their reputation. 
Consequently, increases in abnormal accruals in IPO firms underwritten by less 
reputable underwriters may represent the possibility of earnings manipulation. 
The authors use a sample of 2,053 stock offerings for US firms from 1989 to 2003 
and measure the magnitude of earnings management through current 
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discretionary accruals and adjusted discretionary current accruals. They find that 
IPO firms with more reputable underwriters present a low level of aggression in 
earnings management. However, there is an insignificant relation between post-
IPO performance and earnings management in firms with more reputable 
underwriters.  
Lee and Masulis (2011) investigate the participation of financial intermediaries in 
the IPO process and their role in restraining earnings management. The authors 
analyse 1,346 IPOs among US issuers in the SDC New Issue database from 
1993 to 2004. The results suggest that the reduction in earnings management is 
stronger if the company have more reputable venture capital and investment 
banks. This shows that there is a very complementary relation between them 
rather than substitutive. These VC investors and investment banks also enhance 
the certification and monitoring of financial reporting by IPO issuers.  
Armstrong et al. (2009) examine the properties of discretionary accruals around 
IPO. They use a larger dataset employing pre-IPO financial statement information 
for over 1,500 companies. In contrast to previous studies, the results show the 
evidence that earnings manipulation around IPOs is less prevalent and there are 
lower economic and empirical impacts than portrayed in the literature. They find 
that pre-IPO discretionary accruals are reliably negative. Firms with high and low 
discretionary accruals have the same rate of mean reversion in performance. 
These firms also have the same abnormal returns after controlling for cash flow. 
They also investigate the incentives for earnings management in IPO and find 
that executive compensation is reduced when issuers engage in earnings 
management. They finally document that the amount of associated damages and 
the probability of litigation is greater for issuers engaging in earnings 
management.  
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Rangan (1998) examines the relationship between earnings manipulation around 
the time of the SEO and poor performance in post-SEO. This research is based 
on the results of previous studies that companies conducting SEOs experience 
low share prices and negative returns on shares in the post-offering period. The 
author uses 230 SEOs from 1987 to 1990 and finds that earnings manipulation 
during the year around the offering leads both to changes in earnings and market 
adjustment in stock returns in following year. They explain that after the offering, 
companies need to reverse the discretionary accruals, leading to decreased 
earnings. Consequently, the market will react to the earnings decline by 
correcting its valuation errors. They conclude that the offering firms are able to 
manipulate their stock price by managing their earnings. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine earnings behaviour around SEOs for both 
accrual-based and real earnings management activities. The authors use a 
sample of 1,511 completed US offers from SDC New Issue database from 1987 
to 2006. They measure accruals earnings management following Jones (1991) 
and real earnings management following Roychowdhury (2006). The results 
suggest that firms use both real and accrual-based earnings management 
activities around SEOs. They also investigate how accrual earnings management 
and real earnings management effects the operating performance of the firms 
after SEO and find that the reduction in performance is more severe with real 
earnings management than accruals management.  
In conclusion, the majority of the prior research shows evidence that IPO or SEO 
firms have motivations to manipulate their earnings prior to the offering to rise the 
stock price. The size of IPO or SEO firms and the participation of financial 
intermediaries such as investment banks (underwriters) or VCs have different 
effects on the earnings management behaviours of IPO or SEO firms. Also, IPO 
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or SEO firms which engage in earnings management before the offering often 
experience poor share performance in subsequent years. 
2.4.4 Regulation motivations 
There is a large volume of published studies on the effect of regulations on 
earnings management. The literature shows that earnings management is 
motivated by regulation, such as industry-specific regulations, antitrust 
regulations, tax regulations, price control regulations or stock exchange 
regulations. These regulatory rules can put pressure on firms, leading them to 
engage in earnings management. Depending on the regulations, firms could 
report either decreasing or increasing earnings to protect their benefits. 
Cahan (1992) investigates the correlations between monopoly-related antitrust 
investigations and the reporting of firms’ earnings. The author analyses 48 firms 
investigated from 1970 to 1983 for monopoly-related violations. The results 
suggest that managers adjust earnings using discretionary accruals to deal with 
monopoly-related antitrust investigations. Management tends to decrease the 
probability of an unfavourable ruling and associated costs by using accounting 
procedures to report abnormally low income. 
Collins et al. (1995) analyse the relation between bank-specific regulation in 
making capital-raising decisions and financial reporting and/or tax incentives. The 
research is based on analysing a sample of 160 banks with available data from 
1971 to 1991 from Bank Compustat annual data files. The authors find that 
profitable banks engage in earnings management using loan loss provisions. 
Banks with high (low) growth issue common stocks consistent with capital (tax) 
management.  
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Cahan et al. (1997) investigate earnings management among chemical firms in 
response to environmental regulations in 1979, when Congress was considering 
enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response. They use a sample of 43 
firms with the potential for being subjected to cost exposure resulting from the 
regulations and use several continuous measures to measure the political costs 
resulting from the legislation. They find that these firms present significant 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals in 1979, but not in the preceding year. 
The results suggest that firms subject to the greatest harm from legislation will 
tend to take drastic measures to reduce the effect to the minimal level.  
Key (1997) examines political cost theory by analysing the cable television 
industry within the period of Congressional scrutiny. Discretionary accruals are 
applied to measure earnings management. The author finds that income-
decreasing accruals in the companies for which the proposed regulations are 
expected to be more catastrophic are higher than in others.  
Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) study the correlation between litigation events, 
managers’ accounting choices and the possibility of large damage awards. They 
hypothesize that the level of damage awards is a function of reported net worth 
and net income. The correlation between net income and net worth drives 
management to manipulate accounting numbers. Therefore, managers have the 
motivation to engage in earnings management. The sample in their paper 
includes all selected firms belonging to the top 20 largest oil companies in terms 
of total assets in the Compustat data file during the period 1974 and 1992. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that oil companies facing large damage 
awards manage non-working capital accruals downward relative to other oil 
companies.  
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Magnan et al. (1999) investigate whether Canadian firms launching an 
antidumping complaint against foreign competitors reduce reported earnings 
during the period of investigation by the Canadian External Trade Tribunal. The 
sample data consist of 17 Canadian firms involved in 14 antidumping 
investigations during the period 1976 to 1992. The results of the study indicate 
that during the period of investigation of antidumping, the reported earnings of 
Canadian firms significantly decrease.  
Patten and Trompeter (2003) investigate the correlation between pre-event 
environmental disclosure and the degree of earnings manipulation as a result of 
a regulatory threat. The sample includes 40 companies likely to be affected by 
regulatory threat arising from the chemical leak at Union Carbide’s Bhopal plant 
in India in December 1984. The results show remarkable negative discretionary 
accruals for all companies in the sample.  
Bowman and Navissi (2003) examine the correlation between abnormal returns 
and earnings management in relation to price control regulations which control 
increases in commodity price for manufacturing firms. They find that firms engage 
in income-decreasing accruals to obtain approval for the commodity price 
increase. The results also show that firms turn towards more aggressive practices 
in engaging in income-decreasing accruals if they are affected most negatively 
by the price control regulations.  
Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca (2005) study the accounting policy of Spanish 
electricity firms under the impact of price regulation. According to the political cost 
hypothesis, an increase in the tariff leads to reductions in reported earnings. The 
empirical data for this research include all electricity firms in Spain quoted in the 
period 1991–2001. Discretionary accruals are used to proxy managers’ 
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accounting discretion. The results of this study confirm the effect of political costs 
on the accounting policy of firms. 
Garrod et al. (2007) aim to identify which economic incentives modify political 
costs affecting accounting choices. This research uses a sample of 25,740 small 
private firms in Slovenia, within which 96.446% have a maximum of 10 owners. 
The results of this study identify that profitable companies are unable to reduce 
current corporate tax, even though they manage earnings downward. The reason 
is the increased possibility of a tax audit, constraining the elimination of the tax. 
Moreover, this political cost also encourages companies without tax obligations 
in the current period to adopt earning-increasing accounting policies.  
In summary, there is emerging evidence that regulation is a determinant of 
earnings management. Most the research on the impact of regulation on earnings 
management investigates a particular industry, such as: the relation between 
bank-specific regulation and financial reporting and/or tax incentives (Collins et 
al. 1995), earnings management among chemical firms in response to 
environmental regulations in 1979 (Cahan et al. 1997), the accounting policy of 
Spanish electricity companies under the impact of price regulation (Gill-de-
Albornoz and Illueca 2005).  
2.4.5 Earnings benchmarks 
Earnings benchmarks have been used as essential reference points for firms’ 
financial information by stakeholders to evaluate performance and firms’ financial 
position. Therefore, managers attempt to meet or beat earnings benchmarks to 
avoid a negative effect on stock performance or reputation of management. To 
be specific, if the earnings expected by stakeholders fall short of the desired 
threshold, firms tend to manipulate earnings to meet the earnings benchmarks. 
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There is a body of research that finds firms manipulate earnings to meet or beat 
various earnings benchmarks in a range of ways, such as: (i) avoiding reporting 
decreases in earnings; (ii) avoiding reporting losses; (iii) meeting analysts’ 
forecasts. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that the companies can manipulate their 
earnings in financial reports to minimize losses and avoid reducing in earnings. 
They find that around 30–44% of companies having slight negative pre-managed 
earnings engage in earnings management to have a positive earnings report. 
They explain that the reason for avoiding decreases in earnings and minimizing 
losses is that the firms wish to avoid costs related to transactions with 
stakeholders because if firms report a decrease in earnings, they could face high 
costs.  
Degeorge et al. (1999) examine the correlation between earnings thresholds and 
earnings management. They find clear evidence that firm’s earnings 
management is driven by three thresholds: (i) reporting positive profits; (ii) 
sustaining recent performance; (iii) meeting analysts’ expectations. The results 
also show that the firm's priority is to show positive profits, then to report quarterly 
profits at least equal to the profits in the same quarter in the previous year and 
finally to meet analysts’ expectations. In addition, they find that the future 
performance of firms that just meet these thresholds will be lower than that of less 
suspect control firms. 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds that managers using real earnings management to 
minimize losses. Specifically, author shows that managers use price discounts to 
temporarily increase sales, overproduction to lower the cost of goods sold and 
cutting down abnormal expenses to improve profit margins. The author also finds 
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other factors that affect real earnings manipulation, such as inventory and 
receivables. They also find that companies manipulate real earnings 
management to meet analysts’ forecasts.  
Huang et al. (2012) study the relationship between the age of the CEO and the 
quality of financial reporting of companies. The quality of financial reporting in this 
paper is based on meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts and financial 
manipulation. The authors hypothesize that older CEOs are related to higher 
quality financial reports. This research uses a sample of 3,414 companies from 
2005 to 2008 and finds a positive relationship between CEO age and financial 
reporting quality. In particular, the researchers find that CEO age has a negative 
association with companies meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
financial manipulation. These results suggest that older CEOs are less likely to 
manipulate earnings in meeting or beating analysts’ earnings predictions and 
older CEOs are less likely to be linked to financial manipulation.  
In general, the existing literature documents that firms engage in earnings 
management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, such as prior years’ 
earnings, zero earnings and analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
2.4.6 Mergers and acquisitions motivation for earnings management 
The literature finds consistent evidence that prior to a share for share bid, firms 
manage earnings to inflate share prices so that they can pay less for M&A deals 
(Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Koumanakos et al. 2005; Gong et al. 
2008; Botsari and Meeks 2008). The literature review of earnings management 
motivated by M&A will be presented in Section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3. 
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To summarize, there are many motivations of earnings management. This thesis 
focuses on earnings management motivated by M&A activities. Previous 
research (Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow et al. 2011; Amiram et al. 2015) argues that 
earnings management models are subject to criticism, so it is important to know 
whether the existing evidence indeed suggests the presence of earnings 
management or is it just the result of measurement errors. Therefore, this study, 
first, applies Benford’s Law to reinvestigate the earnings management of 
acquirers prior to a merger announcement. Second, this study extends on the 
literature by investigating the effect of board connections and CEO characteristics 
on earnings management prior to the merger announcement. 
2.5 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
2.5.1 Mergers and acquisitions definition 
Financial Reporting Standard 102 (FRS-102) includes accounting practices, 
encompassing the regulations with respect to business combinations beginning 
on or after 1 January 2015. The definition of merger in FRS-102 is as follows: 
“A business combination is the bringing together of separate entities or 
businesses into one reporting entity. The result of nearly all business 
combinations is that one entity, the acquirer, obtains control of one or more 
other businesses, the acquiree. The acquisition date is the date on which 
the acquirer obtains control of the acquiree”.  
The general idea of FRS-102 is that a business combination constitutes the 
combining of many different independent companies into a distinct company, 
which results from the uniting or taking control over assets or operation of one 
entity by another. FRS 102 also mentions that M&A may be affected by the 
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transfer of equity, cash or mixture. The M&A transactions might be between the 
shareholders of one entity or combining with the shareholders of another entity. 
Acquirers may also establish a new entity to control the merger. 
2.5.2 Methods of payments 
There are three methods for conducting takeover transactions: cash, stock for 
stock exchange, or a mixture of these. Each method has its pros and cons.  
Under the cash method, the first advantage is that there is no change in the level 
of control in the company for the acquirer’s shareholders. This is important when 
the shareholders in acquiring companies want to maintain their control (Jensen 
1991; Faccio and Masulis 2005). Second, using cash as the payment method is 
simple and precise, creating the opportunity of success. The other two ways carry 
uncertainty about the true values and therefore cash payment, with its real value, 
has a high probability to be chosen by vendors, especially in volatile markets 
(Travlos 1987; Loughran and Vijh 1997). However, payment by cash still has 
some disadvantages related to tax. The target shareholders may be subject to 
paying capital gains tax (CGT) (Hansen 1987). They have to pay when the gains 
are realized at a rate depending on the specific country. In contrast, in share 
transactions, when the target shareholders receive shares from the acquiring 
companies, their investment gain is considered to be unrealized and they are not 
liable to pay CGT at that time. They can defer tax payment until the time of the 
sale of the new shares if they earn a capital gain in total. 
Turning to payment by shares, there are some advantages. First, the target 
shareholders who receive shares in acquiring transactions can defer CGT as the 
investment gain is unrealised (Hansen 1987; Faccio and Masulis 2005). Second, 
target shareholders have to share the risk with the acquirer’ shareholders if the 
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target is overvalued (Hansen 1987). Third, from the view of the acquirer, there is 
no immediate effect on the cash outflow. In contrast, it is also important for the 
firm to consider the capital structure and dilution of existing shareholders’ position 
(Faccio and Masulis 2005). Finally, using shares can improve the price/ earnings 
(P/E) ratio. Arnold (2005) conclude that the share price can increase even though 
there is no economic gain from the merger. 
Regarding a mixture of cash and share payment, the main advantage of this 
payment method is that the acquirers can share risk of the acquisition with the 
target shareholders. The percentage of share payment in the mixture of share 
and cash payment shows the extent of confidence on the part of the management 
of the acquirers in evaluating the benefits of the acquisition. 
The choice of payment method depends entirely on acquirers’ and targets’ 
motivation and legal protection for investors. With regard to acquirers’ and 
targets’ interests, Erickson and Wang (1999) state that in M&A, the management 
has an incentive to increase the price of the acquirers’ share by managing the 
pre-merger reported earnings in upward trends to be able to acquire the target at 
a lower price for stock mergers. In terms of legal protection for investors, in 
countries with less legal protection for investors, selling firms choose cash for the 
takeover to avoid becoming minority shareholders. Accordingly, there is more 
cash-financed deals and less share-financed deals in such nations. 
2.5.3 Motives for mergers and acquisitions 
2.5.3.1 Synergy and monopolistic power 
The synergy motive is when the purpose of M&A is to create a new combined 
firm such that the value and performance of the new merged company will be 
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greater than that of the acquiring and target companies operating independently 
(Bradley et al. 1988; Seth et al. 2000). Three types of synergy motive have been 
classified in the literature: operational synergy, managerial synergy and financial 
synergy. 
2.5.3.1.1 Operating synergy 
Economies of scale and scope or monopolistic power could be major 
determinants of the operational synergy motive. The unit cost of production will 
decrease when a firm reaches certain economies of scale (Sudarsanam 2003). 
Therefore, a combination of several product lines in two firms helps to produce 
products which are less cost than those products are separately produced in the 
acquiring and target companies. Regarding economies of scope, the new 
combined firm can achieve economies by using assets or skills from target firms 
which were already employed to make a special product or service (Berger et al. 
1999; Lewis and Webb 2007). In terms of monopolistic power, the new combined 
firm can be formed based on the desire of acquirers to create market power 
(Stigler 1964). Therefore, the new combined firm can reduce industry competition 
and in less competitive markets the new firm can increase the prices of its 
products and services, thus increasing the shareholders’ wealth (Blair and 
Harrison 1993). 
The operational synergy motive is supported by the results of some empirical 
studies. Trautwein (1990) studies theories of acquisition motivations and 
connects them to prescriptions for acquisition strategies. They finding evidence 
supporting theories of valuation, managerial empire building and process effects, 
rather than those related to efficiency gains or monopolistic power. Moreover, 
Mukherjee et al. (2004) research the motives for mergers as well as divestitures 
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and the methods used to value targets from 1990 to 2001. The survey result 
shows that the primary motive for mergers is to achieve operating synergies, 
whereas the primary reason for divestitures is to enhance focus. The evidence 
also shows that most companies believe diversification is a reasonable 
motivation for mergers, which are a tool for reducing losses during economic 
crisis.  
2.5.3.1.2 Managerial motive 
The managerial synergy motive can arise when acquirers have an efficient 
management team. In this case, acquirers can buy the right to control (and 
manage) targets with inefficient managers (Manne 1965). Since such acquirers 
create managerial synergy by controlling the inefficient firm, they may able to 
prevent the possibility of bankruptcy for the inefficient target and create wealth 
for both the acquirer and target shareholders.  
Lang et al. (1989) are among the empirical studies on the managerial synergy 
motive. They use a sample of successful tender offers and find that stockholders 
of acquiring firms with high Tobin’s Q receive higher benefits than stockholders 
of acquiring firms with low Tobin’s Q. In contrast, stockholders of targets with low 
Tobin’s Q can receive higher benefits than stockholders of targets with high 
Tobin’s Q. The results of this study are consistent with the view that mergers of 
poorly managed targets and well-managed acquirers bring high total gains. The 
results also show that well-managed targets receive fewer benefits than poorly 
managed targets in acquisitions.  
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2.5.3.1.3 Financial motive 
Financial synergy can arise when the acquisitions results in a lower cost of capital 
for the newly merging company. There are various types of financial synergy 
motive. First, the cost of capital of the newly merging firm is reduced by gaining 
the benefits of debt financing such as tax savings (Graham 2000). For example, 
if there is any unused debt capacity in target firms or acquirers, consequently, the 
newly merging company have a much higher debt capacity. Therefore, the newly 
merging firm could gain various tax benefits. Second, there will be more 
resources resulting from the new combination when the acquirer or target firms 
have plenty of financial resources (Sudarsanam et al. 1996). 
Shih (1994) introduces a model demonstrating a tax motivation for conglomerate 
acquisitions. Conglomerate acquisitions are mergers between companies in 
which one firm has poor projected performance in the future; the other tends to 
overperform. According to the author, by combining such companies into 
common taxable firms, conglomerate mergers bring various tax benefits. First, 
they enhance the opportunity for tax write-offs in the future and the credits will be 
put to use immediately in full rather than deferred as less valuable tax loss carry-
forwards. Second, such mergers reduce the chance that tax write-offs and credits 
are permanently lost because of bankruptcy. Finally, they increase the possibility 
of writing off the interest on the additional debt. There is empirical evidence that 
supports these hypotheses. The changes to US tax law in 1981 and 1986 
encouraged and discouraged acquisition activity respectively. Cross-sectional 
testing of US acquisitions shows that acquisitions tend to enhance the combined 
leverage when the incomes of joining companies are less highly correlated. Non-
tax-related bankruptcy expenses are not explicitly modelled, but companies with 
high potential tax write-offs and credits are likely to have a lower preference for 
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leverage. As a result, in many cases the diminishing bankruptcy risk is not a 
motivation for conglomerate mergers, but full use of tax write-offs is such a 
motive. 
Fluck and Lynch (1999) propose a theory of mergers and divestitures wherein the 
motivations for mergers lie in the inability for a company to be marginally 
profitable. A merger can be used as a tool to resolve the difficulties of financing 
when a company stands alone. A conglomerate merger can help the company to 
obtain financial resources and survive in periods of distress. If the profitability of 
the company improves and the need for financing ends, the acquirer divests its 
assets to reduce coordination expenses.  
2.5.3.2 The agency hypothesis 
Agency theory is a fundamental proposition in modern corporate finance 
literature. Managers primarily make decisions to benefit themselves, even if these 
decisions could lead to destroying the wealth of shareholders (Jensen 1986). In 
the M&A context, the incumbent managers are motivated to implement takeovers 
by their self-interest (Goergen and Renneboog 2004). For example, acquirer 
managers may primarily make decisions that provide them with more prestige 
and power, based on diversification, size and growth (Guidry et al. 1999), while 
shareholders are more likely to be interested in the actions that help increase 
their stock prices and the profitability of their firm. 
The agency motive is supported by the evidences of various empirical research. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) show that acquirer managers take over the 
target that enhances the dependence of the merger firms on their own skills and 
knowledge, even when such M&A can reduce the wealth of the acquirers’ 
shareholders. For example, “specialist” acquirer managers are more likely to 
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acquire target firms which are in their own lines of business, so that the future 
prospects of the combined firm continuously depend on their “specialist” 
knowledge and skills. 
Hartzell et al. (2004) are motivated by agency conflict problems in mergers and 
acquisitions. They study the benefits received by CEOs of target firms in M&A. 
The authors find that benefits received CEOs of target firms increase and are 
almost from share. CEOs also receive financial benefits at last-minute when the 
board of directors approve the mergers, e.g. an increase 12% in their golden 
parachutes and 28% in additional cash bonuses. Researchers show that last-
minute cash payments positively correlate to the prior excess compensation of 
CEOs of target firms and these kinds of payments is an import factor in 
negotiating M&A. This study also finds that target stockholders receive lower 
merger benefits in the case that includes large payment to CEO. 
2.5.3.3 The Hubris hypothesis 
The hubris motive proposes that M&A activities are motived by overconfidence 
and overestimating the gains from M&A. Therefore, the takeovers may take place 
and there might be an overpayment for the targets. Consequently, the synergy 
gain is zero (Roll 1986). The hubris hypothesis is also explained by the “winners 
curse” theory, which describes that the winning acquirers suffer a high cost for 
paying target firms that have a low value (DePamphilis 2009). The reason is that 
there are many companies take place in the auction, it leads to be more 
complicated in valuating target’ value. Consequently, the winner might pay a 
higher price than target’s the actual value.  
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) explain the wealth experience of the acquirer and target 
shareholders regarding the synergy and ownership structure while controlling for 
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the acquire dynamics variables. The results prove that combination between 
companies with a supportive of liquidity slack and surplus investment chances 
creates value for shareholders from both sides. However, when highly evaluated 
companies buy less highly evaluated targets, the acquirer shareholders 
experience wealth decreases while target shareholders experience wealth 
increases. This finding is consistent with acquiring management’s acting out of 
hubris. 
Mathew and Hambrick (1997) investigate the role of a CEO’s hubris in explaining 
the large premiums paid for M&A. The authors use a sample of 106 large merger 
transactions from 1989 to 1992 and find that four indicators of CEO exaggerated 
self-confidence have a strong relationship with the size of the premium paid. The 
indicators are the recent performance of the acquirer, CEO’s press coverage, an 
evaluation how importance of CEO in company and an indicator which combines 
these factors. They find that the correlation between CEO hubris and premiums 
is more significant when a low percentage of internal directors are not in board. 
They also find that acquirers face higher losses if CEO hubris and merger 
premiums are high. As a result, CEO hubris has its practical consequences and 
exerts a great influence on strategic behaviour. 
Mueller and Sirower (2003) provide support for hypotheses concerning how 
acquisitions increase or do not increase the acquirers’ and targets’ values. The 
study conducts a method based on using the losing and gaining distribution over 
company samples and tests these distributions under four hypotheses regarding 
the causes of acquisitions: (i) the hubris hypothesis; (ii) the managerial discretion 
hypothesis; (iii) the synergy hypothesis; (iv) the market-for-corporate-control 
hypothesis. Mueller and Sirower (2003) use data from 168 acquisitions from 1978 
to 1990 to test these four hypotheses. Their evidences are in line with the hubris 
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and managerial discretion hypotheses and some evidences are also in line with 
the market-for-corporate-control hypothesis. 
Taken together, it seems that the agency hypothesis is the best relevant 
explanation for the research questions of this study “why do acquirers manipulate 
their earnings prior to a merger announcement?” and “why do CEOs with different 
characteristics manipulate earnings management in different ways”. According to 
agency theory, managers make decisions on M&A to benefit themselves by 
providing them with more prestige and power, even if these decisions could lead 
to destroying the wealth of shareholders (Jensen 1986). Louis (2004) prove that 
earnings management of acquirers prior to M&A leads to post-merger 
underperformance anomaly. Gong et al. (2008) find that there is a positive 
association between post-merger announcement lawsuits and share-financed 
acquirers’ earnings management prior to a merger announcement. 
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3 CHAPTER 3: REVISITING THE EVIDENCE OF EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT PRIOR TO MERGER ANNOUNCEMENTS: AN 
APPLICATION OF BENFORD’S LAW 
Abstract 
This chapter revisits the evidence suggesting share-financed acquirers engage 
in earnings management prior to announcing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
deals to minimize the cost of the transactions. Given that earnings management 
models are subjected to criticism, it is important to know whether the existing 
evidence indeed suggests the presence of earnings management or is it just the 
result of measurement errors. Applying Benford’s Law to study a sample of 295 
observations of public acquirers in UK from 2007 to 2012, the chapter confirms 
existing evidence that while cash-financed acquirers do not manage earnings 
prior to merger announcements, share-financed acquirers exhibit significantly 
high abnormal accruals and abnormal real earnings activities in the first year prior 
to merger announcements. This chapter makes a contribution by showing that 
the first digits of figures reported in the financial statements of share-financed 
acquirers in the year preceding the merger announcement are distributed 
remarkably differently from what might be expected under Benford’s Law. 
Therefore, the evidence suggests these financial statements might have been 
manipulated, significantly mitigating concerns regarding possible errors in 
measuring abnormal earnings and strengthening the important conclusion that 
share-financed acquirers do indeed manage earnings before announcing an 
M&A deal. 
Key words: Accrual-based earnings management, Real earnings management, 
Benford’s Law, M&A.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In a stock swap M&A deal, the acquirer uses stock to pay the target’s 
shareholders. The acquirer and target often first negotiate and agree on the 
purchase price (value) of the target firm. However, the number of shares issued 
by the acquiring firm to pay for the target will only be determined in the future 
based on the acquiring firm’s share price on or near the takeover agreement date. 
Because the acquiring firm’s stock price is inversely related to the exchange ratio, 
if the price of the acquiring firm’s share by the agreement date is higher, the 
acquirer will need to issue fewer shares to pay for the deal, which means the cost 
of the deal is cheaper from the acquirer’s point of view. Therefore, if an M&A deal 
is financed by shares, the acquirer will have a financial motive to seek ways of 
boosting their share price prior to the takeover. Engaging in income-increasing 
earnings management could be one of the solutions.  
Several studies have examined whether acquiring firms engage in income-
increasing earnings management prior to a merger announcement. Louis (2004) 
uses an accrual model to estimate unexplained accruals, which is used as a proxy 
for earnings management. The author finds that acquirers tend to overstate their 
profits by reporting positive abnormal accruals in the period before share-
financed M&A announcements. Botsari and Meeks (2008) use the Jones and 
modified Jones models to detect earnings management of acquirers prior to a 
stock swap announcement in the UK. They find that acquirers exhibit abnormally 
high income-increasing accruals in one year prior to the merger announcement, 
suggesting that they inflate earnings before the merger announcement. Higgins 
(2013) investigates the earnings management of acquirers prior to a stock swap 
announcement in the Japanese market using the Jones and modified Jones 
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models. Consistent with the literature, the author finds that acquirers have 
abnormally high long-term positive accruals prior to the merger announcement.  
In addition to accruals earnings management, the literature also documents that 
acquiring firms may structure real business transactions (real earnings 
management) to inflate earnings before a merger announcement. For example, 
Zhu and Lu (2013) have investigated whether or not share-financed acquirers 
manipulate real earnings activities prior to the merger announcement. Using 
abnormal discretionary expenditure, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
cash flow as proxies for real earnings management, the authors find that share-
financed acquirers try to boost their firms’ market value prior to the merger 
announcement by engaging in real earnings management activities. Similar to 
Zhu and Lu (2013), Farooqi et al. (2017) investigate whether or not share-
financed acquirers in the US manipulate both accruals and real earnings 
activities. They find that share-financed bidder firms engage in increasing income 
through both accrual-based and real earnings management. In general, it is 
relatively well established in the existing literature that share-financed acquirers 
inflate earnings prior to a merger announcement. 
The common features of prior studies on earnings management before merger 
announcement is that they are based on accruals-based earnings management 
models and Roychowdhury’s (2006) real earnings management models. Most of 
accrual-based models treat abnormal accruals as evidence of earnings 
management (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005). Despite the 
existence of a large number of competing models used to detect accrual-based 
earnings management, Dechow et al. (1995) and Peasnell et al. (2000) indicate 
that the Jones model and its modified versions (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) 
remain among the most efficient. 
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However, there are limitations to the effectiveness of these models (Dechow et 
al. 2012). Dechow et al. (1995) show that if the samples contain firms with 
extreme financial performance, the Jones and modified Jones models are often 
misspecified. In line with Dechow et al. (1995), McNichols (2000) shows that if 
the samples include firms with extreme forecasts for long-term earnings growth, 
testing earnings management is also misspecified if the Jones and modified 
Jones models are used. To reduce model misspecification, Kothari et al. (2005) 
construct a performance-matching procedure to reduce performance-related 
misspecification by matching each firm with controls having closest returns on 
assets. However, Dechow et al. (2012) argue that the performance-matching 
approach also has a limitation, such as it reduces test power because the 
matching procedure needs control observations. Dechow et al. (2010b) argue 
that abnormal accruals might be a noisy proxy for earnings management because 
they could contain errors and biases and there is no realistic way of completely 
eliminating such noise. Ball (2013) and Gerakos and Kovrijnykh (2013) also 
express concern that in using abnormal accruals, earnings management tends to 
appear everywhere and at implausibly large magnitude. Many other prominent 
criticisms of the use of abnormal accruals models, such as the Jones and 
modified Jones, can be found, for example, in Holthausen et al. (1995), Fields et 
al. (2001), Ball (2013) and Owens et al. (2013a). 
In terms of the models used to detect potential real earnings management 
activities, real earnings management studies estimate abnormal levels of 
business activities through various expectations models. Specifically, prior 
studies have developed models to measure normal levels of discretionary 
expenditure (Berger 1993; Perry and Grinaker 1994; Gunny 2005; Roychowdhury 
2006; Cohen et al. 2008), production costs (Dechow et al. 1998; Roychowdhury 
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2006) and cash flows from operations (Roychowdhury 2006). The residuals of 
these expectations models are abnormal levels of business activities. The 
limitation of those expectations models is similar to that of accruals detecting 
models, which require large volumes of data to run cross-sectional and time-
series regressions. Dechow et al. (1995) argue that discretionary accrual-based 
models typically require hundreds of observations to gain a reasonable chance 
to detect subtle earnings management. Especially in M&A research, samples 
tend to be small. Thus, data constraints could limit the application of expectations 
models (Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow et al. 2011; Amiram et al. 2015). 
In general, with the current state of the earnings management literature, 
accounting researchers have had to rely on the Jones and modified Jones models 
for decades in detecting accrual-based earnings management and in recent 
years the expectations models developed by Roychowdhury (2006)  for detecting 
real earnings management, but all of the obtained evidence is subject to a 
growing concern that the key conclusions might actually have little to say about 
true earnings management behaviour. The evidence that acquirers inflate 
earnings prior to stock swap announcement, as mentioned above, is no 
exception. 
It is already apparent that these acquirers exhibit high abnormal accruals and real 
earnings activities prior to a merger announcement, but whether this is evidence 
of earnings management or is purely the results of misspecifications of earnings 
management models remains an unanswered question. One direction in 
mitigating such concern is to use alternative proxies for earnings management to 
test the existing evidence. Ex-post measures of earnings management (e.g. 
publicly announced instances of earnings restatements or violations of GAAP) 
are good alternatives because they typically have low Type I error. However, the 
67 
 
samples used with such ex-post measures, are often small, and thus it is not 
possible to use only ex-post measures of accrual-based earnings management 
in the context of M&A research.  
This research applies recent methodology to measure an alternative empirical 
proxy for both accrual-based and real earnings management based on Benford’s 
Law. This law that predicts that the first digits of figures in many datasets are 
distributed in a systematic way such that smaller values are more likely to occur 
than larger values. For example, Benford's Law predicts that the first digit of 
figures reported in a firm’s financial statement is most likely to be 1, and least 
likely to be 9. The law’s author (Newcomb 1881) builds an equation to determine 
the probability that a number (1, 2,…, 9) is on the first digit, n, is as follows: 
Equation 3-1 
Probability(the first digit is n) = Log10(n + 1) − Log10(n) 
where n = 1, 2, …, 9. This equation provides the theoretical distribution of the first digits 
1 through 9, which is presented in Table 3-1 as follows:  
Table 3-1: The first digit distributions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0.301 0.1761 0.1249 0.0969 0.0792 0.0669 0.058 0.0512 0.0458 
Therefore, if the actual distribution of the first digits of figures in a firm’s financial 
statements differs too greatly from the theoretical distribution depicted by 
Benford’s Law, the financial statements might have been manipulated.  
Amiram et al. (2015) propose an approach to detect earnings management by 
developing a score, namely the FSD_SCORE and the KSMAX, based on 
Benford’s Law. The FSD_SCORE is designed to capture the deviation between 
the actual distribution of the first digits of items reported in financial statements 
and the expected distribution from Benford’s Law. The KSMAX is designed to 
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capture the maximum of cumulative absolute deviations between the distribution 
of the first digits of the reported figures in the financial statement and the 
theoretical distribution from Benford’s Law. Amiram et al. (2015) find that earnings 
management correlates with the FSD_SCORE and the KSMAX by (1) running 
univariate analysis by separating firm-years into terciles based on Benford’s Law 
proxies and estimating the means of accrual-based earnings management 
proxies for each tercile and (2) running multivariate analysis on the relation 
between Benford’s Law proxies and accruals-based earnings management 
proxies.  
Using Benford’s Law approach to proxy for earnings management has the 
advantage that it does not suffer from the model misspecification issues in the 
Jones model, modified Jones model and the expectations models developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006); hence if evidence obtained from using Benford’s Law 
approach is in line with that obtained using the Jones model, the modified Jones 
model and the expectations models developed by Roychowdhury (2006), it will 
significantly reinforce the conclusions that earnings management had indeed 
occurred. 
The paper uses a sample of 295 M&A deals from public acquirers in the UK 
acquirers between 2007 and 2012, of which 62 are share-financed and 233 are 
cash-financed. Using the Benford’s Law approach, the study finds that share-
financed acquirers have a higher FSD_SCORE and KSMAX in the year prior to 
a merger announcement, suggesting their financial statements might have been 
manipulated. Using the Jones and modified Jones models and the expectations 
models developed by Roychowdhury (2006), it finds that share-financed 
acquirers engage in accrual and real earnings management in the first year prior 
to announcing the deal, which is in line with the extant literature. However, under 
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either approach, there is no evidence suggesting that cash-financed acquirers 
inflate their earnings prior to announcing M&A deals. Therefore, the evidence 
suggests that the existing findings showing that share-financed acquirers exhibit 
high abnormal accruals are more attributable to earnings management than to 
abnormal accruals model misspecifications. 
Based on the best knowledge available, this chapter is the first apply Benford’s 
Law to study earnings management in the context of M&A. Evidence is presented 
that acquirers exhibit large deviations of first digits from Benford’s Law in one 
year prior to a merger announcement, suggesting that acquirers manipulate 
earnings. The results also provide further evidence using existing accrual-based 
earnings management models (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) and real 
earnings management models (Roychowdhury 2006). In general, my evidence 
reassures that the practice of managing earnings prior to a share for share bid by 
the acquirer is firmly evidenced. This is an important contribution because of 
using an innovatively new model which effectively addresses the weakest point 
of the existing evidence. The research provides important reassurance on 
previously documented evidence that share-financed acquirers are associated 
with high abnormal accruals and high levels of real activities are indeed driven by 
their motivation to inflate earnings rather than a result of model misspecification. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a discussion 
of the literature and hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the procedures employed 
to select the sample. Section 3.4 describes the main methodologies. The 
empirical results and robustness tests are reported in Section 3.5 and Section 
3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes. 
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1 Earnings management prior to the merger announcement and the 
inconclusive conclusions 
Share-financed acquirers might want to inflate their earnings to increase their 
stock price prior to announcing deals; as a result, they can reduce the cost of the 
deals as they have to issue fewer shares to pay for the targets. Substantial 
evidence has been documented suggesting earnings management. Erickson and 
Wang (1999) investigate whether both stock- and cash-financed acquirers use 
earnings management to enhance their stock prices before a merger 
announcement. The authors use a sample of completed share- and cash-
financed mergers from 1985 to 1990 and find that share-financed acquiring 
companies manipulate earnings upwards before the date of the acquisition 
agreement by examining abnormal accruals calculated using the Jones model. 
The evidence also shows that accounting manipulation by acquiring firms is 
positively related to the size of the deal.  
Louis (2004) examines whether acquirers manipulate earnings to explain the 
well-documented abnormally poor post-merger performance. The author uses a 
discretionary current accruals model, the Healy (1985) model, to estimate 
unexplained accruals and finds that share-financed acquirers tend to overstate 
their earnings in the period before the acquisition announcement. He also finds 
that the share price of the acquirer is reversed post-merger in both the short term 
and the long term because of the acquirer’s increasing stock price through 
earnings manipulation in the quarter before the announcement, but this reversal 
is only partial.  
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Following Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004), Botsari and Meeks (2008) 
investigate earnings management by acquirers before a merger announcement 
in the UK from 1997 to 2001 using a sample of 42 publicly traded firms. The 
evidence, using the Jones and modified Jones models shows that acquiring firms 
manipulate accruals to increase income in the year before the merger 
announcement. There is also evidence of accruals reversals in the year after 
acquisition. Baik et al. (2007) examine whether acquirers engage in earnings 
management, proxied by abnormal accruals estimated using the performance-
matching model (Kothari et al. 2005), for acquisitions using different payment 
forms and with different listing status. They find that acquiring companies tend to 
use accrual earnings management to inflate income when buying private firms, 
especially for smaller targets or if the targets are operating in an industry other 
than that of the acquirers.  
Extending previous research, Mahdavi-Ardekani et al. (2012) investigate the 
correlation between earnings management and share- and cash-financed 
acquiring firms’ performance in Malaysia. The authors use the modified Jones 
model to measure discretionary accruals. They find that share-financed acquirers 
inflate earnings prior to a share for share bid, while cash-financed acquirers do 
not. They also find that earnings management on the part of share-financed 
acquirers preceding the merger announcement is negatively correlated with the 
performance of share-financed acquirers following M&A deals. Njah and Jarboui 
(2013) examined the effect of institutional ownership on accrual-based earnings 
management in France. They find that absorbing firms engage in earnings 
management before the offer announcement when there is the presence of 
institutional holding. 
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Also recently, Zhu and Lu (2013) have investigated real earnings management 
by share-financed acquirers prior to a share for share bid. Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), the authors employ the expectations models to measure 
abnormal discretionary expenditure, production costs and cash flow. They find 
that share-financed acquirers engage in income-increasing real earnings 
management activities to boost their firms’ market value prior to a share for share 
bid. Specifically, the authors find that acquirers employ discounted price 
activities, which can temporarily increase sales, as well as overproduction 
activities, which can lower the cost of goods sold. In line with Zhu and Lu (2013), 
Farooqi et al. (2017) examine both accrual-based and real earnings management 
of share-financed acquirers in the US prior to a share for share bid. By measuring 
abnormal accruals derived from the modified Jones model and measuring 
abnormal discretionary expenditure and production costs derived from the 
models following Roychowdhury (2006), they find that share-financed bidder 
firms manipulate both accrual-based and real earnings management. The 
authors also find that of share-financed acquirers engage in more real earnings 
management than accrual-based earnings management prior to a share for share 
bid in the short term. 
In summary, it has been shown in the literature that share-financed acquirers 
engage in income-increasing accrual-based and real earnings management prior 
to a merger announcement. In addition, it is clear that acquirers have the 
motivation to inflate accounting earnings to boost share prices, so that can reduce 
the costs of M&A deals. However, target firms are well aware of this motive and 
hence they will be cautious about whether the acquirer has managed earnings, 
often employing the extensive use of experts, such as auditors, accountants, and 
investment bankers. If earnings management is detected within the acquiring firm 
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in the period prior to a share for share bid, the target firm’s management and 
board of directors may threaten to cancel the deal, demand a higher exchange 
ratio, or inflate their accounting earnings and manipulate real activities to increase 
the target firm’s stock price. As a result, the acquirer could pay even a higher 
price if earnings management is detected. Therefore, despite the mounting 
evidence that share-financed M&A deals are associated with income-increasing 
earnings management on the part of acquirers prior to announcing deals, as cited 
above, there is still strong scepticism because one could argue that acquirers will 
avoid inflating earnings during such a sensitive period as there is a risk of getting 
caught, which could be costly.  
Advocates of that counter-argument could argue that the documented earnings 
management of share-financed acquirers could simply be the result of errors in 
the models used in the existing literature to detect such earnings management. 
To this end, existing earnings management detection models used in the M&A 
literature have some serious limitations. Because of the small samples used to 
examine stock-for-stock M&A deals3, research into earnings management in this 
context generally relies on a number of models that can produce an empirical 
proxy for earnings management at the firm-year level without significantly further 
constraining the sample, such as the Healy model, the Jones model, the modified 
Jones model and the performance-matching model for detecting accrual-based 
earnings management and the expectations models developed by 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) for detecting real earnings management. In particular, 
although used extensively, these accrual-based models for detecting earnings 
management suffer from a range of limitations and have recently received 
                                                 
3 Erickson and Wang (1999) use 55 stock-for-stock deals and Botsari and Meeks (2008) use 42 stock-for-
stock deals 
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considerable criticism (Holthausen et al. 1995; Fields et al. 2001; Dechow et al. 
2010a; DeFond 2010; Ball 2013).  
Dechow et al. (1995) use a test statistic across the measure of abnormal accruals 
generated by several models, such as the Healy, DeAngelo, Jones, modified 
Jones and industry models to assess their specification and power. They 
conclude that if the samples contain firms with extreme financial performance, 
these models may be misspecified in detecting earnings management. In line 
with Dechow et al. (1995), McNichols (2000) shows that using samples with 
extreme forecasts of long-term earnings growth will introduce errors in earnings 
management detection models. The performance-matching model was 
constructed to reduce performance-related misspecification (Kothari et al. 2005). 
However, Dechow et al. (2012) argue that the performance-matching approach, 
albeit a good solution, is not a panacea. They show that the performance-
matching approach sometimes reduces misspecification, but on other occasions 
might even exaggerate the issue. For example, although model misspecification 
in samples with extreme book-to-market and earnings-to-price ratios is shown to 
be significantly reduced, the performance-matching approach exaggerates 
misspecification in samples with extreme operating cash flows and size values. 
Moreover, the performance-matching approach could increase the standard 
errors, leading to a weakened ability to test for earnings management. 
Ball (2013) argues that using the existing abnormal accruals models, earnings 
management would appear to be “rife”, which is not necessarily true. In particular, 
researchers often rely on a regression using some firm fundamentals to predict a 
level of “normal” accruals, then conclude that any significant deviation from the 
predicted level is evidence of earnings management. The problem with that is 
even with a very good model (i.e. assuming we know exactly how to model 
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accruals and the determinants), the chances are that very few observations would 
sit exactly on the regression line. The issue is aggravated because admittedly we 
have no comprehensive theory to explain the accrual-generating process, i.e. 
what determines accruals and how much is considered “normal” (McNichols 
2000; McNichols 2002; Dechow et al. 2010a; Owens et al. 2013b).  
In general, since most of the existing evidence suggesting that share-financed 
acquirers engage in earnings management prior to the merger announcement 
relies on models subject to some serious limitations, we still cannot conclude 
whether the high abnormal accruals and abnormal real activities observed among 
such acquirers are indeed evidence of earnings management or whether they are 
simply the result of model misspecifications. In this context, using other measures 
of earnings management that do not suffer from the same problems as the 
abnormal accruals models seems necessary.  
One possible direction is to use some ex post measures of earnings 
management, such as published instances of earnings restatements or violations 
of GAAP, which typically have low Type I error (for example: when a company 
has actually been required to restate financial report, it is more likely to engage 
in earnings management). However, the number of such instances is usually 
small and only applies to detecting accrual-based earnings management, 
resulting in difficulties for use in M&A studies. Another direction would be to use 
a model which captures both accrual-based and real earnings management at 
the firm-year level without having to rely on any determinants of accrual-based or 
real earnings management, an area in which most of the controversy surrounding 
existing models lies due to the lack of a theory explaining how accruals might be 
generated. The next section, reviews a fairly recent model based on Benford’s 
Law, which meets this requirement and is used in this chapter.  
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3.2.2 Benford’s Law 
Benford’s Law is a mathematical property discovered by Newcomb (1881) and 
rediscovered by Benford (1938). Benford’s Law proposes that the digits of 
numbers in a dataset follow a logarithmic distribution. For example, numbers 
beginning with larger digits appear less frequently than those beginning with 
smaller ones. Therefore, numbers that are manipulated, created or unrelated 
usually do not follow a Benford distribution. Consequently, Benford’s Law has 
been used as a powerful tool to investigate and identify manipulation and 
misstated data. 
McGinty (2014) wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal about the results of an 
audit firm checking whether refunds issued by national call centre operators are 
true or fraudulent based on testing whether refund data conform to the Benford 
Law distribution. The auditors checked the first digits of each call centre 
operator’s refunds and found that there was a divergence from Benford’s Law for 
a small group of call centre operators. Further investigation found that thousands 
of dollars in fraudulent refunds were issued by these operators to themselves, 
family and friends.  
Alali and Romero (2013) investigate a set of accounts based on financial 
statements of US banks in the period from 2000 to 2012. They find insignificant 
deviations between the distribution of the first digits of figures reported in the 
accounts of US banks and the theoretical distribution predicted by Benford’s Law. 
Özer and Babacan (2013) investigate the balance sheets of Turkish banks in the 
period 1990-2010. They find that the distribution of the first digits in the balance 
sheets of these banks diverge significantly from Benford’s theoretical distribution 
only in the year 1999. Gava and Vitiello (2014) examine the first digits of asset 
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accounts for 14 Brazilian companies over the period 1986-2009, which contains 
periods of high and low inflation. They report that the asset accounts of Brazilian 
companies have a high probability of fraud in the high-inflation period because 
the first digits of these companies’ asset accounts in the high-inflation period 
deviate more significantly from Benford’s Law than in the low-inflation period. 
There is a growing body of literature suggesting that Benford’s Law could be used 
to assess earnings management. Carslaw (1988) compares the distribution of the 
second digits of reported income in New Zealand firms’ financial statements to 
the distribution expected by Benford’s Law. The frequencies of zero as the 
second digit are found to be greater than expected by Benford’s Law, while the 
frequencies of the number 9 as the second digit are lower than expected by 
Benford’s Law. Further investigation reveals that managers round up income to 
achieve earnings targets. Thomas (1989) also investigates the distribution of the 
second digits of earnings in the financial statements of US firms, reporting 
patterns similar to those observed for the New Zealand firms.  
Johnson (2009) identifies firm characteristics that may have a correlation with 
earnings manipulation by comparing the first-digit distribution of earnings-per-
share and quarterly net income data of US firms in the period 1999-2004 to the 
distribution expected by Benford’s Law. Johnson (2009) finds that the earnings 
distributions of companies with low capitalization and higher levels of inside 
trading do not conform to the distribution expected by Benford’s Law, indicating 
a high probability that these firms engage in earnings management. Hsieh and 
Lin (2013) investigate the second-digit distribution of the quarterly net income 
figures of US companies in the marine industry. They find that the frequency of 
zero as the second digit is significantly higher than the frequency expected by the 
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Benford Law distribution. They conclude that firms in the marine industry manage 
earnings to achieve key reference points by rounding up earnings numbers. 
The above research focuses on earnings numbers of firms in a period rather than 
using firm-year data. Recent research (e.g. Amiram et al. (2015) relies on the 
properties of numbers following Benford’s Law as a proxy for earnings 
management. Compared with other existing measures of earnings management, 
the use of Benford’s Law has some significant advantages (Amiram et al. 2015). 
First, it does not require cross-sectional or time-series data and needs only firm-
year data for the calculation. Second, it is not statistically biased because it does 
not need estimation based on any particular model. Finally, there are no effects 
of firm characteristics or firm performance. However, Benford’s Law also has 
some limitations. First, it can effectively identify areas with high risk of earnings 
management, but not indicating earnings management instances itself. Second, 
Benford’s law can only predict the distribution of many dataset in which figures 
are generated naturally, such as household electricity bills, earnings, sales, 
expenses, amount of tax payments of companies etc. It cannot predict dataset 
where numbers are sequential such as invoice numbers or if the numbers are 
generated with some intention. 
To the best of my knowledge, there has been no published study that empirically 
investigates earnings management prior to a share for share bid employing 
deviations from Benford’s Law as an earnings management proxy. Based on the 
advantages and limitations of Benford’s Law, this chapter applies deviations from 
Benford’s Law as an alternative approach for detecting earnings management 
prior to the merger announcement. 
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3.2.3 Hypotheses 
As explained earlier, the existing literature generally suggests that share-financed 
acquirers have the incentive to manipulate earnings to increase their stock price 
prior to a merger announcement. As a result, acquiring firms may reduce the cost 
of purchasing the target firm (Louis 2004; Baik et al. 2007; Botsari and Meeks 
2008; Gong et al. 2008; Zhu and Lu 2013; Farooqi et al. 2017). In contrast, cash-
financed acquirers generally do not have the motivation to inflate earnings 
(Erickson and Wang 1999; Mahdavi-Ardekani et al. 2012). Therefore, the 
hypotheses are stated as follows: 
H3.1: The first digits4 of figures reported in the financial statements of share-
financed acquirers prior to a merger announcement conform less closely to the 
distribution expected under Benford’s Law than those of the rest of the sample 
do. 
H3.2: The first digits of figures reported in the financial statements of cash-
financed acquirers prior to a merger announcement do not conform less closely 
to the distribution expected under Benford’s Law than those of the rest of the 
sample. 
H3.3: Share-financed acquirers engage in income-increasing accrual-based 
earnings management prior to a merger announcement. 
H3.4: Cash-financed acquirers do not engage in income-increasing accrual-
based earnings management prior to a merger announcement. 
                                                 
4 Following Amiram et al. (2015), this study investigates the first digit of figures reported in the financial 
statements 
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H3.5: Share-financed acquirers engage in income-increasing real earnings 
management prior to a merger announcement. 
H3.6: Cash-financed acquirers do not engage in income-increasing real earnings 
management prior to a merger announcement. 
H3.7: The first digits of figures reported in the financial statements of share-
financed acquirers prior to a merger announcement conform less closely to the 
distribution expected under Benford’s Law than those of cash-financed acquirers 
do. 
H3.8: Share-financed acquirers engage in income-increasing accrual-based and 
real earnings management prior to a merger announcement to a greater extent 
than cash-financed acquirers. 
 
3.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
This study used a sample of UK companies (dead and alive) from 2007 to 2012. 
Financial data are downloaded from Datastream. Utility and financial firms are 
then removed because the motivations of these companies to manage earnings 
are impacted by special regulations (Burgstahler and Eames 2006). Observations 
with fiscal years longer than 400 or shorter than 330 days and those not using 
the Sterling pound (£) as the reporting currency are also removed. In addition, 
observations with more than one type of equity are deleted. To estimate earnings 
management proxies, all observations within Datastream’s level-six industry-year 
will be eliminated if total observations of that industry-year are less than six. 
Finally, only observations with sufficient data to perform all of the main tests in 
this chapter are retained. The above process yields a final sample of 7,727 
observations (1,855 unique firms across 70 Datastream level-six industries). In 
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order to mitigate the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
For the test employing measures of earnings management based on Benford’s 
Law, the study follows Amiram et al. (2015) to exclude a firm-year observation if 
the firm’s cash flow statements, income statements and balance sheets report 
fewer than 50 items, which could be due to the company being new or to missing 
data, to avoid measurement error. The first digits of all items in cash flow 
statements, income statements and balance sheets are then extracted. This 
results in 4,610 firm-year observations over the period 2007–2012 (1,129 unique 
firms) with 230,200 first digits. This sample was used to calculate the 
FSD_SCORE and KSMAX for share-financed acquiring firms, cash-financed 
acquiring firms and for the entire market to determine if the financial statement 
data of share-financed acquiring firms, cash-financed acquiring firms and the 
entire market conform to Benford’s Law. 
The M&A sample contains all mergers reported in the Bloomberg database. Data 
were collected for all M&A deals in the UK over the period of 2007 to 2012. In 
total, there were 1,707 deals with 937 acquirers. The study only included deals 
made by public UK acquirers.  From this full sample, a data subset was selected 
containing share-financed transactions, which are deals having share payments 
are higher 50% and cash-financed transactions, which are deals having cash 
payments are higher 50%. The sample of share-financed and cash-financed 
mergers was matched with financial data obtained as described above, using the 
international securities identification number (ISIN). Deals without sufficient data 
to calculate empirical variables for the three years before the merger 
announcement were eliminated. The final sample consists of 295 deals out of 
7,727 observations. The 295 deals include 62 share-financed deals and 233 
82 
 
cash-financed deals, while the rest of the same includes 7,432 non-deal 
observations. Table 3-2 shows distributions of UK M&A deals from 2007 to 2012. 
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Table 3-2: Distributions of UK M&A deals in the period 2007-2012 
Panel A: Distribution across years 
Year Full  Sample 
Share-financed deals Cash-financed deals Rest of sample 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
2007 1,351 13 21.0 64 27.5 1,274 17.1 
2008 1,363 12 19.4 38 16.3 1,313 17.7 
2009 1,322 11 17.7 28 12.0 1,283 17.3 
2010 1,294 15 24.2 33 14.2 1,246 16.8 
2011 1,233 7 11.3 34 14.6 1,192 16.0 
2012 1,164 4 6.5 36 15.5 1,124 15.1 
Total 7,727 62 100.0 233 100 7,432 100 
Panel B: Distribution across industries 
DataStream 
Level 6 code Description 
Full 
sample 
Share-
financed 
deals 
Cash-
financed 
deals 
Rest of 
sample 
30 Building Materials and Fixtures 132 0 0 132 
32 Industrial Suppliers 140 1 18 121 
33 Specialty Chemicals 146 0 2 144 
34 Computer Hardware 80 0 1 79 
35 Farm Fish Plantation 63 0 1 62 
36 Home Construction 68 1 1 66 
37 Electrical Equipment 160 0 3 157 
39 Heavy Construction 105 0 4 101 
41 Media Agencies 175 7 12 156 
43 Industrial Machinery 281 1 14 266 
44 Defence 50 0 7 43 
45 Healthcare Providers 73 0 1 72 
46 Financial Administration 40 0 1 39 
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Table 3-2: Distributions of UK M&A deals in the period 2007-2012 
47 Waste- Disposal Services 7 0 0 7 
48 Personal Products 28 0 1 27 
49 Coal  52 0 0 52 
50 Exploration and Production 353 6 4 343 
51 Oil Equipment and Services 85 0 5 80 
54 Nonferrous Metals 38 1 0 37 
55 Recreational Services 92 0 1 91 
56 Iron and Steel 35 1 1 33 
57 Electronic Equipment 127 0 3 124 
58 Software 518 5 15 498 
59 Durable Household Products 37 0 0 37 
60 Furnishings 51 0 0 51 
61 Toys 19 0 0 19 
62 Nondurable and Household Products 4 0 0 4 
63 Auto Parts 58 0 0 58 
64 Transport Services 104 0 0 104 
66 Apparel Retailers 92 0 2 90 
69 Clothing and Accessory 86 1 0 85 
70 Containers and Package 62 0 1 61 
71 Food Products 127 0 4 123 
72 Restaurants and Bars 143 2 3 138 
74 Renewable Energy Equipment 35 0 0 35 
78 Platinum and Precious Metals 53 1 2 50 
80 Hotels 35 0 0 35 
82 Paper 15 0 0 15 
83 Alternative Fuels 44 1 1 42 
84 Publishing 147 1 8 138 
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Table 3-2: Distributions of UK M&A deals in the period 2007-2012 
85 Home Improvement Retailers 46 0 0 46 
86 Business Support Services 588 4 41 543 
87 Broadline Retailers 56 0 1 55 
88 Food Retail-Wholesale 58 1 1 56 
89 Diamonds and Gemstones 46 2 1 43 
90 Specialty Retailers 159 1 8 150 
94 Travel and Tourism 57 0 3 54 
95 Pharmaceuticals 231 4 12 215 
97 Integrated Oil and Gas 36 0 2 34 
98 Aerospace 49 0 3 46 
100 Gambling 86 1 1 84 
101 Diversified Industrials 47 0 1 46 
103 Medical Supplies 65 0 1 64 
112 Real Estate Holding and Development 126 3 0 123 
115 Broadcast and Entertainment 187 0 2 185 
117 Commercial Vehicles and Trucks 36 0 0 36 
119 Gold Mining 199 2 2 195 
122 General Mining 271 4 10 257 
126 Telecommunications Equipment 159 3 5 151 
129 Airlines 31 0 1 30 
130 Semiconductors 200 0 2 198 
132 Medical Equipment 108 1 1 106 
134 Bus Train and Employment 163 0 2 161 
142 Fixed Line Telecommunication 83 0 0 83 
143 Mobile Telecommunication 64 1 2 61 
150 Computer Services 231 3 5 223 
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Table 3-2: Distributions of UK M&A deals in the period 2007-2012 
151 Internet 78 0 5 73 
156 Specialized Consumer Service 44 0 1 43 
157 Biotechnology 235 3 4 228 
167 Real Estate Services 28 0 0 28 
Total 7,727 62 233 7,432 
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3.4 METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1 Deviations of the first digits using Benford’s Law  
Amiram et al. (2015) capture the first digits of numbers in the financial statements 
of a firm-year from the distribution following Benford’s Law. They calculate the 
mean of absolute deviations (FSD_SCORE) and the maximum of cumulative 
absolute deviations (KSMAX) between actual distributions and expected 
distributions following Benford’s Law. 
3.4.1.1 FSD_SCORE calculation  
FSD_SCORE calculation is the sum of the absolute difference between the 
empirical frequency of each first digit from 1 to 9 of numbers in financial 
statements and the theoretical frequency expected by Benford’s Law, divided by 
nine. Following Amiram et al. (2015), the study calculates the FSD_SCORE as 
follows:  
Equation 3-2 
𝐹𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ (𝐴𝑃𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑃𝑑)
9
𝑑=1
9
  
where FSD_SCOREd,i,t, is defined as the mean absolute deviation of the first digits 
of figures reported in financial statements from the distribution expected by 
Benford’s Law of firm i in year t; APd,i,t is defined as the actual probability of the 
first digit d of firm i in year t; EPd is defined as the expected probability of the first 
digit d as defined by Benford’s Law; d = 1, 2, …, 9.  
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3.4.1.2 KSMAX calculation 
KSMAX is the maximum of the difference between the cumulative actual 
distribution, which is the empirical frequency of each first digit from 1 to 9 of the 
numbers in financial statements, and the cumulative expected distribution, which 
is the theoretical frequency expected by Benford’s Law. Following Amiram et al. 
(2015), the study calculated KSMAX as follows: 
Equation 3-3 
𝐾𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝐴𝑋(|𝐴𝑃1,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑃1,𝑖,𝑡|, |(𝐴𝑃1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝑃2,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝑃1,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐸𝑃2,𝑖𝑡,𝑡)|, … , |(𝐴𝑃1,𝑖𝑡,𝑡 + 𝐴𝑃2,𝑖,𝑡 … + 𝐴𝑃9,𝑖,𝑡) − (𝐸𝑃1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑃2,𝑖,𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝐸𝑃9,𝑖,𝑡)|) 
where KSMAXi,t, is defined as the maximum of the difference between the 
cumulative actual probability, which is the cumulative empirical frequency of each 
first digit in financial statements and the expected probability, i.e. the theoretical 
frequency expected by Benford’s Law for firm i in year t; AP1,i,t, AP2,i,t,…, AP9,i,t is 
defined as the actual probability of the numbers 1,2,…,9 of the first digit for firm i 
in year t; EP1,i,t, EP2,i,t,…, EP9,i,t is defined as the expected probability of the 
numbers 1, 2,…, 9 for the first digit as defined by Benford’s Law. 
FSD_SCOREi,t and KSMAXi,t are equal to zero when financial statements are free 
of errors because the empirical probability of the first digit of firms’ financial 
statement numbers follows Benford’s Law (Amiram et al. 2015). If FSD_SCOREi,t 
or KSMAXi,t are higher than zero, this suggests there are errors on the financial 
statement. 
3.4.2 Accrual-based earnings management 
In addition to Benford’s Law, I also used traditional measures of earnings 
management. The accrual-based measures have been employed by numerous 
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studies (Botsari 2014; Botsari and Meeks 2008; Chen et al. 2011b; Dechow et al. 
1995; Healy 1985; Shivakumar 2000). A common feature of those models is to 
estimate abnormal accruals, which are used as a proxy for management 
discretion over financial reporting, or earnings management. 
To evaluate accruals manipulation, many standard models have been used by 
researchers: the Healy (1985) model, the Jones (1991) model, the modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995), the DeAngelo (1986) model, the industry 
model (Dechow and Sloan 1991), the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) model 
and the performance-matched discretionary accruals model (Kothari et al. 2005). 
Following Botsari and Meeks (2008), this study employs the most popular cross-
sectional standard Jones model and the cross-sectional modified Jones model to 
estimate abnormal accruals. In the first stage, the following regression is run in 
each industry-year with at least six observations: 
Equation 3-4 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
In the second stage, the estimated coefficients from Equation 3-4 represented as 
a, b1, b2 are used to calculate abnormal accruals for all firms: 
Equation 3-5  
𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [𝑎 + 𝑏1
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
] 
where AA𝑖,𝑡 is abnormal accruals of firm i in year t. a, b1 and b2 are the calculated 
coefficients from Equation 3-4.  
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Dechow et al. (1995) show that "the Jones model eliminates part of the managed 
earnings from the proxy of discretionary accruals when earnings are managed 
through discretionary revenue". To solve this problem, they suggest that the 
modified Jones model should eliminate changes in receivables (∆REC) from 
changes in sales in the second stage. Therefore, the modified Jones model 
estimated abnormal accruals as follows: 
Equation 3-6 
𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [𝑎 + 𝑏1(
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
−
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝑏2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
] 
3.4.3 Real earnings management 
Real earnings activities are performed by various means, including: reduce costs  
by decreasing R&D expenses, advertising expenses, sale and administrative 
expenses; reducing the cost per unit sold by rising the numbers of products made; 
increase earnings through sales by reducing the product prices (Roychowdhury 
2006). There are several models developed by Roychowdhury (2006) to measure 
real earnings management activities. This thesis examines these real earnings 
management proxies for detecting real earnings management. 
3.4.3.1 Sale-based manipulation 
As documented in the previous literature, companies could engage in 
manipulating sales by providing a greater price discounts to inflate companies’ 
earnings. Sales manipulations may lead to abnormally low cash flows. The 
Roychowdhury (2006)’s model for estimating normal cash flows from operations 
is as follows: 
Equation 3-7 
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𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
For every firm-year, abnormal cash flows from operation (ACF) is computed as 
deviation from the normal level of cash flows, multiplied by -1. 
3.4.3.2 Discretionary expense-based manipulation 
Expenses manipulation is related to unexpected reductions in R&D, advertising 
and selling, general and administrative expenses, etc., for increasing reported 
earnings. Roychowdhury (2006)’s model for estimating normal discretionary 
expenses is as follows: 
Equation 3-8 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where DISEXP𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of R&D, selling, general and administrative (SG&A) 
and advertising expenses of firm i in year t. For every firm-year, abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ADEXP) is computed as deviation from the normal level 
of discretionary expenses, multiplied by -1. 
3.4.3.3 Production cost-based manipulation 
Production cost manipulation is employed for inflating current earnings. 
Companies could manipulate production activities to rise product units produced 
and thus decrease the cost per unit sold, consequently manipulate earnings. 
Production costs is the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) and the change in 
inventory (∆INV) (Roychowdhury 2006). The equation used to calculate normal 
production costs are as follows: 
Equation 3-9 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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where PROD𝑖,𝑡 is production costs of firm i in year t; ΔREV𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 - REV𝑖,𝑡−2. 
For every firm-year, abnormal production costs (APROD) is computed as 
deviation from the normal level of production costs. 
3.4.3.4 Total real earnings managment 
It is possible that acquirers may use any of three types of real earnings activities. 
Therefore, I construct a variable for total real earnings management. The 
abnormal total real earnings management (ATREM) is equal to abnormal cash 
flows plus abnormal production costs plus abnormal discretionary expenditures. 
3.4.4 Indicator of the year when M&A deals are announced 
M&A announcements in the financial press normally relate to three M&A steps. 
The first M&A step is negotiating the terms of the deal called the announcement 
date. The second M&A step is reaching an agreement called the agreement date. 
Finally, the third M&A step is the completing the payment method chosen to 
perform the takeover called the completion date. 
Previous papers have found that acquirers inflate their earnings prior to a merger 
announcement which is the first M&A step (the agreement date). To reinvestigate 
the earnings management of acquirers prior to the merger announcement, there 
is a need to identify the announcement of the agreement date relative to reporting 
periods accurately. Therefore, year t is defined as the announcement year which 
is the first year with acquirer’s earnings release after the agreement date. Year t-
1 is defined as the first year with acquirer’s earnings release before the 
agreement date. Year t-2 is defined as the second year with acquirer’s earnings 
release before the agreement date. Finally, year t-3 is defined as the third year 
with acquirer’s earnings release before the agreement date. These years are 
described in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1: The years prior to M&A deal announcement 
3.4.5 Control variables 
3.4.5.1 Size 
Firm size is an important control variable in investigating accruals earnings 
management. Dechow and Dichev (2002) find that firm size is negatively related 
to earnings management. Consistent with Dechow and Dichev (2002), Cao and 
Lee (2002) and Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) also find a negative 
relationships between firm size and earnings management. The reason is that 
large firms are required to release their financial reports annually to the public. 
Thus, compared to small firms, large firms are less likely to manage earnings. 
Firm size is defined as the natural log of the market value of equity at the end of 
the fiscal year. The coefficient of SIZE is expected to be negative. 
3.4.5.2 Growth opportunities 
The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity (MTB ratio), which is 
used for growth opportunities, is also likely to be correlated with a firm engaging 
in earnings management. Skinner and Sloan (2002) argue that low MTB ratio 
firms have stronger incentives to manage earnings because they are more 
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sensitive to earnings fluctuations. Therefore, the study uses these variables to 
control for systematic variation in estimating accrual-based earnings 
management. MTB is equal to the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year 
divided by the book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. The coefficient of 
MTB is expected to be positive. 
3.4.5.3 Leverage 
Leverage is the next control variable, which is widely used to control the impact 
of debt contracting on earnings management. The reason is that debts usually 
come with restrictions, which are often tied to the firm's performance. Therefore, 
earnings might be increased by managers if firms have a significant amount of 
leverage (Houmes and Skantz 2010). However, Alsharairi (2012) provides other 
evidence of a correlation between leverage and earnings management by 
examining the impact of high leverage on earnings management using a sample 
of non-cash M&A deals. They find that the correlation between leverage and 
earnings management is significantly negative. LEV is defined as the total long-
term and short-term debts at the end of year t divided by total assets at the end 
of year t. Thus, there are no expectations concernings the sign of the coefficient 
of LEV. 
3.4.5.4 Return on assets 
Dechow et al. (1995) provide evidence that firms with strong performance are 
more likely to manage earnings by using accruals. In line with Dechow et al. 
(1995), Kasznik (1999) finds that firm performance tends to have a positive 
relationship with discretionary accruals. Hence, this study controls for acquirer's 
firm performance, proxied by return on assets (ROA). ROA is defined as earnings 
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before interest and tax divided by lagged total assets. The coefficient of ROA is 
expected to be positive.  
3.4.5.5 Net operating assets 
Net operating assets (NOA) is the next control variable. Barton and Simko (2002) 
argue that higher current NOA indicates greater past earnings manipulations 
because the balance sheet accumulates the effects of prior accounting choices. 
Therefore, Barton and Simko (2002) predict that the firms' level of NOA is 
negatively related to managers' ability to use accruals to affect reported earnings. 
Consistent with their predictions, they find that the level of 𝑁𝑂𝐴 is negatively 
related to the probability of meeting or beating analysts' earnings expectations. 
Therefore, NOA is also used here to control for systematic variation in estimating 
accrual-based earnings management. NOA is defined as the total of the book 
value of equity, long-term and short-term debt, cash and equivalents, all divided 
by sales. The coefficient of NOA is expected to be negative. 
3.4.5.6 Equity issuance 
Existing studies suggest that firms are more likely to increase earnings reported 
in financial statements prior to a seasoned equity offering (SEO) (Teoh et al. 
1998b; Shivakumar 2000). Furthermore, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine 
both accruals earnings management and real activity manipulations around SEO 
and find that managers do indeed use both methods to manage earnings 
upwards before SEOs. Following Zang (2012), the study employs SEO as a 
dummy control variable, which takes a value of 1 if the firm issues common equity 
in the fiscal year and zero otherwise. The firm that issues common equity is called 
the equity issuer in a year if: (1) its proceeds from sale/issue of stocks are 
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positive, and (2) the firm's outstanding common shares increase by at least 5% 
on the previous year5. The coefficients of SEO are expected to be positive. 
3.4.6 Empirical models 
To test H3.1, H3.2, H3.3 and H3.4, the following regression is estimated: 
Equation 3-10 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced by FSD_SCOREi,t−1−k and KSMAXi,t−1−k, abnormal total 
accruals estimated by the Jones and modified Jones models (ATA_JMi,t−1−k and  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k) and abnormal working capital estimated by the Jones and 
modified Jones models (AWCA_JMi,t−1−k and AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k),. k will be 
replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the Benford’s Law and the accruals of share- 
and cash-financed acquirers in year t-1, year t-2 and year t-3. SMAi,t and CMAi,t 
are dummy variables which are set to 1 for share-financed acquiring firms and 1 
for cash-financed acquiring firms in year t and zero otherwise. MTBi,t−2−k, 
SIZEi,t−2−k, ROAi,t−1−k, LEVi,t−2−k, NOAi,t−2−k and SEOi,t−1−k are control variables 
to control for the effects of growth opportunities, firm size, firms’ performance, 
debt, equity issuance and the level of net operating assets. 
                                                 
5 The 5% benchmark is a significant share issuance, which is large enough to motivate 
managers to implement earnings management. 
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To test H3.5 and H3.6, linear regressions are also run, investigating whether 
share- and cash-financed acquirers manipulate real earnings management prior 
to a merger announcement. Specifically, the following regression is estimated: 
Equation 3-11 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k and ATREMi,t−1−k. 
k will be replaced by 0, 1 and 2 for investigating the effect of board connections 
on real earnings management in year t-1, year t-2 and year t-3. Other variables 
are as explained in Equation 3-10. This regression excludes the  NOAi,t−1−k 
because previous research has not shown a correlation between real earnings 
management and net operating assets (Barton and Simko 2002). 
To test H3.7 and H3.8, linear regressions are also run to examine Benford’s Law 
and accrual-based earnings management. Specifically, the following regression 
is estimated: 
Equation 3-12 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with FSD_SCOREi,t−1−k, KSMAXi,t−1−k, ATA_JMi,t−1−k, 
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, AWCA_JMi,t−1−k and AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k,. k will be replaced by 0, 1 
and 2 for investigating Benford’s Law and accrual-based earnings management 
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of acquirers in year t-1, year t-2 and year t-3. SMA_CMAi,t are indicator variables 
which are set to 1 for share-financed acquiring firms and zero for cash-financed 
acquiring firms in year t. 
To test H3.8, linear regressions are also run to examine real earnings 
management. Specifically, the following regression is estimated: 
Equation 3-13 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k and ATREMi,t−1−k. 
k will be replaced by 0, 1 and 2 for investigating the real earnings management 
of acquirers in year t-1, year t-2 and year t-3. 
3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3-3 provides an overview of the statistics for earnings management proxies 
(Panel A), firm’ characteristics (Panel B) and control variables (Panel C). The 
mean of FSD_SCORE is 0.038, with a standard deviation of 0.012. These 
statistics are consistent with the mean (0.0296) and standard deviation (0.0087) 
of US listed firms by Amiram et al. (2015). The mean (0.095) and the standard 
deviation (0.043) of KSMAX are higher than the mean and the standard deviation 
of FSD_CORE. The reason is that the KSMAX is the maximum of the difference 
of in the cumulative actual distribution of each first digit from 1 to 9 of numbers in 
financial statements and cumulative expected distribution based on Benford’ 
Law, while FSD_SCORE is the defined as the mean absolute deviation of these 
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distributions from Benford’s Law. The results also show that, on average, the 
means of abnormal total accruals and abnormal working capital accruals 
estimated using the Jones and modified Jones models are negative for all 
proxies. However, the number of observations of accrual-based and real earnings 
management are higher than FSD_SCORE and KSMAX because these are 
calculated based on the first digits of more than 50 items reported in financial 
statements. Finally, firm statistics (Panel C) and control variables (Panel D) are 
similar to those reported in prior research (Goh and Gupta 2016; Nguyen et al. 
2016; Nguyen et al. 2015). 
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 Table 3-3: Descriptive statistics 
Statistics N MEAN STD MIN P25 MEDIAN P75 MAX 
Panel A: Earnings management proxies 
FSD_SCOREi,t−1 4,610 0.038 0.012 0.016 0.030 0.036 0.045 0.074 
KSMAXi,t−1 4,610 0.095 0.043 0.012 0.064 0.086 0.117 0.358 
ATA_JMi,t−1 7,727 -0.010 0.135 -0.553 -0.059 -0.004 0.049 0.428 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 7,727 -0.010 0.134 -0.529 -0.058 -0.005 0.050 0.430 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 7,727 -0.017 0.149 -0.595 -0.074 -0.010 0.051 0.441 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 7,727 -0.017 0.147 -0.589 -0.074 -0.010 0.051 0.425 
ACFi,t−1 7,727 -0.008 0.282 -1.115 -0.100 -0.014 0.057 1.292 
APRODi,t−1 7,727 -0.010 0.255 -1.091 -0.105 -0.003 0.098 0.870 
ADEXPi,t−1 7,727 -0.020 0.434 -2.349 -0.112 0.018 0.145 1.470 
ATREMi,t−1 7,727 -0.029 0.455 -2.207 -0.158 -0.003 0.136 1.754 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
ATi,t−1 7,727 5,208,723 18,120,147 776 19,261 107,551 1,209,600 128,234,000 
IBi,t−1 7,727 349,050 1,440,068 -511,336 -1,190 2,252 46,957 10,866,000 
MACAPi,t−1 7,727 6,176,035 23,201,720 776 15,425 93,203 1,062,694 172,790,923 
SALEi,t−1 7,727 4,151,836 14,718,687 0 10,145 85,638 1,001,900 109,132,000 
Panel C: Control variables 
SEOi,t−1 7,727 0.273 0.445 0 0 0 1 1 
SIZEi,t−1 7,727 11.869 2.889 6.654 9.644 11.443 13.876 18.968 
MTBi,t−1 7,727 2.645 4.301 -11.854 0.936 1.742 3.154 27.638 
LEVi,t−1 7,727 0.176 0.194 0 0.005 0.130 0.272 0.996 
NOAi,t−1 7,727 0.494 0.260 -0.403 0.349 0.539 0.686 0.932 
ROAi,t−1 7,727 -0.056 0.334 -2.143 -0.054 0.036 0.080 0.323 
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics of selected variables. Definitions of variables are in the appendix. 
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3.5.2 Univariate analyses 
Botsari and Meeks (2008) apply t-tests for the discretionary accruals proxies, 
which are computed from the cross-sectional Jones model and modified Jones 
model. The purpose of these tests is to determine whether the abnormal accruals 
of share-financed acquirers are positive and statistically significant in the event 
year. Following Botsari and Meeks (2008), this study estimates abnormal 
accruals using the Jones and modified Jones models and abnormal real earnings 
management using the expectations models developed by Roychowdhury (2006) 
and Benford’s Law proxies, as discussed in section 3.4. All companies in the 
same DataStream level 6 code are taken as the sample to estimate all models 
for each event year (t-1, t-2 and t-3). Companies not experience an acquisition 
are excluded from the sample. 
Table 3-4 presents the results of these cross-sectional t-tests. For share-financed 
acquirers in year t-1, the means of FSD_SCOREi,t−1and KSMAXi,t−1 are significantly 
positive at the 1% level (0.045 and 0.115 respectively). Also, the mean of 
abnormal total accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1) and abnormal working capital accruals 
(AWCA_JMi,t−1) derived from the Jones model are positive and significantly at the 
10% level (0.026 and 0.021 respectively). The mean of abnormal total accruals 
(ATA_MJMi,t−1) derived from the modified Jones model is positive (0.020) and 
statistically significant at the 10% level, whereas the mean of abnormal working 
capital accruals (AWCA_JMi,t−1) derived from the modified Jones model is positive 
(0.014), but not significant. For real earnings management proxies in year t-1, the 
means of abnormal cash flow (ACFi,t−1) and abnormal total real earnings 
management (ATREMi,t−1) are positive and significant at the 10% level (0.065) 
and 5% level (0.119) respectively, while abnormal expenses (ADEXPi,t−1) and 
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abnormal production costs (APRODi,t−1) are positive (0.017 and 0.027 
respectively), but insignificant.  
However, in years t-2 and t-3, the means of ATA_JMi,t−1−k, AWCA_JMi,t−1−k, 
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k, ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k, 
ATREMi,t−1−k, FSD_SCOREi,t−1−k and KSMAXi,t−1−k (k is replaced by 1 and 2 for 
year t-2 and year t-3, respectively) are mixed but importantly insignificant. 
The results are consistent with the hypotheses H3.1, H3.3 and H3.5 and previous 
research in the position that acquirers inflate the earnings by using abnormal 
accruals in the first year prior to the merger announcement, and also manipulate 
real earnings activities especially cash flow-based earnings management prior to 
the merger announcement in the first year. The Benford’s Law results provide 
robust evidence of earnings management in the first year prior to the merger 
announcement. 
For cash-financed acquirers, Table 3-4 shows that the means of abnormal 
accrual-based earnings management, abnormal real earnings management and 
Benford’s Law proxies are mixed and importantly insignificant in years t-1, t-2 and 
year t-3. The results are consistent with the hypotheses H3.2, H3.4 and H3.6 and 
previous research showing that cash-financed acquirers do not manipulate their 
earnings prior to the merger announcement.
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Table 3-4: Earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
Earnings management proxies 
Share-financed acquirers Cash-financed acquirers 
Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
FSD_SCOREi,t−1−k 0.039  0.044  0.045 *** 0.036  0.035  0.034  
KSMAXi,t−1−k 0.105  0.102  0.115 *** 0.088  0.083  0.085  
ATA_JMi,t−1−k -0.026  -0.009  0.026 * 0.003  -0.008  0.003  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k -0.022  -0.010  0.021 * 0.005  -0.004  0.005  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.034  -0.013  0.020 * -0.006  -0.017  -0.006  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.030  -0.015  0.014  -0.004  -0.013  -0.004  
ACFi,t−1−k 0.028  -0.013  0.065 * -0.057  -0.053  -0.035  
ADEXPi,t−1−k -0.004  -0.088  0.017  -0.072  0.002  -0.001  
APRODi,t−1−k 0.064  -0.028  0.027  -0.021  -0.008  -0.037  
ATREMi,t−1−k 0.022  -0.074  0.119 ** -0.181  -0.068  -0.034  
Note: The table reports the means of earnings management and Benford’s Law proxies for acquirers in the UK from 2007 and 2012. The sample 
includes 295 deals, consisting of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. Significance is based on t-tests of the means. ***, ** and 
* indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. Please see the Appendix for variable descriptions. Years t-1, t-2 and t-3 are the 
first, second and third years with an earnings release preceding the announcement of the deal. 
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3.5.3 Multivariate analyses 
3.5.3.1 Earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers and 
the rest of sample test 
Table 3-5 presents comparisons of the means for earnings management proxies 
of share-financed acquirers and cash-financed acquirers and the rest of the 
sample for three years prior to a merger announcement. Panel A presents the 
difference between earnings management proxies of share-financed acquirers 
and cash-financed acquirers and the rest of the sample and the difference 
between earnings management proxies for share-financed acquirers and cash-
financed acquirers in the first year prior to the merger announcement (year t-1). 
Regarding Benford’s Law proxies, the mean FSD_SCOREi,t−1 (0.045) and 
KSMAXi,t−1 (0.118) of share-financed acquirers are significantly higher than those 
of the rest of the sample (0.038 and 0.095 respectively) and significantly higher 
than the FSD_SCOREi,t−1 (0.034) and KSMAXi,t−1 (0.085) of cash-financed 
acquirers, while the mean FSD_SCOREi,t−1 and KSMAXi,t−1 of cash-financed 
acquirers are lower than those of the rest of the sample, but not significant. The 
results provide initial evidence that share-financed acquirers inflate accounting 
earnings to a greater extent than cash-financed acquirers and the rest of the 
sample. The results, as shown in Panels B and C, indicate that there is no 
evidence of share-financed acquirers or cash-financed acquirers inflating 
accounting earnings in the second and third years prior to the merger 
announcement. 
Regarding accrual earnings management proxies, the abnormal total accruals 
and working capital accruals estimated using the Jones model (ATA_JMi,t (0.026) 
and AWCA_JMi,t (0.021)) and the modified Jones model (ATA_MJMi,t (0.020) and 
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AWCA_MJMi,t (0.014)) of share-financed acquirers are significantly higher than 
those of the rest of the sample using the Jones model (ATA_JMi,t (-0.010) and 
AWCA_JMi,t (-0.010)) and the modified Jones model  (ATA_MJMi,t (-0.018) and 
AWCA_MJMi,t (-0.018)). Panel A also shows that the abnormal total and working 
capital accruals estimated using the Jones model and modified Jones model of 
share-financed acquirers are significantly higher than those of cash-financed 
acquirers, while the comparison of accrual earnings management of cash-
financed acquirers and those of the rest of the sample are mixed and insignificant. 
As shown in Panel B and C, mean differences are not significant in year t-2 and 
year t-3. 
Turning to real earnings management proxies, the mean ACFi,t−1 (0.065) and 
ATREMi,t−1 (0.148) of share-financed acquirers are significantly higher than those 
of the rest of the sample (-0.008 and -0.030 respectively) and significantly higher 
than the ACFi,t−1 (-0.035) and ATREMi,t−1 (-0.034) of cash-financed acquirers, 
while the mean APRODi,t−1 (0.017) and ADEXPi,t−1 (0.027) of share-financed 
acquirers are higher than those of the rest of the sample (-0.020 and -0.011 
respectively) and higher than APRODi,t−1 (-0.001) and ADEXPi,t−1 (-0.037) of cash-
financed acquirers, but not significant so in either case. In addition, the real 
earnings management proxies of cash-financed acquirers are higher than those 
of the rest of the sample, but not significant. As shown in Panel B and C, the 
mean differences are not significant in year t-2 and year t-3. 
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Table 3-5: Earnings management proxies of share- and cash-financed acquirers and the rest of the sample in the three years prior to M&A deal announcements 
 
Rest of sample vs share-finance deals Rest of sample vs cash-finance deals Share- vs cash-financed deals 
Rest of 
sample 
Share-
financed 
deals 
Difference Rest of sample 
Cash-
financed 
deals 
Difference 
Share-
financed 
deals 
Cash-
financed 
deals 
Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
A. Earnings management proxies’ year t-1 
FSD_SCOREi,t−1 0.038 0.045 0.007 *** 0.038 0.034 -0.004  0.045 0.034 0.010 *** 
KSMAXi,t−1 0.095 0.118 0.023 *** 0.095 0.085 -0.010  0.118 0.085 0.033 *** 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.010 0.026 0.037 * -0.011 0.003 0.014  0.026 0.003 0.023 * 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.010 0.021 0.031 * -0.010 0.005 0.015  0.021 0.005 0.016 * 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.018 0.020 0.038 * -0.018 -0.006 0.012  0.020 -0.006 0.026  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.018 0.014 0.032 ** -0.018 -0.004 0.014  0.014 -0.004 0.018 * 
ACFi,t−1 -0.008 0.065 0.074 * -0.007 -0.035 -0.029  0.065 -0.035 0.101 ** 
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.011 0.027 0.038  -0.010 -0.037 -0.027  0.027 -0.037 0.064  
APRODi,t−1 -0.020 0.017 0.036  -0.020 -0.001 0.019  0.017 -0.001 0.018  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.030 0.119 0.148 * -0.028 -0.034 -0.005  0.119 -0.034 0.152 ** 
B. Earnings management proxies’ year t-2 
FSD_SCOREi,t−2 0.038 0.044 0.005  0.039 0.035 -0.003  0.044 0.035 0.009  
KSMAXi,t−2 0.095 0.104 0.008  0.096 0.084 -0.013  0.104 0.084 0.020  
ATA_JMi,t−2 -0.012 -0.009 0.003  -0.013 -0.008 0.005  -0.009 -0.008 -0.001  
AWCA_JMi,t−2 -0.011 -0.010 0.001  -0.011 -0.004 0.007  -0.010 -0.004 -0.006  
ATA_MJMi,t−2 -0.019 -0.013 0.007  -0.019 -0.017 0.002  -0.013 -0.017 0.004  
AWCA_MJMi,t−2 -0.018 -0.015 0.003  -0.018 -0.013 0.005  -0.015 -0.013 -0.001  
ACFi,t−2 -0.016 -0.013 0.002  -0.015 -0.053 -0.038  -0.013 -0.053 0.039  
ADEXPi,t− -0.006 -0.028 -0.021  -0.006 -0.008 -0.002  -0.028 -0.008 -0.019  
APRODi,t−2 -0.014 -0.088 -0.073  -0.015 0.002 0.017  -0.088 0.002 -0.090  
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Table 3-5: Earnings management proxies of share- and cash-financed acquirers and the rest of the sample in the three years prior to M&A deal announcements 
 
Rest of sample vs share-finance deals Rest of sample vs cash-finance deals Share- vs cash-financed deals 
Rest of 
sample 
Share-
financed 
deals 
Difference Rest of sample 
Cash-
financed 
deals 
Difference 
Share-
financed 
deals 
Cash-
financed 
deals 
Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ATREMi,t−2 -0.025 -0.074 -0.049  -0.025 -0.068 -0.043  -0.074 -0.068 -0.006  
C. Earnings management proxies’ year t-3 
FSD_SCOREi,t−3 0.039 0.039 0.000  0.039 0.036 -0.003  0.039 0.036 0.102  
KSMAXi,t−3 0.096 0.105 0.009  0.097 0.088 -0.009  0.105 0.088 0.038  
ATA_JMi,t−3 -0.009 -0.026 -0.017  -0.010 0.003 0.012  -0.026 0.003 0.210  
AWCA_JMi,t−3 -0.008 -0.022 -0.014  -0.008 0.005 0.013  -0.022 0.005 0.217  
ATA_MJMi,t−3 -0.016 -0.034 -0.018  -0.016 -0.006 0.010  -0.034 -0.006 0.263  
AWCA_MJMi,t−3 -0.014 -0.030 -0.016  -0.015 -0.004 0.011  -0.030 -0.004 0.262  
ACFi,t−3 -0.021 0.028 0.049  -0.020 -0.057 -0.037  0.028 -0.057 0.049  
ADEXPi,t−3 0.003 0.064 0.061  0.004 -0.021 -0.025  0.064 -0.021 0.308  
APRODi,t−3 -0.024 -0.004 0.021  -0.023 -0.072 -0.049  -0.004 -0.072 0.531  
ATREMi,t−3 -0.052 0.022 0.073  -0.047 -0.181 -0.134  0.022 -0.181 0.040  
Observations 7,727 62   7,727 233 
 
 62 233 
 
 
Note: The table reports the means of earnings management proxies for the final UK sample (n = 7,727 observations) from 2007 and 2012, including 295 deals consisting of 62 
share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. Columns 2-4 and 5-7 compare the mean earnings management and Benford’s Law proxies of share-financed acquiring firms 
with the rest of the sample and cash-financed acquiring firms with the rest of the sample in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. Columns 8-10 compare the mean earnings management and 
Benford’s Law proxies of share- versus cash-financed acquiring firms in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. Significance is based on t-test for the mean. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance respectively. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
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3.5.3.2 Correlations 
Table 3-6 shows correlations between selected variables, including abnormal 
accruals estimated using the Jones and the modified Jones models, abnormal 
real earnings management derived from the expectations models following 
Roychowdhury (2006), FSD_SCORE, KSMAX and control variables. SMAi,t is 
positively related to ATA_JMi,t−1 (0.024), AWCA_JMi,t−1 (0.021), ATA_MJMi,t−1 
(0.023), AWCA_MJMi,t−1 (0.019), ACFi,t−1 (0.023), ATREMi,t−1 (0.030), 
FSD_SCOREi,t−1 (0.059) and KSMAXi,t−1 (0.052) and correlations are statistically 
significant, suggesting share-financed acquirers are engaged in income-
increasing behaviour through both accrual-based earning and real earnings 
managements. However, the relationship between CMAi,t and accrual-based and 
real earnings management proxies is insignificant. The table also indicates that 
abnormal accruals estimated by the Jones and modified Jones models, real 
earnings management and Benford’s Law proxies are negatively correlated with 
NOAi,t−2 and SEOi,t−1 and positively correlated with SIZEi,t−2, LEVi,t−2,  MTBi,t−2 
and ROAi,t−1. In summary, the preliminary evidence is consistent with the 
hypotheses. There are correlations with most of the proxies for accrual-based 
earnings management and real earnings management as predicted.
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Table 3-6: Correlations 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) ATA_JMi,t−1 1                  
(2) AWCA_JMi,t−1 0.979 1                 
(3) ATA_MJMi,t−1 0.974 0.954 1                
(4) AWCA_MJMi,t−1 0.955 0.973 0.981 1               
(5) ACFi,t−1 0.079 0.073 0.067 0.060 1              
(6) APRODi,t−1 -0.023 -0.020 -0.007 -0.006 0.196 1             
(7) ADEXPi,t−1 0.086 0.085 0.092 0.092 -0.400 0.222 1            
(8) ATREMi,t−1 0.147 0.142 0.143 0.139 0.170 0.342 0.782 1           
(9) FSD_SCOREi,t−1 -0.037 -0.040 -0.024 -0.030 0.043 0.037 -0.034 0.005 1          
(10) KSMAXi,t−1 -0.026 -0.029 -0.014 -0.019 0.068 0.013 -0.034 0.022 0.591 1         
(11) SMAi,t 0.024 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.013 0.008 0.030 0.059 0.052 1        
(12) CMAi,t 0.018 0.020 0.014 0.016 -0.017 -0.018 0.007 -0.002 -0.067 -0.049 -0.016 1       
(13) SIZEi,t−2 0.014 0.017 0.006 0.009 -0.059 -0.013 0.000 -0.061 -0.269 -0.223 -0.047 0.037 1      
(14) MTBi,t−2 -0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.007 0.023 -0.040 -0.055 -0.031 0.069 0.055 0.006 0.006 0.100 1     
(15) LEVi,t−2 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.041 0.043 0.022 0.036 -0.125 -0.082 -0.020 -0.017 0.106 -0.079 1    
(16) NOAi,t−2 -0.027 -0.029 -0.023 -0.023 -0.112 0.011 0.133 0.052 -0.109 -0.082 -0.032 -0.017 0.063 -0.175 0.187 1   
(17) ROAi,t−1 0.384 0.398 0.361 0.374 -0.216 -0.130 0.106 -0.054 -0.254 -0.241 -0.029 0.063 0.298 -0.074 0.013 0.146 1  
(18) SEOi,t−1 -0.049 -0.043 -0.052 -0.050 0.113 0.037 -0.051 0.030 0.133 0.104 0.069 -0.038 -0.186 0.074 0.007 -0.001 -0.211 1 
Note: This table reports pooled Pearson correlations for the entire sample of 7,727 firm-years over the period 2007-2012. The values reported in italic indicate the corresponding coefficients are not significant at 5% 
level. Please see Appendix for variable descriptions. 
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3.5.3.3 Earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers prior 
to the merger announcement 
Table 3-7 shows the deviation of the first digit of figures reported in the financial 
statements from that expected by Benford’s Law. Under share-financed payment, 
the coefficients of SMAi,t derived from Equation 3-10 are positive (0.004 when the 
dependent variable is FSD_SCOREi,t−1; and 0.013 when the dependent variable is 
KSMAXi,t−1) and consistently significant at the 1% level and 5% level in year t-1, 
respectively. The results indicate that the FSD_SCORE and KSMAX of share-
financed acquirers are significantly higher than those of the rest of the sample. In 
contrast, the coefficients of SMAi,t in years t-2 and t-3 are 0.002 and -0.003 when 
the dependent variable is FSD_SCORE and -0.004 and 0.004 when the 
dependent variable is KSMAX, but not significant. In general, the results 
demonstrate that share-financed acquirers have higher deviations of first digits of 
the financial statements from Benford’s Law, suggesting that share-financed 
acquirers engage in earnings management activities before the merger 
announcement. Thus, the evidence supports H3.1. 
For cash-financed payment, the coefficients of CMAi,t derived from Equation 3-10 
are mixed(-0.001 when the dependent variable is FSD_SCOREi,t−1; and 0.000 
when the dependent variable is KSMAXi,t−1), but not significant. The coefficients 
of CMAi,t in years t-2 and t-3 are 0.000 and 0.001 when the dependent variable 
is FSD_SCORE and -0.004 and 0.003 when the dependent variable is KSMAX, 
but not significant. In general, the results demonstrate that cash-financed 
acquirers do not exhibit higher deviations from Benford’s Lam than those the rest 
of the sample, suggesting that cash-financed acquirers do not engage in earnings 
management activities. Thus, the evidence supports H3.2.
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Table 3-7: Benford’s Law approach of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
  FSD_SCORE KSMAX 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.056 *** 0.054 *** 0.054 *** 0.138 *** 0.134 *** 0.135 *** 
t-statistic 40.52   43.5   45.11   28.11   30.28   30.71   
SMAi,t -0.003  0.002  0.004 *** 0.004  -0.004  0.013 ** 
t-statistic -1.42   1.1   2.78   0.57   -0.69   2.35   
CMAi,t 0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.003  -0.004  0.000  
t-statistic 0.93   -0.38   -0.73   0.79   -1.29   -0.15   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 * 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 
t-statistic 2.55   3.07   3.68   1.77   2.19   2.77   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** 
t-statistic -14.09   -14.69   -14.75   -10.81   -11.14   -11.13   
ROAi,t−1−k -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.005 *** -0.012 *** -0.016 *** -0.019 *** 
t-statistic -5.64   -7.94   -8.84   -5.84   -8.36   -9.85   
LEVi,t−2−k -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.004 *** 0.006  0.001  -0.006 * 
t-statistic -2.35   -2.52   -3.9   1.62   0.44   -1.68   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.007 ** -0.009 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -4.27   -4.85   -4.79   -2.57   -3.61   -2.67   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.000  
t-statistic 0.57   0.73   0.72   1.06   0.8   -0.19   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted.  R2 0.1683  0.1627  0.1688  0.0977  0.1072  0.1122  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
consisting of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-10) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with FSD_SCOREi,t−1−k, and  KSMAXi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-8 presents accruals earnings management derived from the Jones model 
with the intercept of share- and cash-financed acquirers prior to a merger 
announcement. For share-financed payments, the findings shows that the 
coefficients of SMAi,t derived from Equation 3-10 are positive (0.033 when the 
dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−1; and 0.030 when the dependent variable is 
AWCA_JMi,t−1) and both are significant at the 5% and 10% levels in year t-1. The 
results mean that abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals of share-
financed acquirers are higher than for the rest of the sample by 3.3% and 3% 
respectively. Thus, the evidence supports H3.2. In year t-2, the coefficients of 
SMAi,t are positive (0.020 when the dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−2; 0.018 
when the dependent variable is AWCA_JMi,t−2), but insignificant. In year t-3, the 
coefficients of SMAi,t are positive (0.008 when the dependent variable is 
ATA_JMi,t−3; 0.003 when the dependent variable is AWCA_JMi,t−3), but 
insignificant. These results imply that share-financed acquiring firms manage 
total accruals and working capital accruals upward in the first year prior to the 
merger announcement after implementing a number of control variables. 
For cash-financed payment, Table 3-8 shows that the coefficients of CMAi,t 
derived from Equation 3-10 are negative (-0.004 when the dependent variable is 
ATA_JMi,t−1; -0.007 when the dependent variable is AWCA_JMi,t−1) and 
insignificant in year t-1. In year t-2, the coefficients of CMAi,t are positive (-0.010 
when the dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−2; -0.011 when the dependent variable 
is AWCA_JMi,t−2) and insignificant. In year t-3, the coefficients of CMAi,t are 
negative (-0.003 when the dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−3; -0.005 when the 
dependent variable is AWCA_JMi,t−3) and insignificant. Thus, the evidence 
supports H3.4. These results imply that cash-financed acquiring firms do not 
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manage total accruals and working capital accruals prior to the merger 
announcement.  
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Table 3-8: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with the intercept of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.105 *** 0.097 *** 0.121 *** 0.112 *** 0.105 *** 0.133 *** 
t-statistic 10.32   10   13.1   10.06   9.9   12.94   
SMAi,t 0.008  0.020  0.033 ** 0.003  0.018  0.030 * 
t-statistic 0.42   1.19   2.05   0.17   0.96   1.68   
CMAi,t -0.003  -0.010  -0.004  -0.005  -0.011  -0.007  
t-statistic -0.32   -1.12   -0.52   -0.46   -1.2   -0.82   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 ** 
t-statistic 1.38   3.06   2.66   1.35   2.8   2.11   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** 
t-statistic -11.46   -10.21   -11.6   -11.71   -10.68   -12.03   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.186 *** 0.182 *** 0.186 *** 0.195 *** 0.189 *** 0.194 *** 
t-statistic 35   36.16   40.25   33.29   34   37.64   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.056 *** 0.040 *** 0.042 *** 0.057 *** 0.044 *** 0.046 *** 
t-statistic 7.07   5.02   5.4   6.53   5.01   5.34   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.057 *** -0.055 *** -0.061 *** -0.059 *** -0.058 *** -0.066 *** 
t-statistic -9.18   -9.05   -10.38   -8.53   -8.61   -10.1   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.001  -0.003  0.002  -0.004  -0.006  -0.001  
t-statistic -0.24   -0.98   0.69   -0.96   -1.5   -0.32   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 Yes  yes  Yes  yes  Yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 Yes  yes  Yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1618  0.1658  0.1898  0.1534  0.1562  0.1779  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
consisting of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-10) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-9 presents abnormal total accruals and abnormal working capital 
accruals derived by the modified Jones model with the intercept of share- and 
cash-financed acquirers prior to a merger announcement. For share-financed 
payment, Table 3-9 presents the coefficients of SMAi,t are positive (0.024 when 
the dependent variable is ATA_MJMi,t−1 and significant at the 10% level, 0.022 
when the dependent variable is AWCA_MJMi,t−1) but insignificant, while the 
coefficients of SMAi,t are positive (0.015 when the dependent variable is 
ATA_MJMi,t−2; 0.012 when the dependent variable is AWCA_MJMi,t−2), but not 
significant in either case in year t-2. In year t-3, the coefficients of CMAi,t are 
positive (0.009 when the dependent variable is ATA_MJMi,t−3; 0.005 when the 
dependent variable is AWCA_MJMi,t−3), but insignificant. Thus, the evidence 
supports H3.2. These results imply that share-financed acquiring firms manage 
total accrual upward in the first year prior to the merger announcement. 
For cash-financed payments, Table 3-9 shows that the total and working capital 
accruals proxies estimated by the modified Jones model are consistent with the 
results shown in Table 3-8, the coefficients of CMAi,t are insignificantly negative 
in year t-1 (-0.003 when the dependent variable is ATA_MJMi,t−1; -0.006 when the 
dependent variable is AWCA_MJMi,t−1). The coefficients of CMAi,t are also 
insignificantly negative (-0.008 when the dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−2; -
0.009 when the dependent variable is AWCA_MJMi,t−2) and insignificant in year t-
2. In year t-3, the coefficients of CMAi,t are insignificantly negative (-0.004 when 
the dependent variable is ATA_MJMi,t−3; -0.006 when the dependent variable is 
AWCA_MJMi,t−3). Thus, the evidence supports H3.4. These results imply that 
across four alternative accruals earnings management proxies the cash-financed 
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acquiring firms do not manage accrual earnings prior to the merger 
announcement.  
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Table 3-9: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model with the intercept of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept 0.103 *** 0.095 *** 0.119 *** 0.110 *** 0.103 *** 0.129 *** 
t-statistic 10.18   9.92   13   9.83   9.74   12.69   
SMAi,t 0.009  0.015  0.024 * 0.005  0.012  0.022  
t-statistic 0.52   0.9   1.56   0.24   0.64   1.28   
CMAi,t -0.004  -0.008  -0.003  -0.006  -0.009  -0.006  
t-statistic -0.4   -0.94   -0.36   -0.57   -1   -0.63   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 ** 
t-statistic 1.3   3.26   2.92   1.12   2.89   2.13   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** 
t-statistic -11.36   -10.27   -11.71   -11.5   -10.68   -12.03   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.194 *** 0.190 *** 0.191 *** 0.200 *** 0.195 *** 0.198 *** 
t-statistic 36.48   38.04   41.88   34.15   35.42   38.97   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.053 *** 0.037 *** 0.042 *** 0.054 *** 0.042 *** 0.046 *** 
t-statistic 6.74   4.75   5.46   6.18   4.82   5.44   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.057 *** -0.056 *** -0.062 *** -0.057 *** -0.058 *** -0.066 *** 
t-statistic -9.1   -9.22   -10.64   -8.29   -8.66   -10.24   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.003  0.000  0.005  -0.001  -0.003  0.000  
t-statistic 0.73   0.05   1.46   -0.31   -0.75   0.12   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.17  0.1775  0.2006  0.1565  0.1639  0.1864  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
consisting of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-10) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-10 presents the real earnings management of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers prior to a merger announcement. For share-financed payments, Table 
3-10 shows that the coefficients of SMAi,t derived from Equation 3-11 are positive 
(0.063 when the dependent variable is ACFi,t−1; 0.050 when the dependent 
variable is ADEXPi,t−1; 0.022 when the dependent variable is APRODi,t−1; and 
0.145 when the dependent variable is ATREMi,t−1). However, there are only 
ACFi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 which are significant at the 10% and 5% level in year t-
1, respectively. Thus, the evidence supports H3.5. In year t-2, the coefficients of 
SMAi,t are negative (-0.003 when the dependent variable is ACFi,t−2; -0.026 when 
the dependent variable is ADEXPi,t−2; -0.054 when the dependent variable is 
APRODi,t−2; and -0.043 when the dependent variable is ATREMi,t−2), but 
insignificant. In year t-3, the coefficients of SMAi,t are mixed (-0.034 when the 
dependent variable is ACFi,t−3; 0.131 when the dependent variable is ADEXPi,t−3; 
0.022 when the dependent variable is APRODi,t−3; and 0.048 when the dependent 
variable is ATREMi,t−3), but insignificant. These results imply that share-financed 
acquiring firms manipulate real earnings activities in the first year prior to the 
merger announcement especially sale-based real earnings management. 
For cash-financed payment, Table 3-10 shows that the coefficients of CMAi,t 
derived from Equation 3-11 are mixed (-0.005 when the dependent variable is 
ACFi,t−1; 0.007 when the dependent variable is ADEXPi,t−1; -0.013 when the 
dependent variable is APRODi,t−1; and 0.000 when the dependent variable is 
ATREMi,t−1) and insignificant in year t-1. In years t-2 and t-3, the coefficients of 
CMAi,t are mixed and insignificant when the dependent variables are ACFi,t−2, 
ADEXPi,t−2, APRODi,t−2, ATREMi,t−2,ACFi,t−3, ADEXPi,t−3, APRODi,t−3 and 
ATREMi,t−3. Thus, the evidence supports H3.6. These results imply that cash-
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financed acquiring firms do note manipulate real earnings activities prior to the 
merger announcement. 
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 Table 3-10: Abnormal real earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept -0.040  -0.059 ** 0.002  0.127 *** -0.006  -0.098 *** -0.100 *** -0.095 *** -0.056 *** 0.055  -0.076 * -0.092 ** 
t-statistic -1.16   -2.41   0.1   2.82   -0.16   -2.88   -3.5   -4.02   -2.98   1.06   -1.86   -2.55   
SMAi,t -0.034  -0.003  0.063 * 0.131  -0.026  0.050  0.022  -0.054  0.022  0.048  -0.043  0.145 ** 
t-statistic -0.55   -0.08   1.77   1.64   -0.39   0.85   0.41   -1.25   0.64   0.52   -0.6   2.3   
CMAi,t 0.002  -0.009  -0.005  -0.057  0.012  0.007  -0.001  0.011  -0.013  -0.083 * -0.024  0.000  
t-statistic 0.06   -0.38   -0.28   -1.31   0.33   0.22   -0.03   0.49   -0.76   -1.67   -0.63   0.01   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.005 *** -0.002  -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 ** -0.001  -0.003 ** 
t-statistic 0.93   0.37   0.79   -3.2   -1.5   -3.43   -4.63   -4.07   -4.47   -2.52   -0.99   -2.28   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.002  0.003 *** 0.000 *** -0.006 ** -0.006 *** -0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.003 *** -0.008 ** -0.005 *** -0.007 *** 
t-statistic -0.81   1.75   -0.03   -2.04   -2.53   -1.92   3.77   4.11   2.49   -2.46   -2.14   -3.16   
ROAi,t−1−k -0.259 *** -0.207 *** -0.171 *** 0.189 *** 0.133 *** 0.128 *** -0.153 *** -0.145 *** -0.111 *** -0.038  -0.094 *** -0.066 *** 
t-statistic -14.1   -15.76   -16.68   7.98   6.72   7.39   -9.48   -11.03   -11.02   -1.38   -4.38   -3.57   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.137 *** 0.084 *** 0.055 *** 0.062 * 0.031  0.057 ** 0.012  0.035 * 0.046 *** 0.135 *** 0.075 ** 0.078 ** 
t-statistic 4.96   4.04   3.17   1.74   0.98   1.97   0.51   1.72   2.79   3.3   2.22   2.56   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.065 *** 0.044 *** 0.049 *** -0.051 *** -0.033 ** -0.022 * 0.002  0.008  0.018 ** 0.022  0.003  0.024 * 
t-statistic 5.01   4.8   6.43   -3.03   -2.35   -1.76   0.17   0.94   2.49   1.15   0.2   1.78   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 Yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 Yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0655  0.0515  0.0655  0.0262  0.026  0.0309  0.0655  0.0194  0.018  0.0272  0.0158  0.0179  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals consisting of 
62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-11) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k and ATREMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the real earnings management of share- and 
cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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3.5.3.4 Earnings management of share-financed acquirers versus cash-
financed acquirers prior to the merger announcement 
Under Benford’s Law proxies, the first-digit deviation of figures reported in the 
financial statements from that expected by Benford’s Law, Table 3-11 reports that 
the coefficient of SMA_CMAi,t derived from Equation 3-12 are positive (0.004 when 
the dependent variable is FSD_SCOREi,t−1 and 0.007 when the dependent variable 
is KSMAXi,t−1) and significant at the 10% level in year t-1. The results indicate that 
the FSD_SCORE and KSMAX of share-financed acquirers are significantly 
higher than those of cash-financed acquirers. In contrast, the coefficients of 
SMA_CMAi,t  in years t-2 and t-3 are both insignificant when the dependent 
variable are FSD_SCOREi,t−2, FSD_SCOREi,t−3, KSMAXi,t−2 and KSMAXi,t−3. In 
general, the results demonstrate that share-financed acquirers have more 
deviations from Benford’s Law than cash-financed acquirers in year t-1, 
suggesting that share-financed acquirers involve in earnings management before 
the merger announcement. Thus, the evidence supports H3.7. 
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Table 3-11: Benford’s Law of share-financed acquirers versus cash-financed acquirers 
  FSD_SCORE KSMAX 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.055 *** 0.053 *** 0.054 *** 0.117 *** 0.121 *** 0.144 *** 
t-statistic 7.81   9.45   8.48   4.53   6.31   6.39   
SMA_CMAi,t -0.003  0.002  0.004 * 0.005  0.000  0.007 * 
t-statistic -1.02   0.76   1.8   0.57   0.06   0.85   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.000 * 0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  
t-statistic 0.85   1.67   1.25   0.89   1.64   -0.04   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.001 ** -0.001 *** -0.001 ** -0.003  -0.004 *** -0.005 *** 
t-statistic -2.61   -3.32   -2.52   -1.45   -3.22   -3.12   
ROAi,t−1−k -0.005  -0.005 *** -0.011 *** -0.013  -0.010 *** -0.021 *** 
t-statistic -1.02   -2.07   -3.08   -0.79   -1.07   -1.66   
LEVi,t−2−k -0.015 ** -0.010 * -0.004  -0.054 ** -0.006  0.002  
t-statistic -2.25   -1.71   -0.63   -2.2   -0.32   0.09   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.003  -0.003  -0.009 ** 0.022  0.000  -0.030 ** 
t-statistic -0.88   -0.88   -2.53   1.58   0.03   -2.51   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.002  0.000  -0.002  -0.002  0.002  0.003  
t-statistic -0.63   0.1   -0.87   -0.26   0.27   0.38   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 Yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 Yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted.  R2 0.1046  0.1771  0.1582  0.1056  0.0538  0.1154  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 295 deals, including 62 share-financed 
deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-12) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with FSD_SCOREi,t−1−k, and  KSMAXi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the different accruals earnings of share- and cash-
financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-12 presents the comparison of accruals earnings management estimated 
by the Jones model with the intercept of share-financed acquirers and cash-
financed acquirers prior to a merger announcement. Table 3-12 shows that the 
coefficients of SMA_CMAi,t derived from Equation 3-12 in year t-1 are positive 
(0.053 when the dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−1 and 0.038 when the 
dependent variable is AWCA_JMi,t−1) and significant at the 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. The results mean that abnormal total accruals and working capital 
accruals of share-financed acquirers are higher those of cash-financed acquirers 
by 5.3% and 3.8%. Thus, the evidence supports H3.8. In year t-2, the coefficients 
of SMA_CMAi,t are positive (0.033 when the dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−2; 
0.022 when the dependent variable is AWCA_JMi,t−2), but insignificant. In year t-
3, the coefficients of SMA_CMAi,t are positive (0.002 when the dependent variable 
is ATA_JMi,t−3; 0.009 when the dependent variable is AWCA_JMi,t−3), but also 
insignificant. These results implicate that share-financed acquiring firms have 
higher accrual-based earnings management than cash-financed acquiring firms 
have in the first year prior to the merger announcement, after implementing a 
number of control variables. 
 
124 
 
Table 3-12: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with the intercept of share-financed acquirers versus 
cash-financed acquirers 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.084  -0.037  0.008  0.102  -0.059  0.039  
t-statistic 1.45   -0.66   0.13   1.62   -0.91   0.64   
SMA_CMAi,t 0.002  0.033  0.053 ** 0.009  0.022  0.038 * 
t-statistic 0.09   1.6   2.34   0.36   0.93   1.59   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.003 ** 0.002  0.000  0.003 ** 0.004 ** -0.001  
t-statistic 2.3   1.25   -0.2   2.4   2.03   -0.64   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.007 * 0.003  0.000  -0.008 * 0.004  -0.002  
t-statistic -1.78   0.7   -0.11   -1.95   0.91   -0.42   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.143 *** 0.147 *** 0.178 *** 0.148 *** 0.137 *** 0.171 *** 
t-statistic 4.31   5.8   5.25   4.16   4.73   4.77   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.047  0.041  0.071  -0.007  -0.016  0.043  
t-statistic 1.04   0.89   1.35   -0.15   -0.31   0.78   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.011  -0.080 *** -0.036  -0.001  -0.066 ** -0.031  
t-statistic -0.38   -2.73   -1.17   -0.02   -1.99   -0.95   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.010  -0.030 * 0.012  -0.013  -0.025  0.012  
t-statistic -0.49   -1.78   0.62   -0.62   -1.3   0.58   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted.  R2 0.1911  0.2681  0.0965  0.1933  0.2313  0.1322  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 295 deals, including 62 share-financed 
deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-12) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the different accruals earnings of share- and cash-
financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-13 presents the comparison of accruals earnings management estimated 
by the modified Jones model with the intercept of share-financed acquirers and 
cash-financed acquirers prior to the merger announcement. The results show that 
the coefficients of SMA_CMAi,t derived from Equation 3-12 in year t-1 are 
significant positive (0.042 when the dependent variable is ATA_MJMi,t−1 and 
significant at 10%) and insignificant positive (0.038 when the dependent variable 
is AWCA_MJMi,t−1), while the coefficients of SMA_CMAi,t are positive (0.030 when 
the dependent variable is ATA_MJMi,t−2; 0.022 when the dependent variable is 
AWCA_MJMi,t−2), but insignificant in year t-2. In year t-3, the coefficients of 
SMA_CMAi,t are positive (0.008 when the dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−3; 0.009 
when the dependent variable is AWCA_MJMi,t−3), but also insignificant. Thus, the 
evidence supports H3.8. These results implicate that share-financed acquiring 
firms manage accrual upwards higher than cash-financed acquiring firms do in 
the first year prior to the merger announcement. 
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Table 3-13: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model with the intercept of share-financed acquirers 
versus cash-financed acquirers  
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept 0.115 ** -0.055  0.029  0.102  -0.059  0.039  
t-statistic 1.98   -0.95   0.5   1.62   -0.91   0.64   
SMA_CMAi,t 0.008  0.030  0.042 * 0.009  0.022  0.038  
t-statistic 0.34   1.36   1.91   0.36   0.93   1.59   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.003 ** 0.003  -0.001  0.003 ** 0.004 ** -0.001  
t-statistic 2.23   1.64   -0.37   2.4   2.03   -0.64   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.008 ** 0.003  -0.002  -0.008 * 0.004  -0.002  
t-statistic -2.08   0.86   -0.41   -1.95   0.91   -0.42   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.154 *** 0.154 *** 0.182 *** 0.148 *** 0.137 *** 0.171 *** 
t-statistic 4.63   5.81   5.5   4.16   4.73   4.77   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.009  0.007  0.055  -0.007  -0.016  0.043  
t-statistic 0.19   0.15   1.07   -0.15   -0.31   0.78   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.016  -0.073 ** -0.027  -0.001  -0.066 ** -0.031  
t-statistic -0.52   -2.4   -0.88   -0.02   -1.99   -0.95   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.006  -0.020  0.018  -0.013  -0.025  0.012  
t-statistic -0.32   -1.16   0.93   -0.62   -1.3   0.58   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted.  R2 0.2032  0.2379  0.1378  0.1933  0.2313  0.1322  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 295 deals, including 62 share-financed 
deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-12) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the different accruals earnings of share- and 
cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-14 presents the comparison of real earnings management of share-
financed acquirers cash-financed acquirers prior to the merger announcement. 
Table 3-14 shows that the coefficients of SMA_CMAi,t derived from Equation 3-13 
are mixed (0.064 when the dependent variable is ACFi,t−1; -0.021 when the 
dependent variable is ADEXPi,t−1; 0.098 when the dependent variable is 
APRODi,t−1; and 0.083 when the dependent variable is ATREMi,t−1). However, 
only ACFi,t−1 is significantly positive at the 10% level in year t-1. Thus, the 
evidence supports H3.8. In years t-2 and t-3, the coefficients of SMA_CMAi,t are 
mixed and insignificant when the dependent variable is ACFi,t−2, ADEXPi,t−2, 
APRODi,t−2, ATREMi,t−2, ACFi,t−3, ADEXPi,t−3; APRODi,t−3 and ATREMi,t−3. These 
results implicate that share-financed acquiring firms have higher real earnings 
management than cash-financed acquiring firms have especially sale-based 
earnings management in the first year prior to the merger announcement, after 
implementing a number of control variables. 
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Table 3-14: Abnormal real earnings management of share- versus cash-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept 0.300  -0.032  0.455 *** 0.379  0.473 * -0.217  -0.114  0.120  -0.063  0.478  0.422  0.062  
t-statistic 1.02   -0.19   3.28   1.02   1.94   -1.09   -0.59   0.78   -0.47   1.18   1.45   0.26   
𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 -0.086 
 0.088  0.064 * 0.171  -0.104  -0.021  0.055  -0.026  0.098  0.108  0.069  0.083  
t-statistic -0.74   1.4   1.18   1.13   -1.12   -0.27   0.7   -0.44   1.81   0.66   0.62   0.87   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.022 *** 0.000 
 0.009 ** -0.005  -0.004  -0.016 *** 0.003  -0.003  -0.002  0.014  0.000  -0.006  
t-statistic 3.44   0.1   2.22   -0.66   -0.63   -2.78   0.72   -0.78   -0.58   1.58   -0.01   -0.8   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.028 
 0.007  -0.025 *** -0.044  -0.039 ** 0.005  0.005  -0.009  0.004  -0.063 ** -0.036 * -0.015  
t-statistic -1.35   0.66   -2.66   -1.58   -2.18   0.33   0.38   -0.9   0.38   -2.08   -1.71   -0.86   
ROAi,t−1−k -0.193 
 -0.056  -0.055  0.310  0.050  -0.127  -0.112  -0.064  -0.044  0.152  -0.058  -0.150  
t-statistic -1.12   -0.74   -0.67   1.52   0.49   -1.16   -0.97   -0.9   -0.54   0.68   -0.48   -1.14   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.107 
 -0.094  0.029  0.774 *** 0.399 ** -0.154  0.278 * 0.329 ** 0.218 * 0.873 *** 0.376  -0.228  
t-statistic 0.46   -0.68   0.23   2.8   2.08   -0.89   1.74   2.56   1.75   2.92   1.64   -1.09   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.203 ** -0.010 
 0.015  -0.164  -0.180 ** 0.009  0.135 ** 0.012  -0.015  0.003  -0.312 *** 0.097  
t-statistic 2.02   -0.21   0.33   -1.24   -2.35   0.13   1.99   0.25   -0.32   0.02   -3.41   1.2   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0812  -0.0712  0.1272  -0.0509  -0.0646  0.0653  -0.0073  0.0374  0.1579  0.066  -0.0162  0.1061  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals consisting 
of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-13) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k and ATREMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the effect of board connections on real 
earnings management in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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3.5.4 Propensity score matching: two samples t-test. 
Armstrong et al. 2010 and Lawrence et al. (2011) contend that the results derived 
from regression frameworks could suffer from misspecification because the 
different treatments of the control variables and the dependent variable could lead 
to different results. They suggest that propensity score matching could address 
this concern. Following Armstrong et al. 2010 and Lawrence et al. (2011), Burnett 
et al. (2012) use propensity score matching to reduce the influences of firm 
characteristics on the association between suspect accruals and high audit 
quality. They argue that the fundamental differences in firm characteristics may 
still influence the results of regression despite the use of control variables. In this 
study, it is possible that firms involved in M&A activities might be fundamentally 
different from those that are not. 
Thus, propensity score matching method is employed for testing two samples t-
test to control for differences in the relevant dimensions between two samples (1) 
M&A firms sample and (2) non-M&A firms sample by forming new alternative 
matched samples. The samples comprise M&A firms and non-M&A firms that are 
similar to the M&A deals in terms of performance (ROA) and basic characteristics 
(SIZE, LEV and MTB). Specifically, the procedure suggested by Chen et al. 
(2011a), Burnett et al. (2012) and Shipman et al. (2017) is closely followed. First, 
a probit regression is run to estimate the likelihood of conducting M&A deals 
employing the determinants of M&A deals based on explanatory variables (firm 
characteristics). The explanatory variables are ROA or SIZE, LEV and MTB. The 
two alternative probit regressions are as follows: 
Equation 3-14 
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𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) 
Equation 3-15 
𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1) 
The sample used to estimate the logit regressions (Equation 3-14 and Equation 
3-15) consists of the 295 deals in the treatment sample (share- and cash-financed 
deals) and 7,432 candidate control sample deals (firm performance and 
characteristics in firm-years). The estimated coefficients from this logit regression 
are used to estimate the probabilities of share- and cash-financed observations 
for each firm-year in the sample. The propensity scores (probabilities) are then 
used to perform a nearest-neighbour match. The matching is done with 
replacements using a standard tolerance (0.005 caliper matching6) and allowing 
for up to five unique matches per share- and cash-financed observation. 
Consequently, I obtain matched samples of 1,770 firm-year observations with 
295 M&A deal observations and 1,475 in the firm performance control sample 
and 1,475 in the firm characteristics control sample. 
Table 3-15 presents the two samples t-test of earnings management for the 
share- and cash-financed sample, the ROA matched sample and the basic 
characteristics matched sample in the three years prior to the merger 
announcement. Panel A show the difference in mean earnings management of 
the share- and cash-financed sample and the ROA matched sample. The 
difference in mean Benford’s Law proxies (FSD_SCOREi,t−1(0.017) and 
                                                 
6 Cochran and Rubin (1973) introduce caliper matching, which is a modification of the nearest-neighbour 
matching procedure. Caliper matching entails an imposed tolerance on the difference between the 
treatment and control samples. Control observations that do not match the treatment observations based 
on standard caliper matching are excluded from the nearest-neighbour matching procedure. 
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KSMAXi,t−1(0.049), the difference in mean accrual-based earnings management 
(ATA_JMi,t−1(0.046), AWCA_JMi,t−1(0.057), ATA_MJMi,t−1(0.037) and 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1(0.047)) and the difference in mean real earnings management 
(ACFi,t−1(0.018), ADEXPi,t−1(-0.015), APRODi,t−1(-0.016) and ATREMi,t−1(0.023)) 
of share-financed acquirers are positive and significant in year t-1 (the exceptions 
being ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1), while the differences between the 
mean earnings management proxies of share-financed acquirers under ROA 
matching in years t-2 and t-3 and those of cash-financed acquirers under ROA 
matching in years t-1, t-2 and t-3 are mixed and insignificant. 
Panel B shows the differences in the mean earnings management of the share- 
and cash-financed sample and the characteristics matched sample. The 
differences in mean Benford’s Law proxies (FSD_SCOREi,t−1(0.045) and 
KSMAXi,t−1(0.081), the difference in mean accrual-based earnings management 
(ATA_JMi,t−1(0.042), AWCA_JMi,t−1(0.042), ATA_MJMi,t−1(0.037) and 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1(0.036)) and the difference in mean real earnings management 
(ACFi,t−1(0.037), ADEXPi,t−1(0.087), APRODi,t−1(0.093) and ATREMi,t−1(0.191)) of 
share-financed acquirers are positive and significant in year t-1 (the exceptions 
are AWCA_MJMi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1 and APRODi,t−1. Similar to Panel A, the differences 
between the mean earnings management proxies of share-financed acquirers 
and the characteristics matched sample in years t-2 and t-3 and those between 
cash-financed acquirers and the characteristics matched sample in years t-1, t-2 
and t-3 are mixed and insignificant. 
The results in Panel A and B of Table 3-15 show that share-financed acquirers 
manipulate their earnings using accrual earnings management, and real earnings 
management, in particular engaging in cash flow real earnings management, in 
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the first year prior to the merger announcement, while cash-financed acquirers 
do not manipulate their earnings prior to the merger announcement. These 
results are consistent with the hypotheses of this chapter. 
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Table 3-15: T-test of earnings management for matched samples  
The differences in mean of earnings 
management proxies 
Share-financed acquirers Cash-financed acquirers 
Year  
t-3   
Year  
t-2   
Year  
t-1   
Year  
t-3   
Year  
t-2   
Year  
t-1   
Panel A: Matching on the firm performance (ROA) 
FSD_SCOREi,t−1−k 0.007  0.015  0.017 *** 0.004  0.008  0.008  
KSMAXi,t−1−k 0.019  0.032  0.049 *** 0.009  0.016  0.019  
ATA_JMi,t−1−k 0.021  -0.005  0.046 * 0.004  0.000  0.014  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k 0.022  0.003  0.057 ** 0.002  -0.002  0.013  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k 0.020  -0.005  0.037  0.003  0.002  0.015  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k 0.019  0.003  0.047 * 0.000  0.000  0.015  
ACFi,t−1−k 0.068  -0.048  0.018 * -0.032  -0.056  -0.018  
ADEXPi,t−1−k 0.072  -0.064  -0.015  -0.013  0.018  -0.004  
APRODi,t−1−k -0.062  -0.095  -0.016  -0.037  0.041  0.012  
ATREMi,t−1−k -0.001  -0.094  0.023  -0.094  -0.020  -0.011  
Panel B: Matching on the basic characteristic (SIZE, LEV & MTB)  
FSD_SCOREi,t−1−k 0.043  0.041  0.045 ** 0.020  0.017  0.016  
KSMAXi,t−1−k 0.070  0.069  0.081 *** 0.050  0.040  0.039  
ATA_JMi,t−1−k -0.014  0.018  0.042 * 0.014  -0.012  0.013  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k -0.004  0.024  0.042 * 0.011  -0.018  0.009  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.026  0.012  0.037 * 0.014  -0.007  0.016  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.017  0.017  0.036  0.010  -0.012  0.013  
ACFi,t−1−k 0.049  0.002  0.037 * 0.005  -0.046  -0.018  
ADEXPi,t−1−k 0.003  -0.072  0.087  -0.035  0.030  -0.013  
APRODi,t−1−k 0.072  -0.033  0.093  -0.045  -0.018  -0.032  
ATREMi,t−1−k 0.105  0.002  0.191 ** -0.094  -0.033  -0.043  
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Table 3-15: T-test of earnings management for matched samples  
The differences in mean of earnings 
management proxies 
Share-financed acquirers Cash-financed acquirers 
Year  
t-3   
Year  
t-2   
Year  
t-1   
Year  
t-3   
Year  
t-2   
Year  
t-1   
Note: The table reports the differences in mean earnings management and Benford’s Law using propensity score matching. Matched samples 
consist of 1,770 firm-year observations with 295 share- and cash-financed deal observations and 1,475 in the firm performance (ROA) control 
sample or 1,475 in the firm characteristics control sample. Earnings management and Benford’s Law variables are described in the Appendix. k 
is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 for the difference in mean of earnings management and Benford’s Law of share- and cash-financed acquirer with 
matching samples in years t-1, t-2 and t-3 respectively. Years t-1, t-2 and t-3 are the first, second and the third years with an earnings release 
preceding the announcement of the deal. Significance is based on t-tests for the differences in mean. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance respectively.  
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3.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
3.6.1 The Jones model without intercept 
Kothari et al. (2005) show that the inclusion of an intercept in the Jones and 
modified Jones models enhances the specification of these traditional accruals 
models and improves the power of the test. They show that if these models 
include no intercept, the rejection rates will be 20% more than those models 
included an intercept. Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that an intercept can help 
avoid asymmetry around zero discretionary accruals. Following Kothari et al. 
(2005), this thesis estimates non-discretionary accruals using the Jones and 
modified Jones models with the intercept and without the intercept for robustness 
tests to assure the findings. The accrual-based earnings of acquirers estimated 
using the Jones and modified Jones models with the intercept are presented in 
Sections 3.5.3. This section analysis the accrual-based earnings of acquirers 
estimated using the Jones and modified Jones models without the intercept. 
Table 3-16 and Table 3-17 present the coefficients of SMAi,t and CMAi,t estimated 
by Equation 3-10, replacing the dependence variable (Yi,t−1−k) with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, 
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k, ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, and AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k to detect accrual-based 
earnings management of acquirers prior to the merger announcement. These 
abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals are estimated using the 
Jones and modified Jones models without the intercept. As reported in Table 3-16 
and Table 3-17, the results for the earnings management of share- and cash-
financed acquirers prior to the merger announcement do not qualitatively change 
when abnormal accrual are estimated by the Jones and modified Jones models 
without the intercept. 
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Table 3-16: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model without the intercept of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers  
  
ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.121 *** 0.106 *** 0.115 *** 0.129 *** 0.117 *** 0.127 *** 
t-statistic 12.11   11.25   12.76   11.88   11.28   12.8   
SMAi,t 0.015  0.012  0.032 ** 0.016  0.010  0.029 * 
t-statistic 0.88   0.75   2.03   0.85   0.56   1.71   
CMAi,t -0.004  -0.012  -0.005  -0.007  -0.013  -0.007  
t-statistic -0.43   -1.4   -0.67   -0.69   -1.4   -0.85   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 * 
t-statistic 0.78   2.62   2.57   0.65   2.31   1.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -10.49   -9.32   -10.7   -10.11   -9.39   -10.64   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.175 *** 0.169 *** 0.171 *** 0.183 *** 0.177 *** 0.178 *** 
t-statistic 33.45   34.43   37.87   32.01   32.74   35.84   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.039 *** 0.020 ** 0.021 *** 0.031 *** 0.018 ** 0.017 ** 
t-statistic 4.96   2.56   2.79   3.68   2.06   2.09   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.053 *** -0.050 *** -0.054 *** -0.056 *** -0.054 *** -0.058 *** 
t-statistic -8.6   -8.4   -9.45   -8.26   -8.22   -9.22   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.003  -0.005  0.000  -0.008 * -0.009 ** -0.005  
t-statistic -0.91   -1.5   -0.07   -1.89   -2.33   -1.32   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1401  0.1416  0.1606  0.1305  0.1307  0.1473  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
consisting of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-10) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-17: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model without the intercept of share- and cash-
financed acquirers 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.120 *** 0.106 *** 0.114 *** 0.127 *** 0.115 *** 0.125 *** 
t-statistic 11.99   11.24   12.77   11.72   11.17   12.72   
SMAi,t 0.020  0.009  0.025 * 0.020  0.005  0.023  
t-statistic 1.16   0.53   1.62   1.07   0.3   1.35   
CMAi,t -0.004  -0.010  -0.004  -0.007  -0.011  -0.005  
t-statistic -0.49   -1.18   -0.47   -0.76   -1.17   -0.61   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 * 
t-statistic 0.77   2.93   2.75   0.58   2.52   1.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -10.5   -9.5   -10.77   -10.06   -9.45   -10.62   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.184 *** 0.178 *** 0.178 *** 0.188 *** 0.184 *** 0.183 *** 
t-statistic 34.99   36.26   39.9   32.94   34.16   37.2   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.036 *** 0.019 ** 0.021 *** 0.029 *** 0.016 * 0.018 ** 
t-statistic 4.58   2.42   2.81   3.37   1.88   2.15   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.051 *** -0.050 *** -0.054 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.057 *** 
t-statistic -8.31   -8.4   -9.45   -7.88   -8.04   -9.17   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.001  -0.001  0.002  -0.005  -0.005  -0.003  
t-statistic 0.15   -0.4   0.71   -1.14   -1.45   -0.76   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  Yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  Yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1502  0.1537  0.1745  0.1363  0.1395  0.1563  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
consisting of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-10) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings of share- and cash-
financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-18 and Table 3-19 present the coefficients of SMA_CMAi,t estimated by 
Equation 3-12, with the dependence variable (Yi,t−1−k) replaced by ATA_JMi,t−1−k, 
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k, ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, and AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k to test whether the 
accrual-based earnings management of share-financed acquirers is higher than 
that of cash-financed acquirers prior to the merger announcement. These 
abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals are estimated using the 
Jones and modified Jones models without the intercept. The results shown in 
Table 3-18 and Table 3-19 indicate that the main results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
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Table 3-18: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model without the intercept of share-financed acquirers versus cash-
financed acquirers 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.084  -0.037  0.008  0.078  -0.049  0.012  
t-statistic 1.45   -0.66   0.13   1.23   -0.8   0.19   
SMA_CMAi,t 0.002  0.033  0.053 ** 0.003  0.028  0.048 * 
t-statistic 0.09   1.6   2.34   0.13   1.21   1.96   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.003 ** 0.002  0.000  0.004 ** 0.003 * -0.001  
t-statistic 2.3   1.25   -0.2   2.58   1.67   -0.35   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.007 * 0.003  0.000  -0.008 * 0.003  0.000  
t-statistic -1.78   0.7   -0.11   -1.77   0.85   -0.08   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.143 *** 0.147 *** 0.178 *** 0.143 *** 0.132 *** 0.167 *** 
t-statistic 4.31   5.8   5.25   3.99   4.73   4.55   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.047  0.041  0.071  0.034  0.021  0.056  
t-statistic 1.04   0.89   1.35   0.7   0.41   0.98   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.011  -0.080 *** -0.036  0.002  -0.077 ** -0.039  
t-statistic -0.38   -2.73   -1.17   0.05   -2.41   -1.16   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.010  -0.030 * 0.012  -0.016  -0.033 * 0.008  
t-statistic -0.49   -1.78   0.62   -0.78   -1.78   0.39   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted.  R2 0.1911  0.2681  0.0965  0.1957  0.2425  0.1073  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 295 deals, including 62 share-financed deals 
and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-12) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the difference accruals earnings management of share- 
and cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-19: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model without the intercept of share-financed acquirers 
versus cash-financed acquirers 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.115 ** -0.055  0.029  0.102  -0.059  0.039  
t-statistic 1.98   -0.95   0.5   1.62   -0.91   0.64   
SMA_CMAi,t 0.008  0.030  0.042 * 0.009  0.022  0.038  
t-statistic 0.34   1.36   1.91   0.36   0.93   1.59   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.003 ** 0.003  -0.001  0.003 ** 0.004 ** -0.001  
t-statistic 2.23   1.64   -0.37   2.4   2.03   -0.64   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.008 ** 0.003  -0.002  -0.008 * 0.004  -0.002  
t-statistic -2.08   0.86   -0.41   -1.95   0.91   -0.42   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.154 *** 0.154 *** 0.182 *** 0.148 *** 0.137 *** 0.171 *** 
t-statistic 4.63   5.81   5.5   4.16   4.73   4.77   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.009  0.007  0.055  -0.007  -0.016  0.043  
t-statistic 0.19   0.15   1.07   -0.15   -0.31   0.78   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.016  -0.073 ** -0.027  -0.001  -0.066 ** -0.031  
t-statistic -0.52   -2.4   -0.88   -0.02   -1.99   -0.95   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.006  -0.020  0.018  -0.013  -0.025  0.012  
t-statistic -0.32   -1.16   0.93   -0.62   -1.3   0.58   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted.  R2 0.2032  0.2379  0.1378  0.1933  0.2313  0.1322  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 295 deals, including 62 share-financed deals 
and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-12) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the difference of accruals earnings management of share- 
and cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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3.6.2 Control for performance 
Kothari et al. (2005) provide evidence that operating performance is associated 
with measurement errors in estimating earnings management proxies. To control 
for the influence of performance on discretionary accruals, they add ROA to the 
traditional Jones models to capture abnormal accruals. Following Kothari et al. 
(2005), this study adds ROA as a regressor in the cross-sectional Jones (1991) 
and the modified Jones models to control for firm performance. Thus, in the 
robustness tests, to estimate abnormal accruals, first the following equation is 
estimated for each industry/year with at least six observations: 
Equation 3-16 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Using coefficients α̂, β̂1, β̂2, β̂3 and β̂4 estimated from Equation 3-16, I compute 
the first proxy for earnings management as abnormal accruals following Jones 
(1991) based on the cash flow approach (ATAi,t), as follows: 
Equation 3-17 
𝐴𝑇𝐴_𝐽𝑀_𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1] 
Employing the modified version of the Jones model, the change in revenue 
(∆REVi,t) is deducted from the change in accounts receivable (∆RECi,t) in the 
second stage. Therefore, using coefficients α̂, β̂1, β̂2, β̂3 and β̂4 estimated from 
Equation 3-16, abnormal accruals using the modified-Jones model based on the 
cash flow approach (ATA_MJM_PCi,t) are calculated as follows: 
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Equation 3-18 
𝐴𝑇𝐴_𝑀𝐽𝑀_𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
)
+ ?̂?4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1] 
Using the approach controlling for performance, I also calculate working capital 
accruals to avoid the effect of long-term accruals. Thus, other measures of 
earnings management are abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA_JM_PCi,t) 
following the Jones model and abnormal working capital accruals following the 
modified Jones model (AWCA_MJM_PCi,t).  
I then run a regression that excludes the ROA control variables to investigate 
whether share-financed acquirers and cash-financed acquirers inflate accruals 
prior to a merger announcement, because the ROA variable is included in the 
Jones and modified Jones models in the performance-controlled approach. The 
regression is as follows: 
Equation 3-19 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
For abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals are estimated using the 
Jones and modified Jones models with the intercept based on the performance 
control approach, Table 3-20 and Table 3-21 present the coefficients of SMAi,t 
and CMAi,t estimated by Equation 3-19, with the dependent variables (Yi,t−1−k) 
replaced by ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, ATA_MJM_PCi,t, and 
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AWCA_MJM_PCi,t. Table 3-20 and Table 3-21 show that the results of the accrual-
based earnings management estimated by the traditional Jones models with the 
intercept of share- and cash-financed acquirers prior to the merger 
announcement do not qualitatively change under the controlled performance 
appproach. 
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Table 3-20: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with the intercept based on the performance control 
approach of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
  ATA_JM_PC AWCA_JM_PC 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.034 *** 0.029 *** 0.048 *** 0.040 *** 0.037 *** 0.057 *** 
t-statistic 3.78   3.48   6.04   3.98   3.97   6.34   
SMAi,t 0.001  0.013  0.031 ** -0.001  0.011  0.032 ** 
t-statistic 0.05   0.86   2.21   -0.07   0.63   1.97   
CMAi,t 0.000  -0.005  0.003  -0.002  -0.007  0.001  
t-statistic -0.04   -0.58   0.36   -0.26   -0.78   0.1   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.75   0.01   0.16   -1.58   -0.34   -0.44   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** 
t-statistic -6.41   -5.06   -5.84   -7.04   -5.98   -6.67   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.040 *** 0.028 *** 0.024 *** 0.042 *** 0.030 *** 0.027 *** 
t-statistic 5.48   3.89   3.46   5.11   3.77   3.42   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.025 *** -0.023 *** -0.025 *** -0.026 *** -0.024 *** -0.028 *** 
t-statistic -4.42   -4.21   -4.85   -4.01   -3.95   -4.79   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.003  -0.001  0.003  -0.006  -0.003  0.001  
t-statistic -1.01   -0.39   0.98   -1.51   -0.87   0.22   
Year Fixed Effects yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0157  0.0125  0.017  0.0216  0.0205  0.0267  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
which consist of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-19) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings management of share- 
and cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-21: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with the intercept based on the performance control 
approach of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
  ATA_MJM_PC AWCA_MJM_PC 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.036 *** 0.030 *** 0.038 *** 0.042 *** 0.037 *** 0.045 *** 
t-statistic 4.2   3.71   4.91   4.36   4.09   5.21   
SMAi,t 0.006  0.009  0.030 ** 0.007  0.008  0.029 * 
t-statistic 0.38   0.63   2.14   0.39   0.51   1.88   
CMAi,t -0.002  -0.005  0.003  -0.005  -0.007  0.002  
t-statistic -0.18   -0.66   0.36   -0.5   -0.78   0.21   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.77   0.06   0.29   -1.88   -0.42   -0.47   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
t-statistic -5.08   -3.68   -4.56   -5.07   -4.06   -4.78   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.031 *** 0.017 ** 0.013 * 0.025 *** 0.015 * 0.010  
t-statistic 4.35   2.42   1.94   3.19   1.88   1.37   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.025 *** -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.025 *** -0.022 *** -0.023 *** 
t-statistic -4.43   -3.95   -4.32   -4.13   -3.71   -4.13   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.005  -0.002  0.002  -0.009 ** -0.006 * -0.001  
t-statistic -1.59   -0.8   0.7   -2.42   -1.66   -0.34   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.041  0.019  0.02  0.036  0.017  0.03  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
which consist of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-19) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings management of share- 
and cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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For abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals are estimated by the 
Jones and modified Jones models without the intercept based on the 
performance control approach, Table 3-22 and Table 3-23 present the 
coefficients of SMAi,t and CMAi,t estimated by Equation 3-19, with the dependent 
variables (Yi,t−1−k) replaced by ATA_JMi,t−1−k, AWCA_JMi,t−1−k, ATA_MJMi,t, and 
AWCA_MJMi,t. The results show that the results of the accrual-based earnings 
management estimated by the traditional Jones models without the intercept of 
share- and cash-financed acquirers prior to the merger announcement remain 
qualitatively unchanged under the performance control appproach. 
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Table 3-22: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model without the intercept based on the performance 
control approach of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.032 *** 0.026 *** 0.045 *** 0.036 *** 0.033 *** 0.053 *** 
t-statistic 3.5   3.06   5.68   3.63   3.55   6.06   
SMAi,t -0.001  0.010  0.026 * -0.005  0.006  0.026 * 
t-statistic -0.08   0.62   1.85   -0.25   0.37   1.66   
CMAi,t 0.000  -0.002  0.003  -0.003  -0.004  0.001  
t-statistic -0.05   -0.29   0.44   -0.29   -0.48   0.17   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001 ** 0.000  0.000  -0.001 ** 0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.99   0.09   0.42   -1.98   -0.29   -0.37   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** 
t-statistic -6.02   -4.77   -5.65   -6.56   -5.67   -6.54   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.038 *** 0.028 *** 0.024 *** 0.039 *** 0.031 *** 0.028 *** 
t-statistic 5.1   3.84   3.5   4.71   3.81   3.6   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.026 *** -0.025 *** -0.026 *** -0.025 *** -0.026 *** -0.029 *** 
t-statistic -4.54   -4.51   -4.97   -3.96   -4.28   -5.04   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.002  0.001  0.004  -0.005  -0.002  0.001  
t-statistic -0.52   0.23   1.26   -1.38   -0.49   0.29   
Year Fixed Effects yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0134  0.0111  0.0162  0.0184  0.0184  0.026  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
which consist of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-19) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings management of share- 
and cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3-23: Abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model without the intercept based on the performance 
control approach of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
  ATA_MJM_PC AWCA_MJM_PC 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.035 *** 0.028 *** 0.035 *** 0.039 *** 0.035 *** 0.043 *** 
t-statistic 4   3.4   4.6   4.02   3.9   4.99   
SMAi,t 0.008  0.005  0.025 * 0.008  0.003  0.025  
t-statistic 0.47   0.35   1.83   0.44   0.2   1.62   
CMAi,t -0.002  -0.002  0.003  -0.005  -0.004  0.002  
t-statistic -0.21   -0.31   0.42   -0.55   -0.42   0.28   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  -0.001 ** 0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.9   0.32   0.5   -2.13   -0.19   -0.44   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
t-statistic -4.96   -3.58   -4.38   -4.82   -4.05   -4.67   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.029 *** 0.017 ** 0.013 ** 0.022 *** 0.015 * 0.011  
t-statistic 3.97   2.35   2   2.79   1.94   1.51   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.025 *** -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.024 *** 
t-statistic -4.37   -3.85   -4.28   -3.83   -3.77   -4.2   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.003  -0.001  0.003  -0.008 ** -0.004  -0.001  
t-statistic -1   -0.21   0.95   -2.16   -1.16   -0.26   
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.036  0.023  0.03  0.028  0.019  0.06  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals 
which consist of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-19) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the accruals earnings management of share- 
and cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Similar to controlling the performance with regard to measuring accrual-based 
earnings management, following Kothari et al. (2005), this study adds ROA as a 
regressor in the real earnings management models. Thus, the following 
equations are estimated for each industry/year with at least six observations: 
Equation 3-20 
𝐶𝐹_𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation 3-21 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation 3-22 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷_𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For every firm-year, abnormal CF controlling for performance (ACF_PC) is the 
actual CF minus the normal CF_PC calculated using the estimated coefficients 
from Equation 3-20, multiplied by -1. Abnormal DISEXP controlling for 
performance controlling (ADEXP_PC) is the actual DISEXP minus the normal 
DISEXP_PC calculated using the estimated coefficients form Equation 3-21, 
multiplied by -1. Abnormal PROD controlling for performance (APROD_PC) is the 
actual PROD minus the normal PROD_PC calculated using the estimated 
coefficients from Equation 3-22. Finally, the abnormal total real earnings 
management controlling for performance (ATREM_PC) is the sum of ACF_PC, 
ADEXP_PC and APROD_PC. 
I then run a regression to investigate whether share-financed acquirers and cash-
financed acquirers inflate real earnings activities prior to a merger 
announcement, that excludes the ROA control variable, because this is included 
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in the real earnings management models in the performance-controlled 
approach. The regression is as follows: 
Equation 3-23 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
Table 3-24 presents the real earnings management of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers prior to a merger announcement based on the performance-controlled 
approach. The coefficients of SMAi,t and CMAi,t estimated by Equation 3-19 are 
consistent with the main findings. Thus, the findings in Table 3-24 are qualitatively 
unchanged when I estimate real earnings management of share- and cash-
financed acquirers based on the appproach controlling for performance. 
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Table 3-24: Abnormal real earnings management based on the performance control approach of share- and cash-financed acquirers versus the 
rest of the sample 
  ACF_PC ADEXP_PC APROD_PC ATREM_PC 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept 0.268 *** 0.207 *** 0.258 *** -0.277 *** -0.297 *** -0.293 *** 0.042  0.027  0.059 *** -0.014  -0.090 ** -0.025  
t-statistic 8.16   8.74   13.23   -5.78   -8.63   -10.23   1.29   0.91   2.76   -0.29   -2.53   -0.81   
SMAi,t -0.012  0.044  0.079 ** 0.125  0.038  0.039  0.028  -0.064  0.018  0.053  0.090  0.154 *** 
t-statistic -0.19   0.99   2.17   1.4   0.59   0.75   0.43   -1.17   0.45   0.59   1.37   2.77   
CMAi,t -0.020  -0.040  -0.045  -0.035  0.051  0.037  -0.008  0.002  -0.002  -0.080  -0.011  -0.009  
t-statistic -0.62   -1.76   -2.43   -0.72   1.5   1.32   -0.25   0.07   -0.12   -1.68   -0.31   -0.31   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** 
t-statistic 4.39   3.95   6.16   -4.75   -6.09   -9.34   -3.52   -2.89   -3.08   -3.26   -4.12   -4.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.017 *** -0.012 *** -0.015 *** 0.007 ** 0.010 *** 0.012 *** 0.004 * 0.000 *** -0.004 *** -0.007 ** -0.002 *** -0.004 *** 
t-statistic -8.32   -8   -12.42   2.46   4.78   7.16   1.75   0.22   -3.22   -2.52   -0.7   -2.4   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.157 *** 0.075 *** 0.075 *** 0.025  0.042  0.074 *** 0.007  0.038  0.058 *** 0.116 *** 0.088 *** 0.140 *** 
t-statistic 5.68   3.6   4.27   0.62   1.4   2.94   0.26   1.47   3   2.94   2.84   5.18   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.100 *** 0.073 *** 0.079 *** -0.074 *** -0.054 *** -0.044 *** 0.032 ** 0.030 *** 0.039 *** 0.022  0.016  0.033 *** 
t-statistic 7.73   7.9   10.3   -3.93   -4.12   -3.94   2.46   2.62   4.63   1.18   1.13   2.79   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.049  0.0439  0.0741  0.0293  0.0367  0.0472  0.0149  0.0209  0.0179  0.0262  0.0109  0.0179  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The total sample has 7,727 observations, including 295 deals which 
consist of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 3-23) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACF_PCi,t−1−k, ADEXP_PCi,t−1−k, APROD_PCi,t−1−k and ATREM_PCi,t−1−k which are calculated by employing the approach controlling 
performance. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the real earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The 
independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has investigated the earnings management of both share- and cash-
financed acquirers prior to a merger announcement by estimating accrual-based 
earnings management, real earnings management and the first-digit deviation of 
acquirers’ financial statement data based on Benford’s Law. The analyses 
employed a sample 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals in the 
period 2007 to 2012. To measure accrual-based earnings management, 
abnormal total accruals and working capital accruals were estimated using the 
Jones model and modified Jones model with and without the intercept under the 
cash flow approach. To measure real earnings management, following 
Roychowdhury (2006)’s real earnings management models, abnormal cash flow, 
abnormal expenses, abnormal production costs and abnormal total real earnings 
management were estimated. For share-financed M&A deals, the results show 
that acquirers exhibit higher deviations from Benford’s Law prior to the merger 
announcement, suggesting that they engage in earnings management activities. 
There is also evidence that acquirers inflate both their accrual-based and real-
based earnings prior to the merger announcement, which is consistent with 
previous research. Regarding cash-financed M&A deals, there is no evidence of 
earnings management by acquirers prior to the merger announcement across all 
earnings management proxies.  
This chapter is the first to document whether acquirers inflate their earnings prior 
to the merger announcement by applying Benford’s Law and confirm Benford’s 
Law as a reliable indicator of earnings management. Using Benford’s Law to 
study earnings management in the context of M&A provides investors and 
regulators with an easily implementable approach for assessing earnings 
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management in the financial reports of acquiring firms. The findings enhance the 
evidence that share-financed acquirers engage in earnings management prior to 
the merger announcement.  
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4 CHAPTER 4: TIMING AND STRATEGIES OF EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT BY SHARE-FINANCED ACQUIRERS PRIOR TO DEAL 
ANNOUNCEMENTS: CONNECTIONS PAYS7 
 
Abstract 
While it is well documented in the existing literature that share-financed acquirers 
might manipulate accrual-based and real earnings managements before deal 
announcement, this chapter investigates whether and how board connections 
between acquiring and target firms influence such earnings management 
behaviour. It compares abnormal accruals prior to a merger announcement 
between acquirers with connections to the target firms and those with no such 
connections. For cash-financed M&A deals, no significant difference is found in 
accrual-based and real earnings managements between these two types of firms. 
The analysis, however, shows that share-financed acquirers with board 
connections engage in accrual earnings management to inflate earnings 
significantly in the first and second years prior to the merger announcement, while 
those without board connections engage in real earnings management to inflate 
earnings just one year before the merger announcement. The findings suggest 
that less uncertainty about the M&A deals and stronger bargaining positions in 
negotiation for acquirers with board connections allow these firms to strategically 
time and confidently use accruals to inflate earnings, while share-financed 
acquirers without board connections strategically use real business transactions 
                                                 
7 This chapter has been presented at 40th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association (EAA), 
British Accounting and Finance Association - South Western Area Group: 2016 Doctoral Colloquium, 
British Accounting and Finance Association - 2016 Doctoral conference and University of East London 2016 
Postgraduate Research Conference. 
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to increase earnings, which might be intended to avoid litigation and regulatory 
risk.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION  
As reviewed in section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3, acquiring firms tend to inflate earnings 
significantly prior to a share for share bid to reduce the cost of buying target firms. 
The main reason is that this will lead to a higher market price of the firms’ stock. 
Consequently, fewer shares of the acquiring firm need to be issued for the target 
firms’ shareholders. Evidence from Louis (2004) shows that there is a higher level 
of earnings management before a stock swap announcement, while the share 
price of acquirers increases significantly in the days leading to a merger 
announcement.  
This chapter extends this line of research by investigating whether and how board 
connections between acquirer and target firms affect earnings management in 
acquirer firms before the merger announcement. Acquirer firms with board 
connections in target firms (i.e., the acquirers have board members who also 
serve on the board of directors of target firms at any time before an M&A deal) 
are suggested to be in a better position to inflate their earnings. Firms with board 
connections have better information flow and lower information asymmetry 
(Gompers and Xuan 2009; Singh and Schonlau 2009; Cai and Sevilir 2012; 
Larcker et al. 2013; Renneboog and Zhao 2014), which in turn may increase the 
certainty of deal completion (Renneboog and Zhao 2014) and mitigate the 
adverse effects of earnings management on deal success (Chen et al. 2011b). 
Therefore, acquirers with board connections may be less conservative in 
manipulating earnings by using accruals than acquirers without board 
connections. 
Furthermore, firms with board connections are more likely to choose the time 
strategically to manipulate their earnings. Arguably, extremely abnormal earnings 
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are highly likely to attract the attention of regulators and auditors (Dechow et al. 
1996b; Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 2000; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002) and thus 
the costs of extremely abnormal earnings may also lead to a litigation penalty 
(DuCharme et al. 2004; Graham et al. 2005; Zang 2012) particularly before the 
merger announcement (Gong et al. 2008; Ball and Shivakumar 2008). Thus, 
excessive earnings management around M&A deals could put acquirers at high 
risk of litigation. With less uncertainty concerning deal completion (Gompers and 
Xuan 2009; Cai and Sevilir 2012; Fracassi and Tate 2012; Renneboog and Zhao 
2014), acquirers with board connections may be more confident that they can 
manipulate their earnings by using accruals long before a merger announcement. 
Furthermore, based on their stronger bargaining position in the negotiations (Cai 
and Sevilir 2012; El-Khatib et al. 2015), acquirers with board connections may 
convince the target to accept M&A deal process (Custódio and Metzger 2014), 
such as the announcement day, giving the acquirers more advantages in timing 
earnings management. Therefore, acquirers with board connections may time 
their earnings management to reduce potential litigation and regulatory risk. In 
contrast, acquirers without board connections may engage in real earnings 
management to avoid the adverse effects of earnings management on deal 
success and reduce the litigation and regulatory risk, as real earnings 
management is difficult to be detected (Roychowdhury 2006). 
The study uses a sample of 295 M&A deals of public acquirers in the UK in the 
period 2007 to 2012, consisting of 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-
financed deals. There are 10 deals with board connections out of the 62 share-
financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of the 233 cash-financed 
deals. Share-financed acquirers without board connections are found to engage 
in real earnings management in the first year prior to the merger announcement, 
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while share-financed acquirers with board connections engage in accrual 
earnings management significantly earlier than those without board connections 
in both the first and second years before the merger announcement. However, 
there is no evidence of significantly difference in earnings management before 
the merger announcement between cash-financed acquirers with and without 
board connections. The results suggest that share-financed acquirers with board 
connections strategically choose the timing of M&A deals and are less 
conservative in manipulating their earnings by using accruals, while share-
financed acquirers without board connections strategically choose real earnings 
management to avoid litigation and regulatory risk8. 
Previous studies paid attention to investigating value creation and destruction 
after M&A returns to estimate the effect of connections on corporate investments 
(Ishii and Xuan 2014; El-Khatib et al. 2015; Schmidt 2015). Other studies have 
investigated the duration of negotiations and the probability of M&A deals as other 
tools to estimate the economic value of networks (Renneboog and Zhao 2014). 
In addition to merger performance and takeover process matters, the motivation 
of this chapter is to extend previous research by investigating the effect of board 
connections on earnings management prior to the merger announcement. 
Therefore, this research enhances understanding of earnings management 
behaviours prior to the merger announcement in UK. 
                                                 
8 In this chapter, I did not use FSD_SCORE and KSMAX, which are deviations from 
Benford’s Law, as earnings management proxies. As well-reviewed in Section 3.2.2, 
while the Benford’s Law approach has no model misspecification problem, this method 
requires financial statements with more than 50 items for every firm-year to calculate 
FSD_SCORE and KSMAX to avoid measurement errors, which may reduce my M&A 
deals sample with board connections. 
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents a discussion 
of the literature and hypotheses. Section 4.3 and section 4.4 describe sample 
selection and methodology. The empirical results and the robustness test are 
reported in section 4.5 and section  4.6. Section Error! Reference source not 
found. concludes the chapter. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1 Literature review 
4.2.1.1 Earnings management of acquiring firms prior to a merger 
announcement: 
As reviewed in section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3, in share-financed M&A deals the 
acquiring firms swap their own shares for the targets’ shares. Hence, a higher 
stock price for acquirers prior to the takeover agreement day will lead to a lower 
deal cost for the acquirer. A higher acquirer stock price will also reduce the effects 
of earnings dilution because the acquiring firm may need to issue fewer shares 
to finance the deal (Erickson and Wang 1999). Therefore, previous research has 
generally found that share-financed acquirers engage in income-increasing 
earnings management (Louis 2004; Baik et al. 2007; Botsari and Meeks 2008; 
Gong et al. 2008) and real earnings management (Zhu and Lu 2013; Farooqi et 
al. 2017) prior to a merger announcement. In contrast, previous research shows 
that cash-financed acquirers do not engage in income-increasing earnings 
management (North and O’Connell 2002; Koumanakos et al. 2005).  
With regard to the timing of earnings management, prior studies show that 
acquiring firms inflate earnings by using accruals within one or two years prior to 
the takeover announcement day. Using total abnormal accruals as a proxy for 
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earnings management, Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004) find that 
acquirers manipulate total accruals prior to the merger announcement, 
particularly in the quarter immediately preceding the offer. Similarly, Botsari and 
Meeks (2008) show that acquiring firms inflate earnings management in both the 
first and second-year prior to a merger announcement.  
A reason for acquirers to inflate earnings a long time - two years or one year - 
before the announcement day is that they may be attempting to avoid the 
attention of regulators and the risk of lawsuits. Concerning the attention of 
regulators, many studies  (Dechow et al. 1996b; Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 
2000; Bradshaw et al. 2001) have shown that extremely abnormal earnings are 
very likely to attract such attention. A potential litigation penalty may be the cost 
of extremely abnormal earnings (DuCharme et al. 2004; Graham et al. 2005; 
Zang 2012). Moreover, acquirers may choose the timing of earnings 
management to avoid possible lawsuits. For example, Gong et al. (2008) claim 
that accruals earnings management in the first quarter prior to the offer leads to 
higher post-merger announcement lawsuits. Therefore, firms may inflate accrual-
based earnings a long time before the announcement day to avoid lawsuits. 
Rangan (1998) points out that firms prevent possible lawsuits by strategically 
increasing earnings after stock issues. Moreover, most of the research on 
earnings management around stock issues shows that firms increase reported 
earnings immediately before stock issues to mislead investors about the future 
performance of the firms’ stock. Therefore, investors might pay too much for 
shares, while firms obtain capital at lower cost (Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al. 
1998b; DuCharme et al. 2004; Kim and Park 2005). 
Regarding deal completion, there are relatively few studies suggesting that the 
rate of successful deal completion is significantly affected by the level of earnings 
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management of acquiring and target firms. Chen et al. (2011b) demonstrated that 
the magnitudes of earnings management of acquiring and target firms negatively 
affect the rate of successful deal completion. This view is supported by Marquardt 
and Zur (2015), who show that low accruals quality in target firms, an indication 
of high earnings management, leads to a lower rate of successful deal 
completion. The authors explain that information about the true value of acquirers 
and targets emerges between the announcement and completion dates. Overall, 
these studies highlight the fact that earnings management leads to deal 
uncertainty. Therefore, firms will tend to be more conservative when deciding 
whether to inflate earnings by using accruals if they are uncertain about deal 
completion. 
4.2.1.2 Do board connections between acquirers and target firms matter? 
Board connections between acquirers and target firms may matter because of 
several reasons. First, compared with acquirers without board connections, 
acquirers with board connections have lower information asymmetry. For M&A 
deals without board connections, Hansen (1987) indicates that both acquiring 
and target firms process M&A transactions with imperfect information. The deal 
valuation is explicitly affected by the information asymmetry problem. However, 
acquirers that have board connections with target firms have improved 
information flow and lower information asymmetry (Singh and Schonlau 2009; 
Gompers and Xuan 2009; Cai and Sevilir 2012; Larcker et al. 2013; Renneboog 
and Zhao 2014). There is evidence that lower information asymmetry may 
increase the certainty of deal completion (Renneboog and Zhao 2014). 
Therefore, acquirers with a board connection are more certain about deal 
completion than acquirers without board connection due to lower information 
asymmetry. Chen et al. (2011b) and Marquardt and Zur (2015) suggest that the 
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successful rate of deal completion is negatively affected by earnings 
management acquirers and targets. Thus, acquirers may be more conservative 
in engaging in earnings management if they are less certain about the deal 
completion. However, compared with acquirers without a board connection, 
acquirers with board connections are more certain about the successful rate of 
deal completion due to lower information asymmetry, they might be less 
conservative in engaging in accrual earnings management. 
The second reason is that acquirers with board connections have greater 
bargaining power in merger negotiations than acquirers without board 
connections. A study by Cai and Sevilir (2012) suggests that, compared with 
acquirers without board connections, acquirers with direct board connections, 
e.g. acquirers and target firms have common board members, can have a better-
informed position about the targets, leading to a greater bargaining power for 
acquiring firms in merger negotiations with the targets. When there is a 
representative of the acquirer on the target board, there will be fewer outside 
bidders because outsider bidders who have less inside information have less 
incentive to offer a higher price to take over the target. Hence, acquirers with 
board connections have a stronger bargaining position in negotiations with 
targets (Kagel and Levin 1986). 
As discussed above, acquirers want to avoid litigation and regulatory risk 
(Rangan 1998; DuCharme et al. 2004; Graham et al. 2005; Zang 2012; Gong et 
al. 2008) and a board connection with the target firms places the acquirers in a 
stronger bargaining position in the negotiations (Kagel and Levin 1986; Cai and 
Sevilir 2012). Acquirers may choose to engage in accrual earnings management 
a long time before M&A transactions and they may convince the target firms to 
accept the acquirers’ chosen time for the M&A. There is evidence that target firms 
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may be convinced to accept M&A process such as announcement day which 
provides the acquirer more flexibility in timing earnings management (Custódio 
and Metzger 2014). Therefore, acquirers with board connections may inflate 
earnings by using accruals in more than one year, e.g. two years prior to the 
merger announcement. 
4.2.2 Hypotheses 
The existing literature suggests that earnings management among acquiring and 
target firms affects the successful rate of deal completion (Chen et al. 2011b; 
Marquardt and Zur 2015). Acquirers with board connections may be less 
conservative in using accrual earnings management because they are less 
uncertain about the deal completion. However, there is also evidence that 
extremely abnormal accruals reported by a share-financed acquirer in the quarter 
immediately prior to the deal announcement could attract the attentions of 
regulators and lead to higher likelihood of post-merger announcement lawsuits 
(Gong et al. 2008). Therefore, if a share-financed acquirer engages in accrual 
earnings management, it is more likely that such manipulation will happen well in 
advance of the deal announcement to prevent litigation and regulatory risk. In 
addition, acquirers with board connections have a stronger bargaining position in 
the negotiations (Kagel and Levin 1986; Cai and Sevilir 2012). Thus they can 
convince target firms to accept M&A deal progress. Consequently, acquirers with 
board connections may strategically time their accrual earnings management to 
avoid litigation and regulatory risk. This study investigates the pattern of accrual-
based earnings management of both share- and cash-financed acquirers with 
board connections up to three years before the merger announcement to test this 
intuition. However, the prior literature shows that cash-financed acquirers 
164 
 
generally do not have the motivations to inflate earnings. The first two hypotheses 
are thus as follows: 
H4.1: Share-financed acquirers with board connections engage in accrual 
earnings management significantly early prior to a merger announcement, while 
those without board connections do not engage in accrual earnings management. 
H4.2: Cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections do not engage 
in accrual earnings management prior to a merger announcement. 
The existing literature documents two methods for managing earnings, namely 
accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Accrual-
based earnings management can be defined as exercising professional 
judgements in applying accounting standards that affect earnings reported in 
financial statements (Healy and Wahlen 1999). For example, firms manage the 
allowance for uncollectible accounts (McNichols and Wilson 1988; Cecchini et al. 
2012), claim loss reserves from insurance (Beaver and McNichols 2001), defer 
tax assets (Miller and Skinner 1998), or other specific accounts (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999). The main benefit of employing accruals earnings management is 
that manipulating earnings has a low cost (Roychowdhury 2006). However, 
accruals earnings management could attract the attention of regulators (Dechow 
et al. 1996b; Mills 1998; Mills and Sansing 2000; Bradshaw et al. 2001) leading 
to the risk of lawsuits (DuCharme et al. 2004; Graham et al. 2005; Zang 2012).  
Real earnings management can be defined as structuring actual business 
transactions to affect reported earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Roychowdhury 
2006). For example, firms may be involved in sales manipulation, overproduction 
and cutting of discretionary expense (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Bushee 
1998; Bens et al. 2003; Roychowdhury 2006). The main benefit of employing real 
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earnings management is that it is less likely attract the attention of auditors and 
regulators than accrual-based manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006).  
Compared to acquirers with board connections, acquirers without board 
connections may be more conservative in using accrual earnings management 
because they are uncertain about deal completion. Extremely abnormal accruals 
for share-financed acquirers immediately prior to a merger announcement could 
result in potential litigation and regulatory risk (Gong et al. 2008). In contrast, the 
existing literature posits that real earnings management is less likely to attract the 
attention of auditors and regulators (Roychowdhury 2006). Therefore, acquirers 
without board connections may engage in real earnings management to increase 
their earnings to avoid potential litigation and regulatory risk. The third and fourth 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H4.3: Share-financed acquirers without board connections engage in real 
earnings management prior to a merger announcement, while those with board 
connections do not engage in real earnings management. 
H4.4: Cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections do not engage 
in real earnings management prior to a merger announcement. 
4.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The sample used in this chapter is similar to that in Chapter 3. The sample has 
7,727 observations covering all UK firms in the period from 2007 to 2012. These 
observations provide enough data to estimate accrual-based and real earnings 
managements. For M&A sample, as explained in section 3.3, the final M&A 
sample consists of 295 deals of public acquirers including 62 share-financed 
deals and 233 cash-financed deals. 
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The data of board connections of acquirers and targets are based on information 
from Bloomberg, the Financial Times, Key Note and LinkedIn. First, from the 
Bloomberg database, a list of directors on board, including each director’s title 
and duration of tenure, the company’s name and the International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN) for each company in each fiscal year. If information 
on the title or tenure of directors was missing from Bloomberg, the directors’ full 
names and company names were used to search for this information in the 
Financial Times, Key Note and LinkedIn. Second, the acquirer and target lists 
were obtained with information of the directors on the board for each acquirer and 
target firm in each fiscal year by matching the ISIN of the acquirers and targets 
with the ISIN of the directors on the board list. Third, linkages between acquirers 
and target firms were inferred. If at least one board director of the acquirer (target) 
had worked for the target (acquirer) prior to an merger announcement day, the 
acquirer was defined as having a board network with the target firm. 
Consequently, 10 share-financed deals and 15 cash-financed deals were 
identified which had board connections between acquirer and target firms.  
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Table 4-1: Year distribution of UK deals in the period of 2007 to 2012: 
Year Full sample 
Rest of 
sample 
M&A Deal 
Total 
M&A 
Share-financed deals Cash-financed deals 
Total Board connection 
No board 
connection Total 
Board 
connection 
No board 
connection 
2007 1,351 1,274 77 13 0 13 64 4 60 
2008 1,363 1,313 50 12 2 10 38 4 34 
2009 1,322 1,283 39 11 3 8 28 0 28 
2010 1,294 1,246 48 15 3 12 33 0 33 
2011 1,233 1,192 41 7 1 6 34 3 31 
2012 1,164 1,124 40 4 1 3 36 4 32 
Total 7,727 7,432 295 62 10 52 233 15 218 
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4.4 METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Accrual-based and real earnings managements 
Previous studies have provided evidence that managers are more likely to 
employ accruals to inflate reported earnings to achieve firms’ financial targets 
because accrual earnings management is less costly than other types of earnings 
manipulation (Graham et al. 2005; Demerjian et al. 2013). Therefore, the study 
first investigated earnings management by estimating discretionary accruals in 
the period around a merger announcement. 
Previous research has presented various models to estimate accrual-based 
earnings management (Holthausen et al. 1995; Fields et al. 2001; Dechow et al. 
2010a; DeFond 2010; Ball 2013). However, Peasnell et al. (2000) argue that the 
most effective model for estimating accrual-based earnings management are the 
Jones (1991) model and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). Thus, 
in this chapter, similar to Chapter 3, these two models are employed to estimate 
earnings management. As described in section 3.4.2, this chapter employs four 
measures of accrual-based earnings, which are abnormal total accruals 
estimated by Jones model and the modified Jones model (𝐴𝑇𝐴_𝐽𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 and 
𝐴𝑇𝐴_𝑀𝐽𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) and abnormal working capital accruals estimated by Jones 
model and the modified Jones model (AWCA_JMi,t−1−k and AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k). 
Similar to Chapter 3, real earnings management proxies are also estimated to 
analyse the effect of board connections on earnings management prior to the 
merger announcement. As described in section 3.4.3, this chapter employs four 
measures of real earnings management, which are abnormal cash flow 
(𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘), abnormal discretionary expenses (𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘), abnormal 
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production costs (APRODi,t−1−k) and abnormal total real earnings management 
(ATREMi,t−1−k).  
4.4.2 Control variables 
As reviewed in section 3.4.5 in Chapter 3, firm characteristics and incentives 
significantly affect earnings management. This chapter controls for firm 
characteristics that could drive aggressive earnings management by adding to 
the regressions firm size (SIZE), firm leverage (LEV), net operating assets (NOA) 
and return on assets (ROA). To control for the effect of firms’ incentives to engage 
in earnings management, the chapter adds seasoned equity offering (SEO) and 
the firms’ stock overvaluation, measured by the market-to-book ratio (MTB), to 
the regressions. 
4.4.3 Empirical models 
To test H4.1 and H4.2, the following regression is estimated: 
Equation 4-1 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
where Yi,t−1−k is replaced by abnormal total accruals estimated by the Jones and 
modified Jones models (ATA_JMi,t−1−k and  ATA_MJMi,t−1−k) and abnormal 
working capital accruals estimated by the Jones and modified Jones models 
(AWCA_JMi,t−1−k and AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k). k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate 
the accruals of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board 
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connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. Under investigating the effects of the board 
connections on share-financed payment, XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t are 
indicator variables which are replaced by SMA_WBCi,t and SMA_WOBCi,t. 
SMA_WBCi,t sets to 1 for share-financed acquiring firms with board connections 
in year t, and SMA_WOBCi,t sets to 1 for share-financed acquiring firms without 
board connections in year t, zero otherwise. Under investigating the effects of the 
board connections on cash-financed payment, XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t are 
replaced by CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t. CMA_WBCi,t sets to 1 for cash-
financed acquiring firms with board connections and CMA_WOBCi,t sets to 1 for 
cash-financed acquiring firms without board connections in year t, zero otherwise. 
MTBi,t−2−k, SIZEi,t−2−k, ROAi,t−1−k, LEVi,t−2−k, NOAi,t−2−k and SEOi,t−1−k are control 
variables to control for the effects of growth opportunities, firm size, firms’ 
performance, debt, equity issuance and the level of NOA, respectively. 
This chapter also employs a regression which includes indicator variables for both 
share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections to test 
H4.1 and H4.2. The regression is presented as follows: 
Equation 4-2 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽7(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽10(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
To test H3.3 and H3.4, linear regressions are run, investigating the effects of 
share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections on real 
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earnings management prior to the merger announcement. Specifically, the 
following regression is estimated: 
Equation 4-3 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k and ATREMi,t−1−k. 
k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate the effect of board connections on real 
earnings management in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. Other control variables are as 
explained in section 3.4.5. This regression excludes NOAi,t−1−k because previous 
research has not shown a significant correlation between real earnings 
management and NOA. 
Similar to accrual-based earnings management, indicator variables for both 
share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections included 
to test H4.3 and H4.4. The regression is presented as follows: 
Equation 4-4 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽7(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
172 
 
4.5 RESULTS 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The sample used to investigate the earnings management of share- and cash-
financed acquirers with and without board connections prior to a merger 
announcement in this chapter is similar that in Chapter 3, comprising 7,727 
observations covering all UK firms in the period from 2007 to 2012. As explained 
in Section 3.3, the final M&A sample consists of 295 deals, which include 62 
share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. There are 10 share-financed 
acquirers with board connections out of the 62 share-financed deals and 15 cash-
financed acquirers with board connections out of the 233 cash-financed deals. 
The descriptive statistics for the whole sample were described in section 3.5.1. 
The descriptive statistics of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without 
board connections are presented in Table 4-2. Table 4-2 shows that the means 
of accrual-based earnings management proxies of share-financed acquirers with 
board connections are positive and higher than those of share-financed acquirers 
without board connections, while the means of real earnings management 
proxies of share-financed acquirers with board connections are negative and 
lower than those of share-financed acquirers without board connections in year 
t-1. The descriptive statistics table also shows that the means of earnings 
management proxies of cash-financed acquirers is not consistently positive or 
negative. Overall, the descriptive statistics give initial evidence that share-
financed acquirers with board connections may engage in accrual earnings 
management to inflate earnings in the first year prior to a merger announcement, 
while those without board connections engage in real earnings management to 
inflate earnings. 
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Besides, the evidence of the effect of board connections on earnings 
management prior to M&A deals is showed in the descriptive statistics table; the 
board connections seem also to influence the method of payment used in M&A. 
The sample of M&A deals in this research shows that deals with board 
connections are more likely to be paid in stock (10 out of 62 stock deals vs 15 out 
of 233 cash deals). This fact is consistent with Renneboog and Zhao (2014) which 
shows that connected targets more frequently accept offers that involve equity.  
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Table 4-2: Summary descriptive statistics 
Statistics N MEAN STD MIN P25 MEDIAN P75 MAX 
Panel A: Earnings management proxies of share-financed acquirers with board connections 
ATA_JMi,t−1 10 0.064 0.130 -0.146 -0.005 0.054 0.135 0.298 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 10 0.050 0.137 -0.181 -0.004 0.050 0.137 0.283 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 10 0.058 0.127 -0.150 -0.005 0.040 0.140 0.281 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 10 0.044 0.134 -0.184 -0.009 0.038 0.141 0.270 
ACFi,t−1 10 -0.083 0.165 -0.497 -0.145 -0.035 0.040 0.052 
ADEXPi,t−1 10 -0.073 0.319 -0.855 -0.076 0.019 0.107 0.203 
APRODi,t−1 10 -0.044 0.176 -0.380 -0.060 0.021 0.039 0.187 
ATREMi,t−1 10 -0.024 0.206 -0.370 -0.017 0.066 0.092 0.224 
Panel B: Earnings management proxies of share-financed acquirers without board connections 
ATA_JMi,t−1 52 0.019 0.172 -0.456 -0.074 0.021 0.097 0.428 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 52 0.014 0.184 -0.466 -0.084 0.017 0.081 0.441 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 52 0.014 0.166 -0.461 -0.101 0.017 0.108 0.430 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 52 0.008 0.173 -0.463 -0.111 0.021 0.077 0.425 
ACFi,t−1 52 0.094 0.377 -1.115 -0.087 0.013 0.296 1.292 
ADEXPi,t−1 52 -0.001 0.471 -1.181 -0.212 0.041 0.307 0.872 
APRODi,t−1 52 0.053 0.365 -1.149 -0.126 0.010 0.212 1.367 
ATREMi,t−1 52 0.192 0.482 -0.616 -0.117 0.027 0.417 1.630 
Panel C: Earnings management proxies of cash-financed acquirers with board connections 
ATA_JMi,t−1 15 0.013 0.093 -0.171 -0.066 0.026 0.081 0.165 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 15 -0.003 0.114 -0.230 -0.122 0.034 0.097 0.161 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 15 0.016 0.094 -0.159 -0.062 0.019 0.090 0.182 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 15 -0.001 0.115 -0.223 -0.125 0.017 0.107 0.178 
ACFi,t−1 15 0.004 0.182 -0.177 -0.142 0.001 0.041 0.538 
ADEXPi,t−1 15 -0.132 0.420 -1.124 -0.191 -0.029 0.114 0.357 
APRODi,t−1 15 0.110 0.421 -0.340 -0.102 0.000 0.318 1.367 
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Table 4-2: Summary descriptive statistics 
Statistics N MEAN STD MIN P25 MEDIAN P75 MAX 
ATREMi,t−1 15 -0.124 0.309 -0.648 -0.289 -0.007 0.035 0.366 
Panel D: Earnings management proxies of cash-financed acquirers without board connections 
ATA_JMi,t−1 218 0.003 0.108 -0.553 -0.043 0.002 0.038 0.428 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 218 -0.006 0.127 -0.595 -0.059 -0.008 0.040 0.441 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 218 0.004 0.110 -0.529 -0.041 0.003 0.039 0.430 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 218 -0.004 0.126 -0.589 -0.059 -0.005 0.042 0.425 
ACFi,t−1 218 -0.038 0.277 -1.115 -0.127 -0.033 0.031 1.292 
ADEXPi,t−1 218 0.030 0.298 -1.628 -0.064 0.066 0.176 1.073 
APRODi,t−1 218 -0.031 0.326 -1.149 -0.162 -0.029 0.118 1.367 
ATREMi,t−1 218 -0.005 0.345 -1.592 -0.152 0.008 0.158 1.630 
Note: The table reports statistics of earnings management proxies of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board 
connections in the UK from 2007 and 2012. Definitions of variables are in the appendix. 
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4.5.2 Univariate analyses 
To test the earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and 
without board connections prior to a merger announcement, a t-test is first run for 
the means of earnings management proxies of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers with and without board connections within three years prior to the 
merger announcement.  
Table 4-3 presents the results of these t-tests for means of earnings management 
proxies. For share-financed acquirers with board connections, in year t-1, the 
means of abnormal total accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1) and abnormal working capital 
accruals (AWCA_JMi,t−1) derived from the Jones model are positive and significant 
at the 10% level (0.064 and 0.058 respectively). The means of abnormal total 
accruals (ATA_MJMi,t−1) and abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA_MJMi,t−1) 
derived from the modified Jones model are also positive and significant at the 
10% level (0.050 and 0.044 respectively). For real earnings management proxies 
in year t-1, the means of abnormal cash flow (ACFi,t−1), abnormal discretionary 
expenses (ADEXPi,t−1), abnormal production costs (APRODi,t−1) and abnormal 
total real earnings management (ATREMi,t−1) are mixed and insignificant (-0.083, 
0.028, -0.053 and -0.066 respectively). In year t-2, the means of accrual-based 
earnings management are significantly positive at the 10% level, except for 
AWCA_MJMi,t−2, while those for real earnings management proxies are mixed and 
insignificant. In year t-3, the means of all accrual-based and real earnings 
management proxies are insignificant. For share-financed acquirers without 
board connections, the accrual-based earnings management proxies are positive 
in year t-1 and negative in year t-2 and year t-3, but insignificant. However, in 
year t-1, ACFi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 are positive and significant at the 10% and 5% 
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levels (0.094 and 0.155 respectively), while real earnings management proxies 
in year t-2 and year t-3 are mixed and insignificant. For cash-financed acquirers 
with and without board connections, the means of accrual-based and real 
earnings management proxies are insignificant in year t-1, year t-2 and year t-3.  
These results are consistent with the hypotheses, which means that share-
financed acquirers with board connections engage in accruals earnings 
management in the first year and the second years prior to the merger 
announcement, while share-financed acquirers without board connections 
engage in real earnings management, especially cash flow-based earnings, in 
the first year prior to the merger announcement. In contrast, cash-financed 
acquirers with and without board connections do not engage in earnings 
management prior to the merger announcement. 
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Table 4-3:  Earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
Earnings management proxies 
With board connections Without board connections 
Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
A. Share-financed acquirers             
ATA_JMi,t−1−k -0.062  0.055 * 0.064 * -0.019  -0.021  0.019  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k -0.077  0.052 * 0.058 * -0.011  -0.022  0.014  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.077  0.046 * 0.050 * -0.026  -0.024  0.014  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.090  0.043  0.044 * -0.018  -0.026  0.008  
ACFi,t−1−k -0.056  0.005  -0.083  0.044  -0.017  0.094 * 
ADEXPi,t−1−k 0.058  -0.140  0.028  -0.015  -0.077  0.014  
APRODi,t−1−k -0.137  -0.073  -0.053  0.104  -0.020  0.042  
ATREMi,t−1−k -0.009  -0.157  -0.066  0.027  -0.058  0.155 ** 
B. Cash-financed acquirers   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATA_JMi,t−1−k 0.011  0.019  0.013  0.002  -0.009  0.003  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k -0.002  0.008  -0.003  -0.007  -0.019  -0.006  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k 0.023  0.017  0.016  0.004  -0.006  0.004  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k 0.010  0.005  -0.001  -0.005  -0.015  -0.004  
ACFi,t−1−k 0.096  0.062  0.004  -0.068  -0.060  -0.038  
ADEXPi,t−1−k -0.396  -0.016  -0.185  -0.055  0.003  0.008  
APRODi,t−1−k -0.136  0.005  0.033  -0.012  -0.009  -0.041  
ATREMi,t−1−k -0.507  -0.051  -0.169  -0.165  -0.069  -0.027  
Note: The table reports mean earnings management of share- and cash-acquirers with and without board connections in the UK sample from 2007 and 2012. 
The sample includes 10 deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. 
Significance is based on t-tests for the mean. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance respectively. Please see the Appendix for 
variable descriptions. Year t-1, year t-2 and year t-3 are the first, second and third years with an earnings release preceding the announcement of the deal. 
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4.5.3 Multivariate analyses 
4.5.3.1 Earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers with 
and without board connection and the rest of sample test 
The second main test is a regression used to compare the earnings management 
of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections with 
the rest of the sample. Table 4-4 presents the different earnings management of 
share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections and the 
rest of the sample in the three years prior to the merger announcement. In Panel 
A, for the different accrual-based and real earnings management proxies of 
share-financed acquirers with board connections, abnormal total and abnormal 
working capital accruals following the Jones model 
(ATA_JMi,t−1−k and AWCA_JMi,t−1−k)and the modified Jones model 
(ATA_MJMi,t−1−k and AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k) of acquirers with a board connection are 
higher than those of the rest of the sample in the second and first years prior to 
the merger announcement (years t-2 and t-1, respectively), while acquirers with 
board connections have lower abnormal total and working capital accruals than 
the rest of the sample in the third year (year t-3) prior to the merger 
announcement. The results provide initial evidence that share-financed acquirers 
with board connections inflate accruals to a greater extent than the rest of the 
sample in the first and second years prior to the merger announcement. However, 
there is no evidence that the real earnings management of share-financed 
acquirers with board connections is significantly higher than that of the rest of the 
sample.  
For the differences in accrual-based and real earnings management proxies of 
share-financed acquirers without board connections, ACFi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 of 
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share-financed acquirers without board connections are significantly higher than 
those of the rest of the sample in year t-1, while ADEXPi,t−1 and APRODi,t−1 and 
accrual-based earnings management are insignificantly higher than those of the 
rest of the sample in year t-1. In years t-2 and t-3, there is evidence that real 
earnings management proxies of share-financed acquirers without board 
connections are significantly higher than those of the rest of the sample.  
Panel B in Table 4-4 presents the differences earnings management of cash-
financed acquirers with and without board connections and the rest of the sample 
in the three years prior to the merger announcement. However, there is no 
evidence that the earnings management proxies of cash-financed acquirers with 
and without board connections are significantly different from those of the rest of 
the sample. 
To sum up, the results of Table 4-4 show that share-financed acquirers with board 
connections engage in accruals earnings management to inflate earnings in the 
first and second year prior to the merger announcement, while share-finance 
acquirer without board connections use real earnings management only one year 
before the merger announcement. Besides, there is no evidence that cash-
financed acquirers with and without board connections manipulate earnings, 
neither using accrual earnings management nor using real earnings 
management, prior to the merger announcement.
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Table 4-4: Mean differences in earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers with or without board connection with the rest of 
sample 
Earnings management proxies 
Rest of 
the 
sample 
With board 
connection Diff Mean 
Rest of 
the 
sample 
Without board 
connection Diff Mean 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Earnings management proxies of share-financed acquirers 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.010 0.064 0.074 * -0.010 0.019 0.030  
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.010 0.058 0.068 * -0.010 0.014 0.024  
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.018 0.050 0.067 * -0.018 0.014 0.032  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.017 0.044 0.061 * -0.018 0.008 0.026  
ACFi,t−1 -0.008 -0.083 -0.075  -0.008 0.094 0.102 * 
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.020 0.028 0.047  -0.020 0.014 0.034  
APRODi,t−1 -0.010 -0.053 -0.043  -0.011 0.042 0.053  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.028 -0.066 -0.037  -0.030 0.155 0.184 *** 
ATA_JMi,t−2 -0.012 0.055 0.068 * -0.012 -0.021 -0.009  
AWCA_JMi,t−2 -0.011 0.052 0.063 * -0.011 -0.022 -0.011  
ATA_MJMi,t−2 -0.019 0.046 0.065 * -0.019 -0.024 -0.005  
AWCA_MJMi,t−2 -0.018 0.043 0.061  -0.018 -0.026 -0.008  
ACFi,t−2 -0.016 0.005 0.021  -0.016 -0.017 -0.001  
ADEXPi,t−2 -0.015 -0.140 -0.126  -0.014 -0.077 -0.063  
APRODi,t−2 -0.006 -0.073 -0.066  -0.006 -0.020 -0.013  
ATREMi,t−2 -0.026 -0.157 -0.131  -0.026 -0.058 -0.032  
ATA_JMi,t−3 -0.009 -0.062 -0.052  -0.009 -0.019 -0.010  
AWCA_JMi,t−3 -0.008 -0.077 -0.069  -0.008 -0.011 -0.003  
ATA_MJMi,t−3 -0.016 -0.077 -0.061  -0.016 -0.026 -0.010  
AWCA_MJMi,t−3 -0.014 -0.090 -0.076  -0.014 -0.018 -0.004  
ACFi,t−3 -0.021 -0.056 -0.035  -0.021 0.044 0.065  
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Table 4-4: Mean differences in earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers with or without board connection with the rest of 
sample 
Earnings management proxies 
Rest of 
the 
sample 
With board 
connection Diff Mean 
Rest of 
the 
sample 
Without board 
connection Diff Mean 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ADEXPi,t−3 -0.024 0.058 0.082  -0.024 -0.015 0.009  
APRODi,t−3 0.004 -0.137 -0.141  0.003 0.104 0.101  
ATREMi,t−3 -0.051 -0.009 0.042  -0.052 0.027 0.079  
Observations 7717 10     7675 52     
B. Earnings management proxies of cash-financed acquirers 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.010 0.013 0.024  -0.011 0.003 0.013  
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.017 -0.003 0.015  -0.018 -0.006 0.012  
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.010 0.016 0.026  -0.010 0.004 0.015  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.017 -0.001 0.016  -0.018 -0.004 0.013  
ACFi,t−1 -0.008 0.004 0.012  -0.007 -0.038 -0.031  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.019 -0.185 -0.166  -0.020 0.008 0.028  
APRODi,t−1 -0.010 0.033 0.043  -0.009 -0.041 -0.032  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.028 -0.169 -0.140  -0.029 -0.027 0.002  
ATA_JMi,t−2 -0.012 0.019 0.031  -0.012 -0.009 0.003  
AWCA_JMi,t−2 -0.019 0.008 0.027  -0.019 -0.019 0.001  
ATA_MJMi,t−2 -0.011 0.017 0.029  -0.011 -0.006 0.005  
AWCA_MJMi,t−2 -0.018 0.005 0.023  -0.018 -0.015 0.003  
ACFi,t−2 -0.016 0.062 0.077  -0.014 -0.060 -0.046  
ADEXPi,t−2 -0.015 -0.016 -0.001  -0.015 0.003 0.018  
APRODi,t−2 -0.007 0.005 0.011  -0.006 -0.009 -0.003  
ATREMi,t−2 -0.026 -0.051 -0.025  -0.025 -0.069 -0.044  
ATA_JMi,t−3 -0.009 0.011 0.020  -0.009 0.002 0.011  
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Table 4-4: Mean differences in earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers with or without board connection with the rest of 
sample 
Earnings management proxies 
Rest of 
the 
sample 
With board 
connection Diff Mean 
Rest of 
the 
sample 
Without board 
connection Diff Mean 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AWCA_JMi,t−3 -0.016 -0.002 0.014  -0.016 -0.007 0.010  
ATA_MJMi,t−3 -0.008 0.023 0.031  -0.008 0.004 0.012  
AWCA_MJMi,t−3 -0.014 0.010 0.025  -0.015 -0.005 0.010  
ACFi,t−3 -0.021 0.096 0.117  -0.020 -0.068 -0.048  
ADEXPi,t−3 -0.024 -0.396 -0.372  -0.023 -0.055 -0.032  
APRODi,t−3 0.004 -0.136 -0.140  0.004 -0.012 -0.016  
ATREMi,t−3 -0.050 -0.507 -0.457  -0.048 -0.165 -0.117  
Observations 7712 15   7509 218   
Note: The table reports the difference in mean of earnings management share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections with the rest 
of the sample. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with 
board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. Significance is based on t-tests for the difference in mean. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
of significance respectively. Please see the Appendix for variable descriptions. 
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4.5.3.2 Univariate correlations 
Table 4-5 shows Pearson correlations among selected variables, including 
abnormal accruals estimated from the Jones and modified Jones models, 
abnormal real earnings proxies and control variables. The table indicates that 
share-financed acquirers with board connections (SMA_WBCi,t) are positively 
correlated with abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the 
Jones (ATA_JMi,t−1 and AWCA_JMi,t−1) and modified Jones models (ATA_MJMi,t−1 
and AWCA_MJMi,t−1), while share-financed acquirers without board connections 
(SMA_WOBCi,t) are positively correlated with abnormal cash flow (ACFi,t−1) and 
abnormal total real earnings management (ATREMi,t−1). Moreover, accrual-based 
earning management proxies are negatively correlated with NOAi,t−2 and 
positively correlated with LEVi,t−2 and ROAi,t−1.
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Table 4-5: Correlations 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) ATA_JMi,t−1 1                    
(2) AWCA_JMi,t−1 0.98 1                   
(3) ATA_MJMi,t−1 0.97 0.95 1                  
(4) AWCA_MJMi,t−1 0.96 0.97 0.98 1                 
(5) ACFi,t−1 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 1                
(6) ADEXPi,t−1 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.40 1               
(7) APRODi,t−1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 0.22 1              
(8) ATREMi,t−1 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.78 0.34 1             
(9) SMAi,t 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 1            
(10) SMA_WBCi,t 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.40 1           
(11) SMA_WOBCi,t 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.92 0.00 1          
(12) CMAi,t 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1         
(13) CMA_WBCi,t 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 1        
(14) CMA_WOBCi,t 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.97 -0.01 1       
(15) SIZEi,t−2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 1      
(16) MTBi,t−2 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.10 1     
(17) LEVi,t−2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.08 1    
(18) NOAi,t−2 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 0.13 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.18 0.19 1   
(19) ROAi,t−1 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.37 -0.22 0.11 -0.13 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.30 -0.07 0.01 0.15 1  
(20) SEOi,t−1 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.19 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.21 1 
Note: This table reports pooled Pearson correlations for the entire sample of 7,727 firm-years over the period 2007-2012. Correlations significant at the 5% level are marked in bold and 
italic. Please see Appendix for variable descriptions. 
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4.5.3.3 Accrual-based earnings management of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers with and without board connections prior to a merger 
announcement 
For share-financed acquirers where the abnormal total and working capital 
accruals estimated under the Jones model with the intercept of share-financed 
acquirers with and without board connections prior to a merger announcement, 
Table 4-6 presents the findings of Equation 4-1 where XMA_WBCi,t and 
XMA_WOBCi,t are replaced by SMA_WBCi,t and SMA_WOBCi,t. The results show 
that, in year t-1, the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are positive (0.084 with the 
dependent variable ATA_JMi,t−1; 0.079 with the dependent variable AWCA_JMi,t−1) 
and significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. The coefficients of 
SMA_WOBCi,t are positive (0.021 with the dependent variable AWCA_JMi,t−1; 0.019 
with the dependent variable ATA_MJMi,t−1), but insignificant. The results mean 
that only acquirers with board connections engage in their accruals in year t-1. 
In year t-2, the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are positive (0.071 with the dependent 
variable ATA_JMi,t−2; 0.071 with the dependent variable AWCA_JMi,t−2) and both 
significant at the 10% level, whereas the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are mixed 
and insignificant (0.000 with the dependent variable AWCA_JMi,t−2; -0.003 with the 
dependent variable AWCA_JMi,t−2). The results mean that acquirers with board 
connections inflate their earnings to a significant degree in year t-2, whereas 
acquirers without board connections do not. 
In year t-3, the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are negative (-0.003 with the dependent 
variable ATA_JMi,t−3; -0.005 with the dependent variable AWCA_JMi,t−3) and are 
insignificant, while the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are positive (0.020 with the 
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dependent variable ATA_JMi,t−3; 0.022 with the dependent variable 
AWCA_JMi,t−3), but insignificant. The results mean that acquirers with and without 
board connections only inflate their earnings to an insignificant degree in year t-
3. 
To sum up, these results imply that share-financed acquiring firms with board 
connections manage earnings upwards by using accruals within the two years 
prior to the merger announcement, while those without board connections do not 
manage accrual-based earnings prior to the merger announcement. The 
evidence supports H4.1. 
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Table 4-6: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with the intercept of share-financed acquirers with and without 
board connections 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept  0.120 *** 0.106 *** 0.115 *** 0.129 *** 0.116 *** 0.127 *** 
t-statistic 12.1   11.2   12.74   11.86   11.24   12.77   
SMA_WOBCi,t 0.020  0.000  0.021  0.022  -0.003  0.019  
t-statistic 1.03   -0.03   1.22   1.01   -0.16   1.02   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.003  0.071 * 0.084 ** -0.005  0.071 * 0.079 * 
t-statistic -0.08   1.86   2.25   -0.11   1.69   1.93   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 * 
t-statistic 0.78   2.63   2.57   0.65   2.32   1.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -10.49   -9.33   -10.71   -10.1   -9.4   -10.65   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.175 *** 0.169 *** 0.171 *** 0.183 *** 0.176 *** 0.178 *** 
t-statistic 33.46   34.35   37.85   32.01   32.67   35.81   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.039 *** 0.020 *** 0.021 *** 0.031 *** 0.018 ** 0.018 ** 
t-statistic 4.95   2.6   2.81   3.68   2.1   2.11   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.053 *** -0.050 *** -0.054 *** -0.055 *** -0.054 *** -0.058 *** 
t-statistic -8.58   -8.39   -9.46   -8.24   -8.21   -9.23   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.003  -0.005  0.000  -0.008 * -0.009 ** -0.005  
t-statistic -0.91   -1.44   -0.01   -1.89   -2.27   -1.27   
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1401  0.1417  0.1608  0.1305  0.1307  0.1474  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘  (Equation 4-1) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of share-
financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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For share-financed acquirers where the abnormal total and working capital 
accruals estimated using the modified Jones model with the intercept of share-
financed acquirer with and without board connections prior to a merger 
announcement, Table 4-7 shows the results derived from Equation 4-1 where 
XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t are replaced by SMA_WBCi,t and SMA_WOBCi,t. The 
coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t  are positive (0.077 with the dependent variable 
ATA_MJMi,t−1; 0.073 with the dependent variable AWCA_MJMi,t−1) and significant 
at the 5% and 10% levels in year t-1. The coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are positive 
(0.014 with the dependent variable ATA_MJMi,t−1; 0.013 with the dependent 
variable AWCA_MJMi,t−1), but insignificant. The results mean that acquirers with 
board connections inflate their earnings in year t-1, while acquirers without board 
connections do not. 
In year t-2, the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t  are positive (0.069 with the dependent 
variable ATA_MJMi,t−2; 0.068 with the dependent variable AWCA_MJMi,t−2); the 
first result is significant at 10% level, but the second is insignificant. The 
coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are negative (-0.004 with the dependent variable 
ATA_MJMi,t−2; -0.008 with the dependent variable AWCA_MJMi,t−2) and 
insignificant. The results mean that only acquirers with board connections inflate 
their earnings in year t-2.  
In year t-3, the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are negative (-0.010 with the dependent 
variable ATA_MJMi,t−3; -0.010 with the dependent variable AWCA_MJMi,t−3), but 
insignificant, while the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are positive (0.028 with the 
dependent variable ATA_MJMi,t−3; 0.028 with the dependent variable 
AWCA_MJMi,t−3), but insignificant. The results mean that neither acquirers with or 
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without board connections inflate their earnings in year t-3. Thus, the evidence is 
consistent with H4.1.  
In general, the results reported in Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 provide consistent 
evidence that share-financed acquiring firms with board connections engage in 
accrual earnings management early within the two years prior to the merger 
announcement, while those without board connections do not.
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Table 4-7: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model with the intercept of share-financed acquirers with and 
without board connections 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept  0.120 *** 0.105 *** 0.114 *** 0.127 *** 0.115 *** 0.125 *** 
t-statistic 11.97   11.2   12.75   11.7   11.12   12.7   
SMA_WOBCi,t 0.028  -0.004  0.014  0.028  -0.008  0.013  
t-statistic 1.42   -0.25   0.83   1.32   -0.42   0.68   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.010  0.069 * 0.077 ** -0.010  0.068  0.073 * 
t-statistic -0.25   1.82   2.1   -0.24   1.63   1.8   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 * 
t-statistic 0.76   2.94   2.75   0.57   2.53   1.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -10.49   -9.51   -10.77   -10.06   -9.46   -10.62   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.184 *** 0.177 *** 0.178 *** 0.188 *** 0.183 *** 0.183 *** 
t-statistic 35   36.19   39.89   32.93   34.09   37.18   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.036 *** 0.019 ** 0.021 *** 0.029 *** 0.016 * 0.018 ** 
t-statistic 4.58   2.45   2.83   3.36   1.92   2.17   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.051 *** -0.050 *** -0.054 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.057 *** 
t-statistic -8.29   -8.4   -9.46   -7.86   -8.03   -9.18   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.001  -0.001  0.003  -0.005  -0.005  -0.003  
t-statistic 0.14   -0.35   0.77   -1.15   -1.4   -0.71   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1503  0.1539  0.1747  0.1363  0.1397  0.1564  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘  (Equation 4-1) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of share-
financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Under cash-financed acquirers where the abnormal total accruals and abnormal 
working capital accruals are estimated by the Jones model, Table 4-8 and Table 
4-9 presents the effect of board connections on accrual-based earnings 
management of cash-financed acquirers prior to a merger announcement. The 
results of Table 4-8 derived from Equation 4-1 where XMA_WBCi,t and 
XMA_WOBCi,t are replaced by CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t. The coefficients of 
CMA_WBCi,t are insignificantly positive (0.016, 0.020 and 0.034 when the 
dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−1, ATA_JMi,t−2 and ATA_JMi,t−3; and 0.008, 0.024 
and 0.032 when the dependent variable is AWCA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−2 and 
AWCA_JMi,t−3), while the coefficients of CMA_WOBCi,t  are insignificantly negative 
(-0.007, -0.014 and -0.007 when the dependent variable is ATA_JMi,t−1, 
ATA_JMi,t−2 and ATA_JMi,t−3; -0.009, -0.016 and -0.010 when the dependent 
variable is AWCA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−2 and AWCA_JMi,t−3). Thus, the evidence is 
consistent with hypothesis H4.2. These results indicate that cash-financed 
acquiring firms with board connections manage total accrual upward early prior 
to the merger announcement, but to an insignificant degree. 
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Table 4-8: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with intercept of cash-financed acquirers with and without board 
connections 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept  0.121 *** 0.106 *** 0.116 *** 0.130 *** 0.117 *** 0.128 *** 
t-statistic 12.17   11.29   12.85   11.93   11.32   12.87   
CMA_WOBCi,t -0.007  -0.014  -0.007  -0.010  -0.016  -0.009  
t-statistic -0.73   -1.62   -0.86   -0.96   -1.63   -0.97   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.034  0.020  0.016  0.032  0.024  0.008  
t-statistic 1.01   0.6   0.52   0.87   0.67   0.24   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 * 
t-statistic 0.8   2.62   2.57   0.67   2.31   1.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -10.55   -9.36   -10.77   -10.16   -9.43   -10.7   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.175 *** 0.169 *** 0.171 *** 0.183 *** 0.177 *** 0.178 *** 
t-statistic 33.44   34.42   37.87   32   32.74   35.83   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.039 *** 0.020 ** 0.021 *** 0.031 *** 0.018 ** 0.017 ** 
t-statistic 4.96   2.56   2.78   3.68   2.06   2.08   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.053 *** -0.050 *** -0.054 *** -0.056 *** -0.054 *** -0.058 *** 
t-statistic -8.62   -8.42   -9.51   -8.28   -8.24   -9.27   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.003  -0.005  0.000  -0.008 * -0.009 ** -0.004  
t-statistic -0.92   -1.47   0.05   -1.89   -2.3   -1.22   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1402  0.1417  0.1602  0.1306  0.1308  0.147  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘  (Equation 4-1) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of share-
financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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For cash-financed acquirers where the abnormal total accruals and abnormal 
working capital accruals are estimated by the modified Jones model, the results 
of Table 4-9 derived from Equation 4-1 where XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t are 
replaced by CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t. The coefficients of CMA_WBCi,t are 
positive (0.019, 0.017 and 0.042 for the dependent variables ATA_MJMi,t−1, 
ATA_MJMi,t−2 and ATA_MJMi,t−3 respectively; 0.010, 0.020 and 0.041 for the 
dependent variables AWCA_MJMi,t−1, AWCA_MJMi,t−2 and AWCA_MJMi,t−3 
respectively), whereas the coefficients of CMA_WOBCi,t are insignificantly 
negative (-0.005, -0.021 and -0.008 for the dependent variables ATA_MJMi,t−1, 
ATA_MJMi,t−2 and ATA_MJMi,t−3 respectively; -0.007, -0.013 and -0.011 for the 
dependent variables AWCA_MJMi,t−1, AWCA_MJMi,t−2 and AWCA_JMi,t−3). Thus, 
the evidence is consistent with H4.2. Therefore, under four alternative accruals 
earnings management proxies which presented in Table 4-8 and Table 4-9, cash-
financed acquiring firms with board connections manage earnings upwards using 
accruals early prior to the merger announcement, but to an insignificant degree. 
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Table 4-9: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model with the intercept of cash-financed acquirers with and 
without board connections 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept  0.121 *** 0.106 *** 0.115 *** 0.128 *** 0.115 *** 0.126 *** 
t-statistic 12.06   11.28   12.84   11.79   11.19   12.78   
CMA_WOBCi,t -0.008  -0.012  -0.005  -0.011  -0.013  -0.007  
t-statistic -0.87   -1.36   -0.68   -1.1   -1.37   -0.73   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.042  0.017  0.019  0.041  0.020  0.010  
t-statistic 1.26   0.53   0.62   1.11   0.58   0.3   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 * 
t-statistic 0.79   2.93   2.75   0.6   2.52   1.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -10.57   -9.53   -10.83   -10.13   -9.48   -10.67   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.184 *** 0.178 *** 0.178 *** 0.188 *** 0.184 *** 0.183 *** 
t-statistic 34.97   36.26   39.9   32.92   34.17   37.2   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.036 *** 0.019 ** 0.021 *** 0.029 *** 0.016 * 0.018 ** 
t-statistic 4.59   2.42   2.8   3.37   1.89   2.14   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.052 *** -0.050 *** -0.054 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.057 *** 
t-statistic -8.34   -8.42   -9.5   -7.91   -8.05   -9.21   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.001  -0.001  0.003  -0.005  -0.005  -0.002  
t-statistic 0.14   -0.38   0.82   -1.15   -1.44   -0.68   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1503  0.1537  0.1743  0.1364  0.1396  0.1561  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘  (Equation 4-1) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of share-
financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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For using alternative regression (Equation 4-2) which includes both share- and 
cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections indicator variables 
(SMA_WBCi,t, SMA_WOBCi,t, CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t) to test H4.1 and H4.2 
as described in Section 4.4.3. When the abnormal total and working capital 
accruals are estimated by the Jones model, Table 4-10 shows that the 
coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are significantly positive (0.083 and 0.071 for the 
dependent variables ATA_JMi,t−1 and ATA_JMi,t−2 respectively; and 0.078 and 
0.071 for the dependent variables AWCA_JMi,t−1 and AWCA_JMi,t−2), while the 
coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are negative (-0.003 with the dependent variable 
ATA_JMi,t−3; -0.005 with the dependent variable AWCA_JMi,t−3), but insignificant. 
In contrast, the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t, CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t when 
dependent variables are accrual-based earnings management proxies in the 
three years prior to the merger announcement are insignificant. Thus, the 
evidence is consistent with H4.1 and H4.2. These results indicate that cash-
financed acquiring firms with board connections manage total accruals upward 
prior to the merger announcement, but to an insignificant degree, while share-
financed acquiring firms with board connections manage accrual-based earnings 
upward early within the two years prior to the merger announcement and those 
without board connections do not use accruals to inflate earnings prior to the 
merger announcement. 
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Table 4-10: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with the intercept of share and cash-financed acquirers with and 
without board connections 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.121 *** 0.106 *** 0.115 *** 0.129 *** 0.117 *** 0.127 *** 
t-statistic 12.12   11.24   12.75   11.89   11.28   12.79   
SMA_WOBCi,t 0.020  -0.001  0.021  0.021  -0.004  0.019  
t-statistic 1.02   -0.05   1.21   1   -0.18   1.01   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.003  0.071 * 0.083 ** -0.005  0.071 * 0.078 * 
t-statistic -0.08   1.85   2.25   -0.11   1.68   1.92   
CMA_WOBCi,t -0.007  -0.014  -0.007  -0.010  -0.016  -0.009  
t-statistic -0.72   -1.61   -0.83   -0.94   -1.63   -0.94   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.034  0.020  0.016  0.032  0.024  0.008  
t-statistic 1.01   0.61   0.53   0.87   0.67   0.25   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 * 
t-statistic 0.77   2.62   2.57   0.64   2.31   1.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -10.51   -9.34   -10.7   -10.12   -9.41   -10.64   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.175 *** 0.169 *** 0.171 *** 0.183 *** 0.177 *** 0.178 *** 
t-statistic 33.45   34.39   37.85   32   32.71   35.81   
NOAi,t−2−k 0.039 *** 0.020 *** 0.021 *** 0.031 *** 0.018 ** 0.018 ** 
t-statistic 4.96   2.58   2.81   3.68   2.08   2.1   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.053 *** -0.050 *** -0.054 *** -0.056 *** -0.054 *** -0.058 *** 
t-statistic -8.6   -8.43   -9.48   -8.26   -8.25   -9.24   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.003  -0.005  0.000  -0.008 * -0.009 ** -0.005  
t-statistic -0.93   -1.44   -0.02   -1.9   -2.27   -1.28   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1401  0.1418  0.1607  0.1305  0.1309  0.1473  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals without board connections and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed 
deals. The regression is as follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽10(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
(Equation 4-2). Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management 
of share-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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When the abnormal total and working capital accruals are estimated by the 
modified Jones model, Table 4-11 shows that the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are 
positive (0.077 and 0.069 for the dependent variables ATA_MJMi,t−1 and 
ATA_MJMi,t−2, respectively, and significant at 5% and 10% level; 0.073 with the 
dependent variable AWCA_MJMi,t−1 and significant at 10% level; and 0.068 with 
the dependent variable AWCA_MJMi,t−2, but insignificant), while the coefficients of 
SMA_WOBCi,t are insignificantly negative (-0.010 with the dependent variable 
ATA_JMi,t−3; -0.010 with the dependent variable AWCA_JMi,t−3). In contrast, the 
coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t, CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t when dependent 
variables are accrual-based earnings management proxies in years t-1, t-2 and 
t-3 prior to the merger announcement are insignificant. Thus, the evidence is 
consistent with H4.1 and H4.2. These results indicate that share-financed 
acquiring firms with board connections manage accrual-based earnings upwards 
early within the two years prior to the merger announcement and those without 
board connections do not. The results also show that cash-financed acquiring 
firms with board connections manage total accrual upwards prior to the merger 
announcement, but to an insignificant degree.
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Table 4-11: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model with the intercept of share and cash-financed acquirers 
with and without board connections 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.120 *** 0.106 *** 0.114 *** 0.128 *** 0.115 *** 0.125 *** 
t-statistic 12   11.24   12.76   11.74   11.16   12.71   
SMA_WOBCi,t 0.028  -0.005  0.014  0.028  -0.009  0.012  
t-statistic 1.41   -0.26   0.82   1.31   -0.43   0.67   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.010  0.069 * 0.077 ** -0.010  0.068  0.073 * 
t-statistic -0.25   1.81   2.1   -0.24   1.63   1.8   
CMA_WOBCi,t -0.008  -0.012  -0.005  -0.011  -0.013  -0.006  
t-statistic -0.85   -1.36   -0.65   -1.09   -1.37   -0.71   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.043  0.017  0.019  0.041  0.021  0.010  
t-statistic 1.26   0.53   0.62   1.12   0.58   0.31   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000  0.001 ** 0.001 * 
t-statistic 0.76   2.93   2.75   0.57   2.53   1.85   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -10.52   -9.51   -10.77   -10.08   -9.47   -10.62   
ROAi,t−1−k 0.184 *** 0.178 *** 0.178 *** 0.188 *** 0.184 *** 0.183 *** 
t-statistic 34.99   36.22   39.87   32.94   34.12   37.17   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.036 *** 0.019 ** 0.021 *** 0.029 *** 0.016 * 0.018 ** 
t-statistic 4.59   2.44   2.83   3.37   1.9   2.17   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.051 *** -0.050 *** -0.054 *** -0.053 *** -0.052 *** -0.057 *** 
t-statistic -8.31   -8.42   -9.48   -7.88   -8.06   -9.19   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.000  -0.001  0.003  -0.005  -0.005  -0.003  
t-statistic 0.13   -0.35   0.77   -1.16   -1.4   -0.71   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1503  0.1539  0.1746  0.1364  0.1397  0.1563  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽7(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽10(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 4-2). Yi,t−1−k is 
replaced with ATA_MJMi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of share-financed 
acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
200 
 
4.5.3.4 Real earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers 
with and without board connections prior to a merger 
announcement 
For the real earnings management proxies, Table 4-12 presents the real earnings 
management behaviour of share-financed acquiring firms with and without board 
connections prior to a merger announcement. The results derived from Equation 
4-3 show that, in year t-1, the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are positive (0.088 with 
the dependent variable ACFi,t−1; 0.049 with the dependent variable ADEXPi,t−1; 
0.031 with the dependent variable APRODi,t−1; and 0.178 with the dependent 
variable ATREMi,t−1). However, only ACFi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 are significant at the 
5% level. The coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are mixed (-0.055 with the dependent 
variable ACFi,t−1; 0.055 with the dependent variable ADEXPi,t−1; -0.024 with the 
dependent variable APRODi,t−1; and -0.010 with the dependent variable 
ATREMi,t−1), but insignificant. These results suggest that only acquirers without 
board connections engages in real earnings management in year t-1. 
In year t-2, the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are mixed and insignificant (-0.016 
with the dependent variable ACFi,t−1; 0.005 with the dependent variable 
ADEXPi,t−1; -0.055 with the dependent variable APRODi,t−1; and -0.024 with the 
dependent variable ATREMi,t−1). Similar to the coefficients for SMA_WOBCi,t, the 
coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are mixed and insignificant (0.053 with the dependent 
variable ACFi,t−1; -0.164 with the dependent variable ADEXPi,t−1; -0.051 with the 
dependent variable APRODi,t−1; and -0.123 with the dependent variable 
ATREMi,t−1). The results mean that both share-financed acquirers with and 
without board connections manipulate their real earnings activities to an 
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insignificant degree in year t-2. Similar to year t-2, the coefficients of the real 
earnings management proxies of SMA_WOBCi,t and SMA_WBCi,t are insignificant 
in year t-3. 
To sum up, these results imply that share-financed acquiring firms without board 
connections manipulate real earnings activities in the first year prior to the merger 
announcement, while those with board connections do not do so. The evidence 
supports H4.3. 
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Table 4-12 :Abnormal real earnings management of share-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept -0.039  -0.059 ** 0.002  0.125 *** -0.005  -0.098 *** -0.100 *** -0.095 *** -0.056 *** 0.052  -0.076 * -0.092 ** 
t-statistic -1.16   -2.42   0.12   2.79   -0.14   -2.87   -3.51   -4.01   -2.99   1.02   -1.86   -2.54   
SMA_WOBCi,t -0.037 
 -0.016  0.088 ** 0.148  0.005  0.049  0.056  -0.055  0.031  0.052  -0.024  0.178 ** 
t-statistic -0.53   -0.32   2.25   1.66   0.07   0.76   0.93   -1.16   0.84   0.5   -0.3   2.58   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.025 
 0.053  -0.055  0.067  -0.164  0.055  -0.131  -0.051  -0.024  0.043  -0.123  -0.010  
t-statistic -0.17   0.51   -0.65   0.37   -1.07   0.39   -1.02   -0.49   -0.29   0.21   -0.74   -0.07   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.001 
 0.000  0.001  -0.005 *** -0.002  -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 ** -0.001  -0.003 ** 
t-statistic 0.93   0.37   0.79   -3.21   -1.5   -3.43   -4.64   -4.07   -4.48   -2.52   -0.99   -2.29   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.002 
 0.003 *** 0.000 *** -0.006 ** -0.006 *** -0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.003 *** -0.008 ** -0.005 *** -0.007 *** 
t-statistic -0.81   1.75   -0.05   -2.03   -2.53   -1.92   3.78   4.11   2.48   -2.46   -2.14   -3.16   
ROAi,t−1−k -0.259 *** -0.208 *** -0.171 *** 0.188 *** 0.134 *** 0.128 *** -0.152 *** -0.144 *** -0.111 *** -0.039 
 -0.094 *** -0.065 *** 
t-statistic -14.11   -15.79   -16.69   7.94   6.77   7.4   -9.48   -11.02   -11.05   -1.45   -4.39   -3.55   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.137 *** 0.084 *** 0.055 *** 0.062 * 0.030 
 0.057 ** 0.012  0.035 * 0.046 *** 0.135 *** 0.075 ** 0.078 ** 
t-statistic 4.96   4.05   3.17   1.74   0.97   1.96   0.5   1.72   2.8   3.31   2.22   2.55   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.065 *** 0.045 *** 0.048 *** -0.051 *** -0.033 ** -0.022 * 0.002 
 0.008  0.018 ** 0.023  0.003  0.024 * 
t-statistic 5.01   4.82   6.39   -3.01   -2.38   -1.76   0.14   0.93   2.5   1.18   0.2   1.75   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0507  0.0515  0.0658  0.026  0.0261  0.0309  0.0187  0.0193  0.018  0.0268  0.0158  0.0181  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 deals 
with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 4-3) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k and ATREMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate real earnings management of share-
financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4-13 presents the real earnings management behaviour of cash-financed 
deals with and without board connections prior to a merger announcement. The 
results of Table 4-13 derived from Equation 4-3 shows that the coefficients of 
CMA_WOBCi,t in year t-1 are insignificant (-0.011, 0.016, -0.018 and -0.003 for the 
dependent variables ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 
respectively). Besides, the coefficients of CMA_WBCi,t in year t-1 are also 
insignificant (0.066, -0.171, -0.138 and 0.069 for the dependent variables 
ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1). Similar to year t-1, the 
coefficients of CMA_WOBCi,t and CMA_WBCi,t in year t-2 and year t-3 are 
insignificant. Thus, the evidence is consistent with H4.4. These results indicate 
that cash-financed acquiring firms with and without board connections engage in 
real earnings management prior to the merger announcement but to an 
insignificant degree.  
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Table 4-13: Abnormal real earnings management of cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept -0.040  -0.059 ** 0.003  0.129 *** -0.007  -0.098 *** -0.100 *** -0.096 *** -0.056 *** 0.056  -0.076 * -0.040  
t-statistic -1.17   -2.39   0.16   2.88   -0.18   -2.87   -3.51   -4.05   -2.96   1.09   -1.88   -1.17   
CMA_WOBCi,t -0.003 
 -0.018  -0.011  -0.061  0.015  0.016  0.009  0.011  -0.018  -0.091  -0.022  -0.003  
t-statistic -0.09   -0.78   -0.56   -1.39   0.4   0.48   0.35   0.48   -1.04   -1.78   -0.57   -0.09   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.069 
 0.131  0.066  0.015  -0.042  -0.171  -0.138  0.014  0.061  0.062  -0.057  0.069  
t-statistic 0.58   1.49   0.95   0.08   -0.26   -1.22   -1.43   0.17   0.94   0.28   -0.33   0.58   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.001 
 0.000  0.001  -0.005 *** -0.002  -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 ** -0.001  0.001  
t-statistic 0.92   0.38   0.8   -3.17   -1.5   -3.43   -4.62   -4.07   -4.47   -2.51   -0.99   0.92   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.002 
 0.003 *** 0.000 *** -0.006 ** -0.006 *** -0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.003 *** -0.008 ** -0.005 *** -0.002  
t-statistic -0.8   1.71   -0.11   -2.1   -2.51   -1.93   3.79   4.13   2.45   -2.5   -2.12   -0.8   
ROAi,t−1−k -0.259 *** -0.207 *** -0.171 *** 0.188 *** 0.133 *** 0.127 *** -0.153 *** -0.144 *** -0.111 *** -0.038 
 -0.093 *** -0.259 *** 
t-statistic -14.09   -15.76   -16.68   7.93   6.74   7.37   -9.49   -11   -11.02   -1.4   -4.36   -14.09   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.137 *** 0.084 *** 0.054 *** 0.062 * 0.031 
 0.056 ** 0.012  0.036 * 0.046 *** 0.135 *** 0.075 ** 0.137 *** 
t-statistic 4.97   4.05   3.16   1.73   0.98   1.96   0.5   1.74   2.79   3.3   2.22   4.97   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.065 *** 0.044 *** 0.050 *** -0.051 *** -0.033 ** -0.022 * 0.002 
 0.008  0.018 ** 0.022  0.003  0.065 *** 
t-statistic 5.01   4.81   6.55   -3.04   -2.36   -1.73   0.17   0.9   2.55   1.14   0.19   5.01   
Year Fixed Effects yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0508  0.0518  0.0652  0.0258  0.026  0.0311  0.0187  0.0191  0.0182  0.0272  0.0158  0.0508  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 deals 
with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 4-3) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k and ATREMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate real earnings management of share-
financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4-14 presents the effect of board connections on real earnings 
management of share- and cash-financed deals prior to a merger announcement. 
The results of Table 4-14 are derived from Equation 4-4, which are included both 
share- and cash-financed acquirer with and without board connection indicator 
independent variables. Table 4-14 shows that the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are 
positive (0.088 and 0.178 for the dependent variables ACFi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 
and significant at the 5% level in year t-1), while the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t 
are insignificant (0.050 with the dependent variable ADEXPi,t−1; -0.030 with the 
dependent variable APRODi,t−1). Besides, the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,twhen 
the dependent variable is real earnings management proxies in year t-2 and year 
t-3 prior to the merger announcement are insignificant. Besides, the coefficients 
of SMA_WBCi,t, CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t when the dependent variable is real 
earnings management proxies in the three years prior to the merger 
announcement are insignificant. Thus, the evidence is consistent with H4.3 and 
H4.4. These results indicate that cash-financed acquiring firms with board 
connections manipulate real earnings activities prior to the merger 
announcement, but to an insignificant degree, while share-financed acquiring 
firms without board connections manipulate real earnings activities in the first 
year prior to the merger announcement and those with board connections do not 
manipulate real earnings activities prior to the merger announcement.  
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Table 4-14: Abnormal real earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept -0.039  -0.059 ** 0.003  0.127 *** -0.006  -0.099 *** -0.100 *** -0.095 *** -0.056 *** 0.055  -0.075 * -0.092 ** 
t-statistic -1.15   -2.4   0.13   2.83   -0.15   -2.9   -3.52   -4.02   -2.97   1.08   -1.85   -2.55   
SMA_WOBCi,t -0.037 
 -0.016  0.088 ** 0.147  0.006  0.050  0.056  -0.054  0.030  0.049  -0.025  0.178 ** 
t-statistic -0.53   -0.32   2.25   1.65   0.07   0.76   0.93   -1.15   0.83   0.48   -0.31   2.58   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.024 
 0.052  -0.055  0.066  -0.163  0.055  -0.131  -0.050  -0.025  0.042  -0.124  -0.010  
t-statistic -0.17   0.51   -0.65   0.37   -1.07   0.39   -1.02   -0.48   -0.29   0.2   -0.75   -0.07   
CMA_WOBCi,t -0.003 
 -0.018  -0.010  -0.060  0.014  0.016  0.010  0.010  -0.018  -0.090 * -0.023  0.007  
t-statistic -0.09   -0.78   -0.53   -1.36   0.39   0.49   0.35   0.46   -1.03   -1.78   -0.57   0.19   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.068 
 0.131  0.066  0.016  -0.042  -0.171  -0.138  0.013  0.061  0.062  -0.058  -0.120  
t-statistic 0.57   1.49   0.95   0.08   -0.26   -1.22   -1.43   0.16   0.94   0.28   -0.33   -0.81   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.005 *** -0.002  -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 ** -0.001  -0.003 ** 
t-statistic 0.93   0.38   0.79   -3.21   -1.5   -3.43   -4.64   -4.07   -4.47   -2.52   -0.99   -2.29   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.002  0.003 * 0.000  -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.004 * 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.003 ** -0.008 ** -0.005 ** -0.007 *** 
t-statistic -0.82   1.71   -0.06   -2.04   -2.52   -1.9   3.81   4.1   2.47   -2.48   -2.13   -3.15   
ROAi,t−1−k -0.259 *** -0.208 *** -0.171 *** 0.189 *** 0.134 *** 0.127 *** -0.152 *** -0.145 *** -0.111 *** -0.038  -0.093 *** -0.065 *** 
t-statistic -14.1   -15.76   -16.65   7.98   6.75   7.38   -9.46   -11.03   -11   -1.39   -4.36   -3.56   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.137 *** 0.084 *** 0.055 *** 0.062 * 0.030  0.057 ** 0.011  0.035 * 0.046 *** 0.135 *** 0.075 ** 0.078 ** 
t-statistic 4.96   4.05   3.17   1.73   0.97   1.97   0.49   1.73   2.79   3.3   2.21   2.55   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.065 *** 0.045 *** 0.049 *** -0.051 *** -0.033 ** -0.023 * 0.002  0.008  0.018 ** 0.022  0.003  0.024 * 
t-statistic 5.01   4.82   6.4   -3.05   -2.38   -1.77   0.14   0.94   2.5   1.14   0.18   1.75   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0505  0.0516  0.0657  0.026  0.0259  0.0309  0.0187  0.0191  0.018  0.027  0.0156  0.0179  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 deals 
with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝛽8(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 4-4) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACFi,t−1−k, ADEXPi,t−1−k, APRODi,t−1−k and ATREMi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate real earnings management of share-
financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
207 
 
4.5.4 Propensity score matching: two samples t-test. 
Similar to Section 3.5.4, this chapter employs propensity score matching as the 
third main test of the earnings management of share- and cash-financed 
acquirers with and without board connections prior to a merger announcement. 
Previous research has found that propensity score matching can deal with 
misspecification by using regression frameworks for testing hypotheses (Brown 
and Pinello 2007; Armstrong et al. 2010). The misspecification is caused by the 
fundamental differences in firm characteristics among research samples. 
Following previous research, Burnett et al. (2012) employ propensity score 
matching to reduce the effects of differences in firm characteristics on the 
association between suspect accruals and high audit quality. It is clear that 
differences in firm characteristics could cause endogeneity problems in the 
research results because those firms involved in M&A activities might have 
different characteristics from those that are not. Therefore, the study tests two 
sample t-test to control for such differences in the relevant dimensions between 
(1) M&A deals sample and (2) the rest of the sample using the propensity score 
matching method to match the five nearest observations based on ROA or basis 
characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB) of the rest of the sample and share- and 
cash-financed deals with and without board connections. The sampling process 
is as described in section 3.5.4. Consequently, I obtain matching samples of 
1,770 firm-year observations with 295 M&A deal observations and 1,475 in the 
firm performance (ROA) control sample and 1,475 in the firm characteristics 
(SIZE, LEV and MTB) control sample. 
In Table 4-15, Panel A shows the difference in mean earnings management of 
share-financed acquirers with and without board connections and the ROA 
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matched sample. For the share-financed acquirers with board connections 
sample and the ROA matched sample, the differences in accrual-based earnings 
management (ATA_JMi,t−1(0.109), AWCA_JMi,t−1(0.120), ATA_MJMi,t−1(0.100) and 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1(0.110)) and the different real earnings management (ACFi,t−1(-
0.169), ADEXPi,t−1(-0.016), APRODi,t−1(-0.041) and ATREMi,t−1(-0.171)) are mixed 
and insignificant in year t-1, with the exception of ATA_JMi,t−1 and AWCA_JMi,t−1. 
In year t-2, the differences in accrual-based earnings management 
(ATA_JMi,t−2(0.096), AWCA_JMi,t−2(0.123) and AWCA_MJMi,t−1(0.107)) are 
positive and significant, while the differences in real earnings management 
proxies are insignificant. In year t-3, the differences in accrual-based and real 
earnings management are mixed and insignificant. For the differences in 
earnings management between the sample of share-financed acquirers without 
board connections and the ROA matched sample, the differences in accrual-
based earnings management (ATA_JMi,t−1(0.034), AWCA_JMi,t−1(0.045), 
ATA_MJMi,t−1(0.025) and AWCA_JMi,t−1(0.034)) and the differences in real 
earnings management (ACFi,t−1(0.053), ADEXPi,t−1(-0.016), APRODi,t−1(-0.010) 
and ATREMi,t−1(0.060)) are insignificant in year t-1, with the exception of ACFi,t−1 
and ATREMi,t−1. In years t-2 and t-3, the differences in accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management are insignificant. 
Panel B in Table 4-15 shows the differences in earnings management for the 
sample of share-financed acquirers with and without board connections and the 
matched firm characteristics sample. The differences in accrual-based earnings 
management (ATA_JMi,t−1(0.073), AWCA_JMi,t−1(0.063), ATA_MJMi,t−1(0.060) and 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1(0.050)) and the differences in real earnings management 
(ACFi,t−1(0.007), ADEXPi,t−1(0.036), APRODi,t−1(0.042) and ATREMi,t−1(0.032)) 
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are positive but insignificant in year t-1, with the exception of ATA_JMi,t−1 and  
ATA_MJMi,t−1. In year t-2, the differences in accrual-based earnings management 
(ATA_JMi,t−2(0.044) and AWCA_JMi,t−2(0.036)) are positive and significant, while 
the differences in accrual-based earnings management (ATA_MJMi,t−2 and 
AWCA_JMi,t−2) and the difference in real earnings management proxies are 
insignificant. In year t-3, the differences in accrual-based and real earnings 
management are mixes and insignificant. For the differences in earnings 
management between the sample of share-financed acquirers without board 
connections and the firm characteristics matched sample, ACFi,t−1(0.042) and 
ATREMi,t−1(0.219) in year t-1 are positive and significant, while the differences in 
accrual-based earnings management in the three years prior to the merger 
announcement and the differences in real earnings management in years t-2 and 
t-3 are insignificant.  
Table 4-16 show the differences in earnings management between the sample 
of cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections and the ROA 
matched sample in Panel A and the firm characteristics matched sample in Panel 
B. However, the differences in accrual-based earnings and real earnings 
management are insignificant in the three years prior to the merger 
announcement for both the ROA matched sample and the firm characteristics 
matched sample. 
The results of Table 4-15 and Table 4-16 show no evidence that cash-financed 
acquirers with and without board connections manipulate their accruals or real 
earnings activities prior to the merger announcement. However, consistent with 
H4.1, H4.2, H4.3 and H4.4, share-financed acquirers with board connections 
inflate accrual-based earnings in the first and second years prior to the merger 
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announcement, while share-financed acquirers without board connections do 
manipulate real earnings activities prior to the merger announcement in the first 
year.
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Table 4-15: Differences in earnings management between the sample of share-financed acquirers with and without board connections and the matched 
samples 
Earnings management proxies 
With board connections Without board connections 
Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
A. ROA matched sample 
ATA_JMi,t−1−k 0.007  0.096 * 0.109 * 0.024  -0.024  0.034  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k 0.019  0.123 ** 0.120 * 0.023  -0.020  0.045  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.022  0.079  0.100  0.028  -0.021  0.025  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.006  0.107 * 0.110  0.024  -0.016  0.034  
ACFi,t−1−k -0.050  -0.009  -0.169  0.091  -0.055  0.053 * 
ADEXPi,t−1−k 0.107  -0.022  -0.016  -0.095  -0.109  -0.016  
APRODi,t−1−k -0.062  -0.036  -0.041  0.098  -0.069  -0.010  
ATREMi,t−1−k 0.064  -0.035  -0.171  -0.014  -0.105  0.060 ** 
B. Firm characteristics matched sample 
ATA_JMi,t−1−k -0.018  0.044 * 0.073 * -0.013  0.013  0.035  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k -0.033  0.036 * 0.063  -0.013  0.019  0.038  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.039  0.037  0.060 * -0.009  0.010  0.032  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k -0.053  0.029  0.050  -0.010  0.014  0.033  
ACFi,t−1−k -0.016  0.074  0.007  0.062  -0.012  0.042 * 
ADEXPi,t−1−k 0.055  0.015  0.036  0.081  -0.041  0.104  
APRODi,t−1−k -0.027  -0.142  0.042  0.006  -0.061  0.095  
ATREMi,t−1−k 0.018  0.070  0.032  0.123  -0.009  0.219 ** 
Note: The table reports the difference in mean of earnings management using propensity score matching. For share-financed deals with board connections, the 
sample consists of 60 observations which include the treatment and control samples. The treatment sample consists of 10 share-financed deals with board 
connections. The control sample is the rest of sample with ROA or the characteristics matching variables. The control sample consists 50 observations which 
match 10 deals with board connections based on the top 5 nearest ROA or firm’s basic characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB). For share-financed deals without 
board connections, the sample consists of 312 observations which include the treatment and control samples. The treatment sample consists of 52 share-financed 
deals without board connections. The control sample is the rest of sample with ROA or the characteristics matching variables. The control sample consists 260 
observations which match 52 deals without board connections based on the top 5 nearest ROA or firm’s basic characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB). Year t-1, 
year t-2 and year t-3 are the first, second and third years with an earnings release preceding the announcement of the deal. Significance is based on t-tests for 
the differences in mean. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. Please see the Appendix for variable descriptions. 
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Table 4-16: Differences in earnings management between the sample of cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections and the matched samples 
Earnings management proxies With board connections Without board connections Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
A. ROA matched sample 
ATA_JMi,t−1−k 0.011  0.047  -0.047  0.004  -0.003  0.019  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k 0.010  0.041  -0.057  0.001  -0.005  0.018  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k 0.025  0.045  -0.050  0.002  -0.001  0.020  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k 0.024  0.035  -0.058  -0.001  -0.002  0.020  
ACFi,t−1−k -0.020  0.122  0.018  -0.033  -0.068  -0.021  
ADEXPi,t−1−k -0.176  -0.024  -0.050  -0.027  0.045  0.017  
APRODi,t−1−k -0.101  0.096  0.190  -0.007  0.013  -0.017  
ATREMi,t−1−k -0.263  -0.006  -0.024  -0.082  -0.021  -0.010  
B. Firm characteristics matched sample 
ATA_JMi,t−1−k 0.025  0.054  0.041  0.013  -0.017  0.011  
AWCA_JMi,t−1−k 0.021  0.049  0.032  0.010  -0.022  0.008  
ATA_MJMi,t−1−k 0.028  0.054  0.050  0.013  -0.012  0.014  
AWCA_MJMi,t−1−k 0.025  0.050  0.041  0.009  -0.016  0.011  
ACFi,t−1−k 0.217  0.134  0.028  -0.009  -0.059  -0.021  
ADEXPi,t−1−k -0.382  -0.053  -0.131  -0.017  0.035  -0.008  
APRODi,t−1−k -0.114  0.064  -0.012  -0.039  -0.024  -0.033  
ATREMi,t−1−k -0.466  0.014  -0.100  -0.074  -0.036  -0.041  
Note: The table reports the difference in mean of earnings management using the propensity score matching. For cash-financed deals with board connections, 
the sample consists of 90 observations which include the treatment and control samples. The treatment sample consists of 15 cash-financed deals with board 
connections. The control sample is the rest of sample with ROA or the characteristics matching variables. The control sample consists 75 observations which 
match 15 deals with board connections based on the top 5 nearest ROA or firm’s basic characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB). For cash-financed deals without 
board connections, the sample consists of 1308 observations which include the treatment and control samples. The treatment sample consists of 218 share-
financed deals without board connections. The control sample is the rest of sample with ROA or the characteristics matching variables. The control sample consists 
1,090 observations which match 218 deals without board connections based on the top 5 nearest ROA or firm’s basic characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB). Year 
t-1, year t-2 and year t-3 are the first, second and third years with an earnings release preceding the announcement of the deal. Significance is based on t-tests 
for the differences in mean. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance respectively. Please see the Appendix for variable descriptions. 
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4.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
4.6.1 The performance control approach is employed as a first robustness test 
in estimating abnormal accruals and real earnings activities to control for 
the effect of firm performance (Kothari et al. 2005).Accrual earnings 
management - performance control approach 
As described in section 3.6.2 in Chapter 3, to control for firm performance, ROA 
is added as a regressor in the Jones and modified Jones models to control for 
firm performance. The four abnormal accruals proxies estimated using the 
performance control approach are ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, 
ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k, and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k. Regressions are then run 
excluding the ROA control variables to investigate whether share-financed 
acquirers and cash-financed acquirers with board connections inflate accruals 
earnings considerably before a merger announcement because the ROA variable 
is included in the Jones and modified Jones models in the performance control 
approach. The regressions are as follows: 
Equation 4-5 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation 4-6 
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𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Table 4-17 presents the accrual-based earnings management behaviour 
estimated by the Jones model under the performance control approach for share-
financed acquiring firms prior to a merger announcement. The results derived 
from Equation 4-5, where XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t replaced by SMA_WBCi,t 
and SMA_WOBCi,t, show that in years t-1 and t-2 the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t 
are positive (0.104 and 0.081 for the dependent variables ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 and 
ATA_JM_PCi,t−2, and significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively; 0.100 and 
0.081 for the dependent variables AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−2, and 
significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively). The coefficients of 
SMA_WOBCi,t are positive and insignificant in year t-1 and negative but 
insignificant in year t-2 (0.017 and -0.023 for the dependent variables 
ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 and ATA_JM_PCi,t−2; 0.016 and -0.026 for the dependent variables 
AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−2). In year t-3, the coefficients of 
SMA_WOBCi,t and SMA_WBCi,t with the dependent variables ATA_JM_PCi,t−3 and 
AWCA_JM_PCi,t−3 are insignificant prior to the merger announcement. 
Table 4-18 presents the accrual-based earnings management behaviour 
estimated by the modified Jones model under the performance control approach 
for share-financed acquiring firms prior to a merger announcement. The results 
derived from Equation 4-5, where XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t replaced by 
SMA_WBCi,t and SMA_WOBCi,t, show that in years t-1 and t-2 the coefficients of 
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SMA_WBCi,t are positive (0.099 and 0.080 for the dependent variables 
ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and ATA_MJM_PCi,t−2, and significant at the 5% and 10% levels 
respectively; 0.095 and 0.079 for the dependent variables AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and 
AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−2, and significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively). The 
coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are positive but insignificant in year t-1 and negative 
but insignificant in year t-2 (0.010 and -0.028 for the dependent variables 
ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 and ATA_JM_PCi,t−2; 0.009 and -0.032 for the dependent variables 
AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−2). In year t-3, consistent with the results in 
Table 4-17, the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t and SMA_WBCi,t with the dependent 
variables ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k are insignificant in the three 
years prior to the merger announcement. 
These results in Table 4-17 and Table 4-18 imply that there are no significant 
differences from the main findings when abnormal accruals are estimated under 
the performance control approach. Share-financed acquirers with board 
connections inflate accruals considerably prior to the merger announcement, i.e. 
two years prior, while share-financed acquirers without board connections do not 
significantly inflate accruals prior to the merger announcement. 
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Table 4-17: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with the intercept using the performance control approach of 
share-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.015  0.009  0.014  0.019 * 0.016  0.021 ** 
t-statistic 1.52   0.97   1.44   1.74   1.5   2.07   
SMA_WOBCi,t 0.004  -0.023  0.017  0.005  -0.026  0.016  
t-statistic 0.2   -1.15   0.94   0.22   -1.23   0.77   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.018  0.081 ** 0.104 *** -0.020  0.081 * 0.100 ** 
t-statistic -0.42   1.97   2.58   -0.43   1.81   2.27   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.65   0.43   -0.27   -1.68   0.24   -0.79   
SIZEi,t−2−k 0.000  0.000 *** 0.000 *** -0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
t-statistic -0.77   0.63   0.19   -0.81   0.09   -0.32   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.019 ** 0.006  0.005  0.011  0.004  0.000  
t-statistic 2.26   0.76   0.57   1.18   0.38   0.04   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.021 *** -0.020 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.023 *** -0.027 *** 
t-statistic -3.2   -3.19   -3.85   -3.11   -3.27   -3.93   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.000  -0.018  -0.015  -0.021  -0.023  -0.020  
t-statistic 0   -5.04   -4.18   -5.04   -5.68   -5.15   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 -0.0005  0.001  -0.0005  0.1305  0.0019  0.0007  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-5) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of 
share-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4-18: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model with the intercept using the performance control approach 
of share-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.009  0.004  0.008  0.014  0.010  0.016  
t-statistic 0.91   0.44   0.87   1.29   0.97   1.6   
SMA_WOBCi,t 0.011  -0.028  0.010  0.011  -0.032  0.009  
t-statistic 0.52   -1.41   0.56   0.48   -1.51   0.44   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.025  0.080 * 0.099 ** -0.026  0.079 * 0.095 ** 
t-statistic -0.58   1.93   2.45   -0.56   1.76   2.16   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.76   0.6   -0.24   -1.81   0.35   -0.89   
SIZEi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
t-statistic -0.34   0.97   0.69   -0.5   0.43   0.09   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.015 * 0.004  0.004  0.008  0.001  0.000  
t-statistic 1.79   0.54   0.48   0.82   0.15   0.02   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.018 *** -0.019 *** -0.022 *** -0.019 *** -0.020 *** -0.025 *** 
t-statistic -2.68   -2.91   -3.56   -2.6   -2.89   -3.69   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.013  -0.015  -0.013  -0.019  -0.020  -0.019  
t-statistic -3.4   -4.19   -3.65   -4.42   -4.98   -4.76   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 -0.0018  -0.0001  -0.0014  -0.0005  0.0008  0  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-5) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of 
share-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4-19 and Table 4-20 present the accrual-based earnings management 
behaviour estimated by the Jones model under the performance control approach 
of cash-financed acquiring firms with and without board connections prior to a 
merger announcement. The results derived from Equation 4-5, where 
XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t replaced by CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t, show 
that the coefficients of CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t, when the dependent 
variables are abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones 
model (ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k) and abnormal total and working 
capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model (ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k and 
AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k), are insignificant in the three years prior to the merger 
announcement. These results in Table 4-19 and Table 4-20 indicate that cash-
financed acquirers with and without board connections inflate accruals in 
insignificant level prior to the merger announcement, which is no significantly 
different to the main finding when abnormal accruals estimated using the 
performance control approach. 
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Table 4-19: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with the intercept using the performance control approach of cash-
financed acquirers with and without board connections 
   ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.016  0.010  0.014  0.019 * 0.016  0.022 ** 
t-statistic 1.52   0.98   1.53   1.75   1.51   2.14   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.005  -0.002  0.007  0.003  -0.003  0.006  
t-statistic 0.55   -0.17   0.79   0.29   -0.25   0.61   
CMA_WOBCi,t 0.049  0.028  0.022  0.047  0.032  0.014  
t-statistic 1.35   0.79   0.66   1.21   0.84   0.39   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.64   0.42   -0.27   -1.67   0.24   -0.8   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.001  0.000 *** 0.000 *** -0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
t-statistic -0.82   0.62   0.09   -0.85   0.08   -0.4   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.019 ** 0.006  0.005  0.011  0.003  0.000  
t-statistic 2.29   0.75   0.56   1.21   0.37   0.02   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.021 *** -0.020 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.023 *** -0.027 *** 
t-statistic -3.23   -3.16   -3.87   -3.14   -3.25   -3.95   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.016  -0.019  -0.015  -0.021  -0.023  -0.020  
t-statistic -4.23   -5.12   -4.11   -5.02   -5.75   -5.1   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.00268  0.00201  0.00329  0.00398  0.00312  0.00385  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-5) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of 
cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4-20: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model with the intercept using the performance control approach 
of cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept -0.014  -0.013  0.006  -0.011  -0.008  0.012  
t-statistic -1.3   -1.33   0.58   -0.95   -0.78   1.11   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.007  0.004  0.011  0.006  0.003  0.009  
t-statistic 0.67   0.46   1.21   0.51   0.32   0.94   
CMA_WOBCi,t 0.053  0.021  0.026  0.046  0.023  0.016  
t-statistic 1.42   0.59   0.77   1.12   0.58   0.44   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.36   0.79   -0.22   -1.38   0.61   -0.74   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.001  0.000 *** 0.000 *** -0.001 *** 0.000 *** -0.001 *** 
t-statistic -0.78   0.7   0.24   -1.56   -0.4   -0.85   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.032 *** 0.022 ** 0.023 *** 0.032 *** 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 
t-statistic 3.69   2.57   2.75   3.38   2.79   2.92   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.022 *** -0.022 *** -0.028 *** -0.021 *** -0.023 *** -0.031 *** 
t-statistic -3.21   -3.38   -4.36   -2.82   -3.25   -4.42   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.012  -0.015  -0.011  -0.016  -0.019  -0.016  
t-statistic -2.96   -4   -3.1   -3.73   -4.51   -4.07   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0089  0.0122  0.0121  0.0129  0.0183  0.0205  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-5) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of 
cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Under using alternative regression (Equation 4-6) which includes both share- and 
cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections indicator variables 
(SMA_WBCi,t, SMA_WOBCi,t, CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t), Table 4-21 and Table 
4-22 present the accrual-based earnings management behaviour using the 
performance control approach of share- and cash-financed acquiring firms prior 
to the merger announcement. The results of Table 4-21 derived from Equation 
4-6 show that in years t-1 and t-2 the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are positive 
(0.105 and 0.081 for the dependent variables ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 and ATA_JM_PCi,t−2, 
and significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively; 0.101 and 0.081 for the 
dependent variables AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−2, and significant at the 
5% and 10% levels respectively). In year t-3, the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t when 
the dependent variables are ATA_JM_PCi,t−3 and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−3 are insignificant 
prior to the merger announcement. Similar to Table 4-21, Table 4-22 shows that 
in year t-1 and t-2 the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t are positive (0.099 and 0.080 for 
the dependent variables ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and ATA_MJM_PCi,t−2, and significant at 
the 5% and 10% levels respectively; 0.095 and 0.079 for the dependent variables 
AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−2, and significant at the 5% and 10% 
levels respectively). In year t-3, the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t when the 
dependent variables are ATA_MJM_PCi,t−3 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−3 are insignificant 
prior to the merger announcement. Table 4-21 and Table 4-22 also present that 
the coefficient of SMA_WOBCi,t, CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t when the 
dependent variables are ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, 
ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k, AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k, are insignificant. Hence, the main 
findings of this chapter are not qualitatively changed after controlling firm 
performance. 
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Table 4-21: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the Jones model with intercept using the performance control approach of share- 
and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ATA_JM AWCA_JM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.015  0.010  0.014  0.019 * 0.016  0.021 ** 
t-statistic 1.52   0.98   1.44   1.74   1.51   2.07   
SMA_WBCi,t 0.004  -0.023  0.018  0.005  -0.026  0.016  
t-statistic 0.21   -1.15   0.95   0.23   -1.23   0.78   
SMA_WOBCi,t -0.018  0.081 ** 0.105 *** -0.020  0.081 * 0.101 ** 
t-statistic -0.41   1.97   2.59   -0.43   1.81   2.28   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.005  -0.002  0.007  0.003  -0.003  0.006  
t-statistic 0.55   -0.18   0.82   0.29   -0.26   0.64   
CMA_WOBCi,t 0.049  0.027  0.022  0.047  0.032  0.014  
t-statistic 1.35   0.79   0.67   1.21   0.84   0.4   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.64   0.43   -0.27   -1.67   0.24   -0.79   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -0.81   0.61   0.15   -0.85   0.07   -0.35   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.019 ** 0.006  0.005  0.011  0.004  0.000  
t-statistic 2.28   0.77   0.59   1.2   0.39   0.05   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.021 *** -0.020 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.023 *** -0.027 *** 
t-statistic -3.21   -3.19   -3.85   -3.12   -3.28   -3.93   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.017  -0.018  -0.015  -0.021  -0.023  -0.020  
t-statistic -4.24   -5.04   -4.15   -5.03   -5.67   -5.12   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.00268  0.00201  0.00329  0.00398  0.00312  0.00385  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-6) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_JM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of 
share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4-22: Abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by the modified Jones model with the intercept using the performance control approach 
of share-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
  Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   Year t-3   Year t-2   Year t-1   
Intercept 0.009  0.004  0.008  0.014  0.010  0.016  
t-statistic 0.92   0.44   0.87   1.3   0.98   1.6   
SMA_WBCi,t 0.011  -0.028  0.011  0.011  -0.032  0.009  
t-statistic 0.54   -1.4   0.58   0.49   -1.5   0.45   
SMA_WOBCi,t -0.025  0.080 * 0.099 ** -0.026  0.079 * 0.095 ** 
t-statistic -0.58   1.93   2.46   -0.55   1.76   2.17   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.005  0.001  0.009  0.002  0.000  0.009  
t-statistic 0.48   0.13   1.06   0.19   0.04   0.9   
CMA_WOBCi,t 0.058  0.025  0.025  0.057  0.029  0.017  
t-statistic 1.59   0.72   0.76   1.44   0.76   0.46   
MTBi,t−2−k -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  -0.001 * 0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -1.76   0.61   -0.24   -1.8   0.35   -0.89   
SIZEi,t−2−k 0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
t-statistic -0.39   0.94   0.64   -0.54   0.41   0.05   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.015 * 0.005  0.004  0.008  0.001  0.000  
t-statistic 1.82   0.55   0.5   0.84   0.15   0.04   
NOAi,t−2−k -0.018 *** -0.019 *** -0.022 *** -0.019 *** -0.020 *** -0.025 *** 
t-statistic -2.7   -2.92   -3.56   -2.62   -2.89   -3.69   
SEOi,t−1−k -0.013  -0.015  -0.013  -0.019  -0.020  -0.018  
t-statistic -3.39   -4.18   -3.6   -4.42   -4.97   -4.72   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.00205  0.00171  0.00282  0.00364  0.00289  0.00359  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 
deals with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as 
follows:𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-6) 
Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k, and  AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate accrual-based earnings management of 
share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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4.6.2 Real earnings management - performance control approach 
As described in section 3.4.3 in Chapter 3, ROA was also added as a regressor 
in the real earnings management models to control for firm performance. The four 
real earnings management proxies estimated using the performance control 
approach are ACF_PCi,t−1−k, ADEXP_PCi,t−1−k, APROD_PCi,t−1−k, and 
ATREM_PCi,t−1−k. Regressions are then run excluding the ROA and NOA control 
variables to investigate whether share-financed acquirers and cash-financed 
acquirers with and without board connections manipulate real earnings activities 
prior to a merger announcement because the ROA variable is included in the real 
earnings management regressions in the performance control approach, while 
NOA is insignificantly correlated with real earnings management. The 
regressions are as follows. 
Equation 4-7 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Equation 4-8 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘)
+ 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Table 4-23 presents the real earnings management behaviour under the 
performance control approach for share-financed acquiring firms with and without 
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board connections prior to a merger announcement. The results derived from 
Equation 4-7, where XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t are replaced by SMA_WBCi,t 
and SMA_WOBCi,t, show that in year t-1 the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are 
positive (0.086 with the dependent variable ACF_PCi,t−1; and  0.182 with the 
dependent variable ATREM_PCi,t−1; and significant at the 1% and 5% levels 
respectively). However, ADEXP_PCi,t−1 and APROD_PCi,t−1 are insignificant. The 
coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t , when the dependent variables are real earnings 
management proxies in year t-2 and year t-3, are insignificant. In contrast, the 
coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t, when the dependent variables are real earnings 
management proxies in the three years prior to the merger announcement, are 
insignificant. These results in Table 4-23 imply that the results for abnormal real 
earnings management estimated under the performance control approach are 
consistent with the main findings. Share-financed acquirers without board 
connections manipulate real earnings activities in the first year prior to the merger 
announcement, while share-financed acquirers with board connections 
manipulate real earnings activities prior to the merger announcement, but not to 
any great extent. 
Table 4-24 presents the real earnings management behaviour under the 
performance controlling approach of cash-financed deals with and without board 
connections prior to the merger announcement. The results of Table 4-24 derived 
from Equation 4-7, where XMA_WBCi,t and XMA_WOBCi,t are replaced by 
CMA_WBCi,t and CMA_WOBCi,t, presents no evidence that cash-financed acquirer 
with and without board connections manipulate real earnings activities estimated 
under the performance controlling approach in three years prior to the merger 
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announcement. The results show no significant difference from the main findings 
reported earlier.  
Table 4-25 presents the real earnings management behaviour under the 
performance control approach of share- and cash-financed acquiring firms with 
and without board connections prior to a merger announcement. The results 
derived from Equation 4-8, which are included both share- and cash-financed 
acquirer with and without board connection indicator independent variables. 
Table 4-25 shows that in year t-1 the coefficients of SMA_WOBCi,t are positive 
(0.095 with the dependent variable ACF_PCi,t−1; and 0.185 with the dependent 
variable ATREM_PCi,t−1; and both significant at the 5% level). However, 
ADEXP_PCi,t−1 and APROD_PCi,t−1 are insignificant. The coefficients of 
SMA_WOBCi,t , when the dependent variables are real earnings management 
proxies in years t-2 and t-3, are insignificant. Similar to the results in section 
4.5.3.4, the coefficients of SMA_WBCi,t, CMA_WOBCi,t and CMA_WBCi,t when the 
dependent variables are real earnings management proxies in the three years 
prior to the merger announcement, are insignificant. These results in Table 4-25 
imply that the main finding remain qualitatively unchanged when abnormal real 
earnings management are estimated under the performance control approach. 
Share-financed acquirers without board connections manipulate real earnings 
activities in the first year prior to the merger announcement, while share-financed 
acquirers with board connections do not significantly manipulate real earnings 
activities prior to the merger announcement. 
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Table 4-23: Abnormal real earnings management under performance control approach of share-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept 0.067 ** 0.032  0.097 *** -0.093 * -0.146 *** -0.166 *** -0.058 * -0.071 ** -0.022  -0.028  -0.114 *** -0.051  
t-statistic 2.02   1.36   5.09   -1.88   -4.14   -5.65   -1.72   -2.37   -1.03   -0.56   -3.07   -1.59   
SMA_WOBCi,t -0.051 
 -0.016  0.086 ** 0.175  0.080  0.062  0.042  -0.091  0.023  0.052  0.066  0.182 *** 
t-statistic -0.75   -0.34   2.29   1.77   1.16   1.1   0.59   -1.53   0.53   0.53   0.9   2.98   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.035  0.119  0.039  0.106  0.029  -0.035  -0.123  -0.071  -0.028  0.053  0.168  0.019  
t-statistic -0.26   1.21   0.48   0.53   0.2   -0.29   -0.81   -0.55   -0.29   0.27   1.11   0.14   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.003 ** 0.001 * 0.002 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.008 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** 
t-statistic 2.51   1.79   3.45   -3.86   -5.08   -7.93   -4.4   -3.85   -4.4   -3.31   -4.27   -5.13   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.004 * 0.000 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 
 0.000 *** 0.004 *** 0.010 *** 0.007 *** 0.001 *** -0.007 ** 0.000 *** -0.003 *** 
t-statistic -1.93   0.13   -3.56   -1.38   0.1   2.35   4.72   3.79   0.92   -2.17   0   -1.43   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.122 *** 0.057 *** 0.055 *** 0.055  0.056 * 0.089 *** -0.009  0.028  0.047 ** 0.115 *** 0.086 *** 0.137 *** 
t-statistic 4.53   2.86   3.34   1.39   1.91   3.58   -0.34   1.08   2.46   2.9   2.78   5.06   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.071 *** 0.046 *** 0.053 *** -0.048 ** -0.033 ** -0.024 ** 0.015  0.013  0.024 *** 0.021  0.012  0.029 ** 
t-statistic 5.63   5.18   7.31   -2.55   -2.51   -2.2   1.19   1.12   2.87   1.12   0.89   2.4   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.1065  0.1357  0.1798  0.0543  0.0716  0.0823  0.0305  0.0412  0.0436  0.0256  0.0116  0.0201  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 deals 
with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-7). Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACF_PCi,t−1−k, ADEXP_PCi,t−1−k, APROD_PCi,t−1−k and ATREM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 
1 and 2 to investigate real earnings management of share-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4-24: Abnormal real earnings management under performance controlling approach of cash-financed acquirers with and without direct 
networks versus the rest of the sample 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept 0.268 *** 0.208 *** 0.259 *** -0.273 *** -0.297 *** -0.293 *** 0.042  0.025  0.060 *** -0.012  -0.089 ** -0.022  
t-statistic 8.17   8.81   13.31   -5.71   -8.62   -10.22   1.31   0.87   2.79   -0.25   -2.48   -0.72   
CMA_WOBCi,t -0.022 
 -0.052  -0.051  -0.040  0.057  0.045  -0.006  0.006  -0.012  -0.088  -0.009  -0.006  
t-statistic -0.68   -2.2   -2.66   -0.81   1.62   1.58   -0.18   0.21   -0.6   -1.8   -0.26   -0.18   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.019 
 0.123  0.029  0.042  -0.070  -0.131  -0.038  -0.047  0.136 * 0.061  -0.060  -0.108  
t-statistic 0.15   1.4   0.41   0.19   -0.45   -1.07   -0.33   -0.44   1.79   0.29   -0.38   -0.82   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** 
t-statistic 4.38   3.95   6.16   -4.72   -6.09   -9.33   -3.51   -2.89   -3.08   -3.25   -4.13   -4.83   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.017 *** -0.012 *** -0.015 *** 0.007 ** 0.010 *** 0.012 *** 0.004 * 0.000 *** -0.004 *** -0.008 ** -0.002 *** -0.005 *** 
t-statistic -8.33   -8.08   -12.51   2.39   4.78   7.16   1.74   0.28   -3.27   -2.57   -0.75   -2.49   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.157 *** 0.075 *** 0.074 *** 0.025 
 0.042  0.074 *** 0.007  0.039  0.058 *** 0.116 *** 0.087 *** 0.140 *** 
t-statistic 5.69   3.59   4.25   0.62   1.4   2.94   0.26   1.49   3   2.94   2.83   5.16   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.100 *** 0.073 *** 0.080 *** -0.074 *** -0.054 *** -0.043 *** 0.032 ** 0.029 *** 0.040 *** 0.022 
 0.016  0.035 *** 
t-statistic 7.73   7.95   10.45   -3.93   -4.11   -3.92   2.46   2.58   4.69   1.17   1.16   2.91   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.049  0.0443  0.0736  0.029  0.0367  0.0474  0.0149  0.0207  0.0183  0.0262  0.0106  0.0176  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 deals 
with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-7). Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACF_PCi,t−1−k, ADEXP_PCi,t−1−k, APROD_PCi,t−1−k and ATREM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate real 
earnings management of cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 4-25: Abnormal real earnings management under performance control approach of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board 
connections 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
  Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 Year t-3 Year t-2 Year t-1 
Intercept 0.268 *** 0.207 *** 0.258 *** -0.276 *** -0.298 *** -0.294 *** 0.041  0.027  0.059 *** -0.013  -0.091 ** -0.025  
t-statistic 8.17   8.76   13.25   -5.77   -8.64   -10.24   1.28   0.91   2.78   -0.28   -2.53   -0.81   
SMA_WOBCi,t -0.012 
 0.033  0.095 ** 0.134  0.034  0.049  0.061  -0.061  0.031  0.052  0.073  0.185 *** 
t-statistic -0.18   0.66   2.39   1.35   0.48   0.86   0.85   -1.01   0.71   0.53   1   3.02   
SMA_WBCi,t -0.011 
 0.097  0.000  0.085  0.055  -0.008  -0.118  -0.081  -0.047  0.053  0.164  0.013  
t-statistic -0.08   0.93   0   0.42   0.38   -0.07   -0.78   -0.61   -0.48   0.27   1.08   0.1   
CMA_WOBCi,t -0.023 
 -0.051  -0.050  -0.039  0.057  0.045  -0.005  0.006  -0.012  -0.088  -0.009  -0.004  
t-statistic -0.68   -2.19   -2.63   -0.78   1.63   1.59   -0.17   0.19   -0.59   -1.79   -0.24   -0.14   
CMA_WBCi,t 0.018 
 0.124  0.030  0.042  -0.069  -0.131  -0.037  -0.047  0.136  0.061  -0.060  -0.107  
t-statistic 0.15   1.41   0.42   0.2   -0.45   -1.07   -0.32   -0.44   1.79   0.29   -0.37   -0.81   
MTBi,t−2−k 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** 
t-statistic 4.39   3.96   6.15   -4.75   -6.09   -9.34   -3.53   -2.89   -3.09   -3.26   -4.12   -4.86   
SIZEi,t−2−k -0.017 *** -0.012 *** -0.015 *** 0.007 ** 0.010 *** 0.012 *** 0.004 * 0.000  -0.004 *** -0.007 ** -0.002  -0.004 ** 
t-statistic -8.33   -8.05   -12.44   2.45   4.8   7.18   1.77   0.23   -3.26   -2.54   -0.7   -2.38   
LEVi,t−2−k 0.157 *** 0.075 *** 0.075 *** 0.025  0.042  0.074 *** 0.007  0.038  0.058 *** 0.116 *** 0.088 *** 0.140 *** 
t-statistic 5.68   3.61   4.27   0.62   1.4   2.94   0.25   1.47   3   2.95   2.84   5.17   
SEOi,t−1−k 0.100 *** 0.073 *** 0.079 *** -0.074 *** -0.055 *** -0.044 *** 0.031 ** 0.030 *** 0.039 *** 0.022  0.016  0.033 *** 
t-statistic 7.73   7.93   10.28   -3.93   -4.12   -3.96   2.44   2.62   4.64   1.17   1.14   2.75   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.0487  0.0442  0.0741  0.029  0.0365  0.0472  0.0148  0.0206  0.0181  0.0259  0.0107  0.0187  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 10 deals 
with board connections out of 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals with board connections out of 233 cash-financed deals. The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑀𝐴_𝑊𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) + 𝛽8(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2−𝑘) +
𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 4-8). Yi,t−1−k is replaced with ACF_PCi,t−1−k, ADEXP_PCi,t−1−k, APROD_PCi,t−1−k and 
ATREM_PCi,t−1−k. k is replaced by 0, 1 and 2 to investigate real earnings management of share- and cash-financed acquirers with and without board connections 
in years t-1, t-2 and t-3. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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4.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has investigated whether and how board connections between 
acquiring and target firms affect earnings management behaviour. The analyses 
are based on the sample of 295 M&A deals in the UK in the 2007 – 2012 period, 
including 62 share-financed deals and 233 cash-financed deals. There are 10 
deals with board connections out of the 62 share-financed deals and 15 deals 
with board connections out of the 233 cash-financed deals. To measure accrual-
based earnings management and real earnings management, the study has 
estimated abnormal total and working capital accruals using the Jones model and 
the modified Jones model under the cash flow approach with the intercept and 
estimated abnormal cash flow, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal 
production costs and abnormal total real earnings management using 
expectations models developed by Roychowdhury (2006). For cash-financed 
M&A deals, there is no evidence that acquirers with and without board 
connections manipulate their earnings prior to the merger announcement. 
However, for share-financed M&A deals, the results show that acquirers with 
board connections significantly increase accrual-based earnings management 
early on, i.e. in the first and second years prior to the merger announcement, 
while those without board connections manipulate real earnings activities such 
as cash flow in the first year prior to the merger announcement. The findings 
suggest that less uncertainty about the M&A deal and a stronger bargaining 
position in the negotiations for acquirers with board connections allow these firms 
to strategically time and confidently inflate their accruals earnings management, 
while share-financed acquirers without board connections strategically 
manipulate real earnings management to avoid potential litigation and regulatory 
risk. 
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Overall, this research enhances understanding of earnings management 
behaviours prior to the merger announcement in UK. The evidence provided from 
this research makes significant contribution to our understanding of how the 
director connections affect corporate decisions.  
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5 CHAPTER 5: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BY SHARE-FINANCED 
ACQUIRERS PRIOR TO DEAL ANNOUNCEMENTS: THE ROLES OF 
FINANCIAL EXPERTISE, TENURE AND REPUTATION9 
Abstract 
Previous research has suggested that share-financed acquirers inflate their 
earnings before merger announcements. The existing literature also indicates 
that the characteristics of CEOs could affect earnings management. This chapter 
extends prior studies by examining the relationships between CEO 
characteristics and accrual-based and real earnings management in share-
financed acquirers before a merger announcement. It finds that CEOs with 
financial expertise, long tenure and high reputation are associated with lower 
abnormal accruals in share-financed M&A deals. However, under real earnings 
management, only CEOs with financial expertise are associated with lower real 
earnings management in share-financed M&A deals. The correlations are 
statistically significant and consistently exist in the first year before the deal 
announcement. These findings are robust to different measures of abnormal 
accruals and real earnings activities and estimations employing different models. 
The evidence suggests that CEO characteristics have an impact on earnings 
management in the context of share-financed M&A and have some implications 
for practitioners.  
                                                 
9 This chapter has been presented at British Accounting and Finance Association (BAFA) annual conference 
2018. This chapter has also been accepted to present at 2018 American Accounting Association (AAA) 
Forensic Accounting Research Conference, 2018 American Accounting Association (AAA) Southeast Region 
Conference, 2018 American Accounting Association (AAA) Ohio Region Meeting, CAAA Canadian Academic 
Accounting Association 2018, 35th Annual Conference of the French Finance Association (AFFI) and The 
World Finance Conference 2018. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As reviewed in section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3, many published studies show that 
share-financed acquirers significantly inflate accruals and real earnings activities 
before a merger announcement to reduce acquisition costs (Louis 2004; Botsari 
and Meeks 2008; Pungaliya and Vijh 2009; Zhu and Lu 2013; Farooqi et al. 2017). 
Prior studies also provide evidence that the characteristics of CEOs matter in the 
context of M&A deals (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Walters et al. 2007; Malmendier 
and Tate 2008; Custódio and Metzger 2013). In this chapter, it is hypothesized 
that CEO characteristics could impact earnings management before the merger 
announcement. The characteristics investigated are financial expertise, tenure 
and reputation of CEOs. 
First, there is evidence that managers with financial expertise are more likely to 
produce higher organizational outcomes. For example, Custódio and Metzger 
(2013)  find that CEOs who are financial experts are often in a better position to 
negotiate in M&A transactions so that the acquirers might pay less, resulting in 
higher post-M&A returns. CEOs with financial expertise are also associated with 
better organizational outcomes, such as more flexible financial policies and ability 
to access external funds in difficult credit situations (Custódio and Metzger 2014). 
Also, Aier et al. (2005) find that CFOs’ financial expertise is negatively correlated 
with the use of accounting restatements, which is a proxy for earnings 
management.  
Second, previous research shows that earnings management is lower in later 
than early years of a CEOs’ service (Ali and Zhang 2015). The reason is thought 
to be that CEOs with long tenure are perceived to be more talented than CEOs 
with short tenure. CEOs with long tenure establish a reputation for managerial 
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ability. Therefore, CEOs with long tenure will be less likely to engage in earnings 
management to protect their reputation (Ali and Zhang 2015). In the case of 
CEOs with short tenure, earnings management tends to be high in the early years 
of service because they have incentives to avoid being judged as having low 
ability, which would lead to their dismissal or negatively affect their autonomy and 
future compensation (Ali and Zhang 2015). 
Finally, the existing literature suggests that the reputation of managers affects 
corporate practices, but the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, Jian and Lee 
(2011) find that CEOs with a high reputation receive favourable responses from 
the market to announcements of capital investment. Moreover, CEOs with a high 
reputation can generate higher post-investment returns. Also, Francis et al. 
(2008) find that firms which use earnings management to a significant degree are 
more likely to hire CEOs with a high reputation so that these CEOs can help to 
reduce earnings management in subsequent periods. The evidence suggests 
that there is a negative relationship between the reputation of CEOs and earnings 
management. On the other hand, CEOs with a high reputation are found to 
prioritize enhancing their reputation instead of improving the wealth of 
shareholders (Hirshleifer 1993; Malmendier and Tate 2009).  
This chapter specifically examines the influence of CEOs’ traits on earnings 
management before a merger announcement, a setting in which existing 
evidence has suggested that the incentives for earnings management will be high 
for the CEOs of acquirers without financial expertise, short tenure and low 
reputation. To measure financial expertise, the study looks at whether the CEOs 
have had work experience as CFOs in the past and other finance-related 
qualifications of CEOs (Aier et al. 2005; Nguyen et al. 2016). Tenure is measured 
using the number of years in the role of CEO (Ali and Zhang 2015). In terms of 
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reputation, the CEO’s media coverage is measured (Milbourn 2003; Francis et al. 
2008; Jian and Lee 2011).  
Regarding proxies for earnings management, abnormal accruals are estimated 
using the models of Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) and abnormal real 
earnings management using real earnings management models developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006). The sample comprises 7,727 firm-year observations of 
UK companies from 2007 to 2012, which includes 62 observations with share-
financed M&A deals. In the first year before a deal announcement, CEOs with 
financial expertise, long tenure and high reputation are found to be associated 
with lower accrual-based earnings management in share-financed acquirers. For 
real earnings management, CEOs with long tenure and high reputation are 
insignificantly correlated with lower real earnings management, except for CEOs 
with financial expertise. The results are statistically significant and robust as 
abnormal accruals and real earnings activities are measured in different ways 
and employing different models. 
The evidence is new and adds significantly to the growing literature investigating 
how CEOs’ traits influence corporate practices. The research is the first to 
examine the relationships between CEO characteristics and earnings 
management in the context of M&A deals. While previous research has only 
focused on earnings management of acquirers and targets before the merger 
announcement (Botsari and Meeks 2008), this study provides evidence that CEO 
characteristics affect earnings management in the first year before the merger 
announcement. Also, it provides further evidence to support the notion that CEO 
characteristics are important determinants of financial policies around M&A deals 
(Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Walters et al. 2007; Malmendier and Tate 2008; 
Custódio and Metzger 2013).  
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The findings of this chapter could be useful for practitioners, such as investors 
and auditors. Investors should be cautious when using information related to M&A 
deal announcements from acquirers with CEOs of low reputation, short tenure 
and without financial expertise because earnings are more likely to be 
manipulated in the first year before the merger announcement. The reason is that 
inflated earnings can be reversed in subsequent periods, which in turn reduces 
abnormal returns from investments in stocks of acquirers. Similarly, when 
auditing financial statements, auditors could particularly pay attention to firms 
with CEOs of low reputation, short tenure and without financial expertise because 
the risks of earnings management are high in the first year before the merger 
announcement. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 presents a literature 
review and develops hypotheses. Section 5.3 presents the sample selection. 
Section 5.4 describes the methodology. Section 5.5 discusses the findings. 
Finally, section 5.6 and Error! Reference source not found. provide robustness 
tests and conclusions. 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
5.2.1 Earnings management in share-financed acquirers 
As reviewed in section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3, M&A is a key part of financial activities 
and corporate growth strategy. Acquirers’ earnings management or the effect of 
acquirers’ earnings management on shareholder wealth has thus attracted 
attention from researchers. Some research has shown that share-financed 
acquirers manage earnings before M&A (Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; 
Botsari and Meeks 2008). 
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Share-financed acquirers are motivated to manage earnings to increase their 
stock price. If the acquirers’ stock price is high, the amount of stock used for 
exchange in M&A deals will be low because the exchange ratio is inverse to the 
acquirers’ stock price. This motivation is explained well by agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1990), which suggests that acquirers 
manage earnings when the costs of undoing earnings management are lower 
than the costs of detecting earnings management (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; 
Erickson and Wang 1999). However, the risk of detection may not deter acquirers 
from becoming involved in earnings management activities if earnings are 
managed within GAAP10. Thus, earnings management in acquirers is neither 
easily detected nor prevented. 
5.2.2 CEO characteristics and earnings management 
Although previous research shows that share-financed acquirers inflate their 
earnings management before a merger announcement, acquirers with different 
CEO characteristics could manipulate earnings differently. This section briefly 
discusses the relationship between CEO characteristics and earnings 
management.  
Previous research provides evidence that the working experience and 
personalities of CEOs can affect corporate practices. Hambrick and Finkelstein 
(1987) argue that managers’ traits matter because managers rely on their own 
experience, values and personalities to interpret strategic circumstances. Miller 
et al. (1986) also provide a psychological explanation for the relationship between 
top executives’ characteristics and organizational outcomes.  
                                                 
10 General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
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There is also empirical evidence in line with the argument that CEO 
characteristics are determinants of organizational outcomes. Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003) find that management style affects various corporate practices. 
Ge et al. (2011) also provide evidence that the style of CFOs affects corporate 
investment and financial policies. On the direct evidence on concerning CEO 
characteristics, Custódio and Metzger (2014) find that CEOs who are financial 
experts are more likely to generate better organizational outcomes, such as more 
flexible financial policies and the ability to access external funds in difficult credit 
situations. 
In addition to the above evidence, the existing literature also suggests that 
executives’ characteristics influence accounting practices such as earnings 
management. Specifically, financial expertise is an important determinant of 
earnings management. Aier et al. (2005) examine whether CFO characteristics 
are related to accounting restatement, a measure of earnings management. They 
argue that CFOs who are financial experts can contribute considerably to the 
accounting system. Thus, they are more likely to result in good accounting 
outcomes. Consistent with their prediction, they find that firms with CFOs who are 
financial experts are less likely to be involved in accounting restatement. 
In terms of CEO tenure, Ali and Zhang (2015) investigated the correlation 
between CEO tenure and earnings management. They find that earnings 
management is greater in firms with long-tenured CEOs than in firms with short-
tenured CEOs. They argue that CEOs with long tenure are more talented than 
those with short tenure. They have built up their reputations in managerial ability 
over a long-time in the role. Therefore, they will have an incentive not to prioritize 
earnings management if there is a risk of it damaging their reputation. In contrast, 
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the market is usually uncertain about the management ability of newly appointed 
CEOs (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Ali and Zhang 2015). Therefore, CEOs with 
short tenure are more likely to be keen to engage in earnings management to 
prove their managerial ability, while protecting their compensation and remaining 
in their position (Kuang et al. 2014; Ali and Zhang 2015). 
Reputation is also a characteristic that influences earnings management, but the 
evidence on this influence is mixed. On the one hand, Hirshleifer (1993) suggests 
that managers are motivated to affect corporate investment in a way that builds 
up their reputation rather than the wealth of shareholders. Also, Malmendier and 
Tate (2009) evaluate the effect of CEOs achieving “superstar” status on firm 
performance. The researchers find that the statistical distribution of 
compensation, status and reputation of executives in the US is highly skewed: a 
few “superstars” enjoy significant benefits in terms of rewards. They find that, 
after winning an award conferred by national media organizations such as 
Forbes, Time and Fortune, CEOs underperform compared with their prior 
performance and compared with CEOs who have not won an award. The 
evidence also indicates that superstar CEOs extract higher compensation and 
firms’ earnings are managed upward after CEOs win awards. The results suggest 
that CEOs opportunistically inflate their firms’ earnings. However, Francis et al. 
(2008) also find that firms engaging in significant earnings management are more 
likely to hire CEOs with high reputations so that these CEOs can help to reduce 
earnings management in subsequent periods. The evidence suggests that there 
is a negative relationship between the reputation of CEOs and earnings 
management. 
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5.2.3 Do CEO characteristics matter for mergers and acquisitions? 
As discussed above, previous research shows that share-financed acquirers 
inflate their earnings before a merger announcement (Botsari and Meeks 2008). 
Prior evidence also suggests that CEO characteristics are important 
determinants of earnings management (Francis et al. 2008; Malmendier and Tate 
2009; Feng et al. 2011). Thus, it is possible that CEO characteristics may affect 
earnings management around M&A deals. 
There are reasons to believe that CEO traits are relevant in the context of M&A. 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) explain why CEO characteristics are important for 
M&A deals. They find that powerful CEOs are more likely to influence the 
decisions of boards of directors to extract higher compensation and bonuses 
related to the completion of M&A deals. Walters et al. (2007) also explain that 
CEOs affect M&A deals by extending their tenure in acquirers. Custódio and 
Metzger (2013) show that CEOs who are financial experts are often in a better 
position to negotiate in M&A transactions in which acquirers pay less, resulting in 
higher post-M&A returns. In contrast to Custódio and Metzger (2013), 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that firms which have overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to make value-destroying M&A deals because they overestimate the 
subsequent returns. 
5.2.4 Hypotheses 
Although CEO characteristics are important for M&A deals, the existing literature 
does not provide any evidence on the relationship between CEO characteristics 
and earnings management around M&A deals. As a response to the gap in the 
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literature, this study examined how characteristics of CEOs affect earnings 
management before the merger announcement.  
The existing literature has shown that CEOs of share-financed acquiring firms try 
to inflate earnings in the year preceding the deals to minimize the number of 
shares exchanged for the target, an expected result assuming CEOs are working 
to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Botsari 
and Meeks 2008). It has also been established that financial expertise generally 
helps managers to be able to deliver better organizational outcomes (Aier et al. 
2005; Burak Güner et al. 2008; Albring et al. 2014; Badolato et al. 2014). In the 
context of M&A deals, CEOs with financial expertise are typically better able to 
estimate the financial costs and benefits of these deals (Ge et al. 2011). 
Therefore, it is expected that CEOs with financial expertise could be able to 
deliver good M&A outcomes without having to resort to costly earning 
management options. Following this line of reasoning, the first hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H5.1: CEOs with financial expertise are associated with lower earnings 
management in the year preceding share-financed M&A a deal announcement. 
With regard to CEO tenure, previous research shows that CEOs with long tenure 
engage in less earnings management than those with short tenure (Ali and Zhang 
2015). CEOs with long tenure are perceived as more experienced and talented 
than CEOs with short tenure. They have established a reputation for high ability. 
Therefore, long-tenured CEOs will not be keen to engage in earnings 
management to protect their reputation (Ali and Zhang 2015). However, CEOs 
with short tenure have an incentive to engage in earnings management because 
they are more likely to wish to avoid being judged as having low ability, which 
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would lead to their dismissal or negatively affect their autonomy and future 
compensation (Kuang et al. 2014; Ali and Zhang 2015). Thus, the second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H5.2: CEOs with long tenure are associated with lower earnings management in 
the year preceding share-financed M&A a deal announcement. 
In a similar vein, the extant literature has shown that CEOs with a better 
reputation are more likely to produce better organizational outcomes (Francis et 
al. 2008; Jian and Lee 2011). Taking this evidence in the context of share-
financed M&A deals, it is posited that highly reputable CEOs will be less likely to 
resort to costly earnings management, not only because their reputation implies 
a good deal is more likely to be reached, but also because engaging in earnings 
management will risk their reputation being damaged. Thus, the third hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H5.3: High reputable CEOs are associated with lower earnings management in 
the year preceding share-financed M&A deal announcement. 
5.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
5.3.1 Sample selection 
The sample used in this chapter is similar that in Chapter 3. The sample has 
7,727 observations covering all UK firms during the period 2007 to 2012 which 
have sufficient data to estimate accruals and real earnings management. For the 
M&A sample, as explained in section 3.3, the final M&A sample consists of 62 
share-financed deals. 
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For CEO characteristics, the CEO is identified as the individual listed in 
Bloomberg as the CEO or equivalent. If a firm has had two CEOs in a firm-year, 
the CEO with than 6 months in the role is excluded. If a firm has had co-CEOs in 
a firm-year, the one with less time in the role is excluded. Next, data were hand-
collected on the characteristics of each CEO in the sample from Bloomberg, 
including the CEO’s financial certificates and/or qualification11 and years in the 
role, if any. If data for a CEO were missing from Bloomberg, the data were 
obtained directly from the annual reports downloaded from Key Note. If it was not 
possible to obtain the CEO’s financial certificates and qualification and years in 
the role using the above procedures, the observation was dropped from the 
sample.  
For media coverage of a CEO in a year, a search was conducted for business 
news related to the CEO in LexisNexis database using the CEO’s name and the 
company name. Following Francis et al. (2008), the search was restricted to 
nationally circulated UK newspapers within the three-year period prior to and 
including the fiscal year considered. Only observations with all the data needed 
for the main analyses were retained. The process yielded a sample of 7,727 firm-
year observations (including 1,855 separate companies across 70 industries). 
The sample consisted of 62 share-financed deals. All continuous variables were 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
                                                 
11 Qualification is a professional accounting certification issued by one of five current qualifying bodies: 
the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), Association of International Accountants 
(AIA), Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), Chartered Accountants Ireland 
(CAI) and Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS). 
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5.3.2 CEO characteristics sample 
The CEO characteristics investigated in this study include financial expertise, 
tenure and reputation. Following previous studies (Aier et al. 2005; Nguyen et al. 
2016), finance and accounting certification or experience as a CFO help CEOs 
gain financial expertise, which is relevant in the context of earnings management. 
The CEO’s financial expertise proxy is EXP, which is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if a CEO has a Master of Business Administration degree or a 
Chartered Accountant certification accredited by the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC, 2016) or equivalent, or if the CEO has worked as a CFO in the past, zero 
otherwise. Following Ali and Zhang (2015), CEO tenure is TENURE, which is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the CEO has a higher than average 
number of years in the role compared to other CEOs in the same industry, zero 
otherwise. Thus, CEOs have financial expertise and long tenure when EXP and 
TENURE are equal to 1.  
Media coverage (PRESS) is the first proxy for CEO reputation (Milbourn 2003; 
Francis et al. 2008; Jian and Lee 2011; Nguyen et al. 2016). There are two PRESS 
proxies, PRESS2 and PRESS3, for robustness testing, which are dummy variables 
taking the value of 1 if the number of news stories covering the CEO’s name and 
company in year t-1 and year t for PRESS2, or year t-2, year t-1 and year t for 
PRESS3 are higher than the average of those in the same industry, zero otherwise. 
Thus, CEOs have a high reputation when PRESS2 or PRESS3 are equal 1. The 
share-financed acquirer’s characteristics sample and CEO characteristics of the 
rest of the sample are presented in Table 5-1.
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Table 5-1: Year distributions of CEOs’ characteristics of UK firms in the period from 2007 to 2012 
Panel A: Year distribution of CEOs’ characteristics for share-financed deals 
Year Full sample 
Long  
tenure 
Short  
Tenure 
With 
financial 
expertise 
Without 
financial 
expertise 
High 
press2 
coverage 
Low 
press2 
coverage 
High 
press3 
coverage 
Low 
press3 
coverage 
2007 13 1 12 2 11 4 9 4 9 
2008 12 3 9 3 9 1 11 1 11 
2009 11 0 11 2 9 1 10 2 9 
2010 15 3 12 7 8 6 9 6 9 
2011 7 3 4 3 4 2 5 2 5 
2012 4 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Total 62 13 49 19 43 16 46 17 45 
Panel B: Year distribution of CEOs’ characteristics for the rest of the sample 
Year Full sample 
Long  
tenure 
Short  
Tenure 
With 
financial 
expertise 
Without 
financial 
expertise 
High 
press2 
coverage 
Low 
press2 
coverage 
High 
press3 
coverage 
Low 
press3 
coverage 
2007 1,338 220 1,118 248 1,090 191 1,147 198 1,140 
2008 1,351 267 1,084 292 1,059 216 1,135 234 1,117 
2009 1,311 279 1,032 327 984 219 1,092 236 1,075 
2010 1,279 277 1,002 355 924 223 1,056 248 1,031 
2011 1,226 284 942 371 855 254 972 269 957 
2012 1,160 291 869 366 794 271 889 289 871 
Total 7,665 1,618 6,047 1,959 5,706 1,374 6,291 1,474 6,191 
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5.4 METHODOLOGY 
5.4.1 Accrual-based earnings management and real earnings 
management 
The chapter estimates abnormal total accruals and abnormal working capital 
accruals from cash flows using the Jones and modified Jones models with the 
intercept and abnormal real earnings management as described in section 3.4.2 
in Chapter 3. Therefore, the proxies for estimating abnormal accruals include 
ATA_JMi,t and  ATA_MJMi,t (abnormal total accruals from cash flows estimated 
using the Jones and modified Jones models with the intercept) and AWCA_JMi,t 
and AWCA_MJMi,t (abnormal working capital accruals from cash flows estimated 
using the Jones and modified Jones models with the intercept). The proxies for 
estimating abnormal real earnings management include ACFi,t (abnormal cash 
flow), ADEXPi,t (abnormal discretionary expenses), APRODi,t (abnormal 
production costs) and  ATREMi,t (abnormal total real earnings management). 
5.4.2 Control variables 
As reviewed in section 3.4.5 in Chapter 3, similar to Chapter 4, this chapter 
controlled for the firms’ characteristics which could drive aggressive earnings 
management by adding to the regressions firm size (SIZE), firms’ leverage (LEV), 
net operating assets (NOA) and return on assets (ROA). To control for the effect 
of firms’ incentives to engage in earnings management, the chapter adds 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) and the firms’ stock overvaluation, i.e. the market-
to-book ratio (MTB), to the regressions. 
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5.4.3 Empirical models 
To test H5.1, H5.2 and H5.3, which investigate the correlation of CEO 
characteristics and accrual-based earnings management by share-financed 
acquirers prior to a merger announcement, the following regressions is as follows: 
Equation 5-1 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1_𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2)
+ 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽9(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by abnormal total accruals estimated by the Jones and modified 
Jones models under the cash flow approach (ATA_JMi,t−1 and  ATA_MJMi,t−1) and 
abnormal working capital estimated by the Jones and modified Jones models 
under the cash flow approach (AWCA_JMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1). Xi,t−1 denotes 
the CEO characteristics, namely EXPi,t−1, TENUREi,t−1, PRESS2i,t−1 and  
PRESS3i,t−1 in year t-1, the first year prior to a merger announcement. SMAi,t is an 
indicator variable which is set to 1 for share-financed acquiring firms i in year t, 
zero otherwise. Other variables are as explained in section 3.4.5. 
In terms of real earnings management, to test H5.1, H5.2 and H5.3, linear 
regressions are run investigating the correlation of CEO characteristics and real 
earnings management by share-financed acquirers prior to deal announcements. 
Specifically, the following regression is estimated: 
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Equation 5-2 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2)
+ 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1. Xi,t−1 
denotes the CEO characteristics, namely EXPi,t−1, TENUREi,t−1, PRESS2i,t−1 and  
PRESS3i,t−1 in year t-1. This regression excludes NOAi,t−1 because previous 
research has not shown significant correlations between real earnings 
management and NOA. 
5.5 RESULT 
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5-2 provides an overview of CEO characteristics (Panel A), proxies of 
earnings management (Panel B), firm characteristics (Panel C) and control 
variables (Panel D). In Panel A, the descriptive statistics show that the sample 
has fewer CEOs with financial expertise and long tenure than CEOs without 
financial expertise and short tenure (the medians of EXP and TENURE are 0). The 
statistics also indicate that there are fewer highly reputable CEOs than CEOs with 
low reputation (the medians of PRESS2 and PRESS3 are 0). The descriptive 
statistics of proxies for earnings management, firm statistics and control variables 
are presented in Panels B, C and D, as discussed in section 3.5.1. 
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Table 5-2: Summary descriptive statistics 
Statistics N MEAN STD MIN P25 MEDIAN P75 MAX 
Panel A: Summary statistics for CEO's characteristics 
EXPi,t−1 7,727 0.256 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
TENUREi,t−1 7,727 0.211 0.408 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PRESS2i,t−1 7,727 0.180 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PRESS3i,t−1 7,727 0.193 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Earnings management proxies 
ATA_JMi,t−1 7,727 -0.010 0.135 -0.553 -0.059 -0.004 0.049 0.428 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 7,727 -0.010 0.134 -0.529 -0.058 -0.005 0.050 0.430 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 7,727 -0.017 0.149 -0.595 -0.074 -0.010 0.051 0.441 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 7,727 -0.017 0.147 -0.589 -0.074 -0.010 0.051 0.425 
ACFi,t−1 7,727 -0.008 0.282 -1.115 -0.1 -0.014 0.057 1.292 
APRODi,t−1 7,727 -0.020 0.434 -2.349 -0.112 0.018 0.145 1.470 
ADEXPi,t−1 7,727 -0.010 0.255 -1.091 -0.105 -0.003 0.098 0.870 
ATREMi,t−1 7,727 -0.029 0.455 -2.207 -0.158 -0.003 0.136 1.754 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
ATi,t−1 7,727 5,208,723 18,120,147 776 19,261 107,551 1,209,600 128,234,000 
IBi,t−1 7,727 349,050 1,440,068 -511,336 -1,190 2,252 46,957 10,866,000 
MACAPi,t−1 7,727 6,176,035 23,201,720 776 15,425 93,203 1,062,694 172,790,923 
SALEi,t−1 7,727 4,151,836 14,718,687 0 10,145 85,638 1,001,900 109,132,000 
Panel D: Control variables 
SEOi,t−1 7,727 0.273 0.445 0 0 0 1 1 
SIZEi,t−1 7,727 11.869 2.889 6.654 9.644 11.443 13.876 18.968 
MTBi,t−1 7,727 2.645 4.301 -11.854 0.936 1.742 3.154 27.638 
LEVi,t−1 7,727 0.176 0.194 0 0.005 0.130 0.272 0.996 
NOAi,t−1 7,727 0.494 0.260 -0.403 0.349 0.539 0.686 0.932 
ROAi,t−1 7,727 -0.056 0.334 -2.143 -0.054 0.036 0.080 0.323 
Note: The table reports statistics of CEOs’ characteristics variables, earnings management proxies and control variables for the UK sample from 2007 
and 2012. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
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5.5.2 Univariate analyses 
Table 5-3 reports the mean abnormal accrual-based and real earnings 
management for each measure of CEO characteristics of M&A firms and the 
differences in abnormal accruals and real earnings activities for each CEO’s 
characteristics of M&A firms (62 share-financed deal observations).  
Panel A first reports the mean earnings management of CEOs with financial 
expertise (EXP = 1) and CEOs without financial expertise (EXP = 0) and the mean 
differences in earnings management between CEOs with and without financial 
expertise.  
The results show that the abnormal accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, 
ATA_NJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1) and abnormal real earnings management 
(ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1) of acquirers which have CEOs 
without financial expertise (EXP = 0) are significantly positive, whereas the 
abnormal accruals of acquirers which have CEOs with financial expertise (EXP= 
1) are negative and insignificant. The results also show that acquirers which have 
CEOs without financial expertise inflate earnings significantly higher than those 
with CEOs with financial expertise, significant at the 5% and 10% levels. For real 
earnings management proxies, the abnormal real earnings management 
(ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1) of acquirers which have CEOs 
without financial expertise (EXP = 0) are positive and significant, with the 
exception of ADEXPi,t−1 and APRODi,t−1, whereas the abnormal real earnings 
management of acquirers which have CEOs with financial expertise (EXP= 1) are 
negative and insignificant. The results also show that acquirers which have CEOs 
without financial expertise manipulate real earnings activities significantly higher 
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than those which have CEOs with financial expertise, especially cash flow, 
significant at the 5% level. The results initially suggest that CEOs without financial 
expertise manipulate real earnings activities to a greater extent than CEOs with 
financial expertise. 
Second, Panel A reports the mean earnings management of CEOs with long 
tenure (TENURE = 1) and CEOs with short tenure (TENURE = 0) and the mean 
differences in earnings management between CEOs with long and short tenure. 
The results show that the abnormal accruals of acquirers which have CEOs with 
short tenure (TENURE = 0) are positive and significant, whereas the abnormal 
accruals of acquirers which have CEOs with long tenure (TENURE = 1) are 
negative and insignificant. The results also show that acquirers which have CEOs 
with short tenure inflate earnings to a considerably great extent than those which 
have CEOs with long tenure, significant at the 1% and 5% levels. For real 
earnings management proxies, the abnormal real earnings management of 
acquirers which have CEOs with long and short tenure (TENURE = 1 and TENURE 
= 0) are insignificant. The results also show that acquirers which have CEOs with 
short tenure manipulate real earnings activities to a greater extent than those 
which have CEOs with long tenure, but not significantly so.  
Panel B of Table 5-3 reports the mean earnings management of CEOs with high 
reputation (PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS3 = 1) and CEOs with low reputation (PRESS2 
= 0 and PRESS3 = 0) and the differences in earnings management between CEOs 
with high and low reputations. The results show that the abnormal accruals of 
acquirers which have CEOs with low reputation (PRESS2 = 0 and PRESS3 = 0) are 
positive and significant, whereas the abnormal accruals of acquirers which have 
CEOs with high reputation (PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS3 = 1) are negative and 
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insignificant. The abnormal accruals of acquirers which have CEOs with low 
reputation (PRESS2 = 0 and PRESS3 = 0) are also significantly higher than those 
of acquirers which have CEOs with high reputation (PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS3 = 1), 
except for AWCA_JMi,t−1. However, the abnormal real earnings management of 
acquirers which have CEOs with low and high reputations (PRESS2 = 0, PRESS3 
= 0, PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS3 = 1) are insignificant. The results also show that 
acquirers which have CEOs with low reputation manipulate real earnings 
activities to a greater extent than those which have CEOs with high reputation, 
but insignificantly so. 
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Table 5-3: Earnings management of share-financed acquirers with CEO characteristics 
Panel A: Financial expertise and tenure 
  𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 1  𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 0 Difference in means of  
𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 1 vs 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 0 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 1  𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 0 
Difference in means of  
𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 1 vs 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 0 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.0313  0.0520 ** -0.0833 * -0.0594  0.0493 ** -0.1087 ** 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.0478  0.0500 ** -0.0979 ** -0.0824  0.0472 *** -0.1297 ** 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0439  0.0498 ** -0.0938 ** -0.0566  0.0417 ** -0.0983 ** 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0574  0.0453 ** -0.1028 ** -0.0788  0.0384 ** -0.1172 ** 
ACFi,t−1 -0.0590  0.1202 ** -0.1793 * 0.0157  0.0784  -0.0627  
APRODi,t−1 -0.0440  0.0393  -0.0833  -0.0711  0.0411  -0.1122  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.0300  0.0521  -0.0821  0.0870  0.0126  0.0744  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.0268  0.1731 ** -0.1999 * -0.0781  0.1735  -0.2515  
Observations 19  43  -24.0000  13  49    
Panel B: Reputation (Press2 coverage and press3 coverage) 
  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 1  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 0  Difference in means of 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 1 vs 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 0 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 1  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 0  
Difference in mean of 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 1 vs 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 0 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.0238  0.0440 ** -0.0678 * -0.0239  0.0455 ** -0.0695 * 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.0347  0.0391 ** -0.0738  -0.0329  0.0400 ** -0.0729  
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0432  0.0435 ** -0.0867 * -0.0421  0.0450 ** -0.0870 * 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0513  0.0365 ** -0.0878 * -0.0484  0.0374 ** -0.0858 * 
ACFi,t−1 0.0203  0.0809  -0.0607  0.0199  0.0824  -0.0626  
APRODi,t−1 0.1221  -0.0160  0.1381  0.1221  -0.0160  0.1381  
ADEXPi,t−1 0.0685  0.0138  0.0547  0.0600  0.0157  0.0444  
ATREMi,t−1 0.1481  0.1095  0.0386  0.1481  0.1095  0.0386  
Observations 16  46    17  45    
Note: The table reports the mean and differences in mean earnings management for the share-financed acquirers with CEO characteristics in the UK 
sample from 2007 and 2012. 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 1 and 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 0 are CEOs with and without financial expertise. 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 1 and 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 0 are CEOs with long 
and short tenure. 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 1 and 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 0 are CEOs with high and low media coverage. 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 1 and 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 0 are CEOs with high and low 
media coverage. The difference in means are the differences in mean earnings management related to CEO characteristics. Significance is based on a 
one sample t-test for the mean and a two samples t-test for the difference in mean. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
Please see the Appendix for variable descriptions. 
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5.5.3 Multivariate analyses 
5.5.3.1 CEO characteristics and earnings management of share-financed 
acquirers and the rest of the sample 
The second main test is a regression to compare the earnings management of 
share-financed acquirers with high and low measures of CEO characteristics and 
the rest of the sample.  
Table 5-4 reports the differences in mean abnormal accrual-based and real 
earnings managements for high and low levels of the CEO characteristics of M&A 
firms and the rest of the sample. Panel A reports the differences in mean earnings 
management of CEOs with financial expertise (EXP = 1) and the rest of the 
sample and the differences in mean earnings management of CEOs without 
financial expertise (EXP = 0) and the rest of the sample. The results show that the 
differences in mean abnormal accruals are positive and significant at the 1% and 
5% levels for EXP = 0 and are negative and insignificant for EXP = 1. For abnormal 
real earnings management, the differences in mean abnormal cash flow (ACFi,t−1) 
and abnormal total real earnings management (ATREMi,t−1) are positive and 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, while the differences in mean abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ADEXPi,t−1) and abnormal production costs (APRODi,t−1) 
are positive but insignificant. These results are consistent with H5.1. 
Panel B in Table 5-4 reports the differences in mean earnings management of 
CEOs with long tenure (TENURE = 1) and the rest of the sample and the 
differences in mean earnings management of CEOs with short tenure (TENURE 
= 0) and the rest of the sample. The results show that the differences in mean 
abnormal accruals are positive and significant at the 1% level for TENURE = 0 
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and are negative and insignificant for TENURE = 1. For abnormal real earnings 
management, the differences in mean abnormal real earnings management are 
mixed and insignificant. These results are also consistent with H5.2. 
Panel C in Table 5-4 reports the differences in mean earnings management of 
CEOs with high reputation (PRESS2 = 1) and the rest of the sample and the 
differences in mean earnings management of CEOs with low reputation (PRESS2 
= 0) and the rest of the sample. The results show that the differences in mean 
abnormal accruals are positive and significant at the 1% and 5% levels for PRESS2 
= 0, but are insignificant for PRESS2 = 1. For abnormal real earnings management, 
the differences in mean abnormal real earnings management for PRESS2 = 1 and 
PRESS2 = 0 are mixed and insignificant.  
Panel D in Table 5-4 also reports the differences in the mean earnings 
management of CEOs with high reputation (PRESS3 = 1) and the rest of the 
sample and the differences in the mean earnings management of CEOs with low 
reputation (PRESS3 = 0) and the rest of the sample. The results show that the 
differences in mean abnormal accruals are positive and significant at the 1% and 
5% levels for PRESS3 = 0, but insignificant for PRESS3 = 1. For abnormal real 
earnings management, the differences in mean abnormal real earnings 
management for PRESS3 = 1 and PRESS3 = 0 are mixed and insignificant. The 
results in Panels C and D in Table 5-4 indicate that CEOs with high reputation for 
both the PRESS2 and PRESS3 proxies are associated with lower accrual-based 
earnings management in the first year prior to the merger announcement. These 
results are also consistent with H5.3. 
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Table 5-4: Difference in mean earnings management of share-financed acquirers with CEOs 'characteristics and the rest of the sample 
  Rest of the sample 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 1 Difference in mean 
Rest of the 
sample 𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 0 Difference in mean 
A. Financial expertise         
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.0101 -0.0313 -0.0212  -0.0105 0.0520 0.0626 ** 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.0174 -0.0478 -0.0305  -0.0178 0.0500 0.0678 *** 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0096 -0.0439 -0.0343  -0.0101 0.0498 0.0599 *** 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0173 -0.0574 -0.0401  -0.0177 0.0453 0.0631 *** 
ACFi,t−1 -0.0076 -0.0590 -0.0515  -0.0084 0.1202 0.1286 ** 
APRODi,t−1 -0.0195 -0.0440 -0.0245  -0.0199 0.0393 0.0592  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.0104 -0.0300 -0.0196  -0.0108 0.0521 0.0629  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.0285 -0.0268 0.0018  -0.0298 0.1731 0.2029 *** 
Observations 7,708 19     7,684 43     
  Rest of the sample 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 1 Difference in mean 
Rest of the 
sample 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 0 Difference in mean 
B. Tenure                 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.0101 -0.0594 -0.0493  -0.0106 0.0493 0.0599 *** 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.0173 -0.0824 -0.0651  -0.0179 0.0472 0.0651 *** 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0096 -0.0566 -0.0469  -0.0100 0.0417 0.0518 *** 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0173 -0.0788 -0.0615  -0.0178 0.0384 0.0562 *** 
ACFi,t−1 -0.0077 0.0157 0.0234  -0.0082 0.0784 0.0867  
APRODi,t−1 -0.0194 -0.0711 -0.0517  -0.0199 0.0411 0.0610  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.0106 0.0870 0.0975  -0.0106 0.0126 0.0232  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.0285 -0.0781 -0.0496  -0.0299 0.1735 0.2033  
Observations 7,714 13     7,678 49     
  Rest of the sample 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 1 Difference in mean 
Rest of the 
sample 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 0 Difference in mean 
C. Reputation (Press2 coverage) 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.0102 -0.0238 -0.0136  -0.0105 0.0440 0.0545 ** 
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AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.0174 -0.0347 -0.0173  -0.0178 0.0391 0.0569 *** 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0096 -0.0432 -0.0336  -0.0100 0.0435 0.0535 *** 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0173 -0.0513 -0.0340  -0.0177 0.0365 0.0542 ** 
ACFi,t−1 -0.0078 0.0203 0.0280  -0.0082 0.0809 0.0892  
APRODi,t−1 -0.0198 0.1221 0.1419  -0.0195 -0.0160 0.0035  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.0106 0.0685 0.0791  -0.0106 0.0138 0.0244  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.0289 0.1481 0.1770  -0.0294 0.1095 0.1389  
Observations 7,711 16     7,681 46     
  Rest of the sample 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 1 Difference in mean 
Rest of the 
sample 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 0 Difference in mean 
D. Reputation (Press3 coverage) 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.0102 -0.0239 -0.0138  -0.0105 0.0455 0.0561 ** 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.0174 -0.0329 -0.0155  -0.0178 0.0400 0.0578 *** 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0096 -0.0421 -0.0324  -0.0100 0.0450 0.0550 *** 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.0173 -0.0484 -0.0311  -0.0177 0.0374 0.0551 ** 
ACFi,t−1 -0.0078 0.0199 0.0276  -0.0082 0.0824 0.0907  
APRODi,t−1 -0.0198 0.1221 0.1419  -0.0195 -0.0160 0.0035  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.0106 0.0600 0.0706  -0.0106 0.0157 0.0262  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.0289 0.1481 0.1770  -0.0294 0.1095 0.1389  
Observations 7,710 17     7,682 45     
Note: The table reports the difference in mean earnings management for the share-financed acquirers with CEO characteristics and the rest of the sample 
in the UK sample from 2007 and 2012. The sample consists of 7,727 observations which include 62 share-financed acquirer observations. EXP = 1 and 
EXP = 0 are CEOs with and without financial expertise. TENURE = 1 and TENURE = 0 are CEOs with long and short tenure. PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS2 = 0 
are CEOs with high and low press2 coverage. PRESS3 = 1 and PRESS3 = 0 are CEOs with high and low press3 coverage. Significance is based on a two 
samples t-tests for the difference in mean. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. Please see the Appendix for variable 
descriptions. 
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5.5.3.2 Correlation 
Table 5-5 shows Pearson correlations among the selected variables, including 
abnormal accruals estimated from the Jones and modified Jones models, 
abnormal real earnings management proxies, CEO characteristics variables, and 
interactions between the CEO characteristic variables and the share-financed 
deal variables and control variables. The table indicates that share-financed 
acquirers with financial expertise (EXPi,t−1*SMAi,t), long tenure 
(TENUREi,t−1*SMAi,t) and high reputation ((PRESS2i,t−1*SMAi,t) and 
(PRESS3i,t−1*SMAi,t)) are negatively correlated with abnormal total and working 
capital accruals estimated by the Jones model (ATA_JMi,t−1 and AWCA_JMi,t−1) 
and the modified Jones model (ATA_MJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1), while there 
only share-financed acquirers with financial expertise (EXPi,t−1*SMAi,t) are 
negatively and significantly correlated with abnormal cash flow (ACFi,t−1). These 
correlations are consistent with H5.1, H5.2 and H5.3. Moreover, the accrual-
based earning management proxies are negatively correlated with NOAi,t−2 and 
positively correlated with LEVi,t−2 and ROAi,t−1. 
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Table 5-5: Correlations 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(1) ATA_JMi,t−1 1                      
(2) AWCA_JMi,t−1 0.98 1                     
(3) ATA_MJMi,t−1 0.97 0.95 1                    
(4) AWCA_MJMi,t−1 0.96 0.97 0.98 1                   
(5) ACFi,t−1 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 1                  
(6) ADEXPi,t−1 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.40 1                 
(7) APRODi,t−1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 0.22 1                
(8) ATREMi,t−1 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.78 0.34 1               
(9) TENUREi,t−1 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 1              
(10) EXPi,t−1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.46 1             
(11) PRESS2i,t−1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.34 0.40 1            
(12) PRESS3i,t−1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.35 0.42 0.96 1           
(13) SMAi,t 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 1          
(14) TENUREi,t−1*SMAi,t -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.46 1         
(15) EXPi,t−1*SMAi,t -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.55 0.38 1        
(16) PRESS2i,t−1*SMAi,t 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.51 0.41 0.57 1       
(17) PRESS3i,t−1*SMAi,t 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.52 0.40 0.61 0.97 1      
(18) SIZEi,t−2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10 -0.16 0.08 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1     
(19) MTBi,t−2 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 1    
(20) LEVi,t−2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 -0.08 1   
(21) NOAi,t−2 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 0.13 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.18 0.19 1  
(22) SEOi,t−1 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.19 0.07 0.01 0.00 1 
Note: This table reports pooled Pearson correlations for the entire sample of 7,727 firm-years over the period 2007-2012. The values reported in italic indicate the corresponding 
coefficients are not significant at 5% level. Please see the Appendix for variable descriptions.  
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5.5.3.3 Financial expertise of CEOs and earnings management of share-
financed acquirers 
For abnormal total and working capital accruals from cash flows estimated using 
the Jones and modified Jones models with the intercept, Table 5-6 presents the 
results of the estimation of Equation 5-1, with EXP used in the model for year t-1 
(one year prior to a merger announcement) and with different measures of 
accrual-based earnings management used as substitutes in the model. When 
abnormal total and working capital accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1 and AWCA_JMi,t−1) are 
estimated in Equation 5-1, the evidence shows that the coefficients of EXPi,t−1 ∗
SMAi,t are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level (coefficients of 
ATA_JMi,t−1 and AWCA_JMi,t−1 are -0.063 and -0.072, respectively). Similarly, 
when abnormal total and working capital accruals (ATA_MJMi,t−1 and 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1) are used in Equation 5-1, the coefficients of EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are 
also negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level (coefficients of 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1 are -0.070 and -0.073, respectively).  
For real earnings management, Table 5-7 presents the results of the estimation 
of Equation 5-2, in which EXP is used in the model for year t-1 (one year prior to 
the merger announcement) and different measures of real earnings management 
are used as substitutes in the model. When abnormal real earnings management 
(ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1) are used in Equation 5-2, the 
evidence shows that the coefficients of EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are mixed (coefficients of 
ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 are -0.186, 0.006, -0.056 and -
0.145, respectively). Only the coefficients of ACFi,t−1 are significant and negative. 
In general, the results of Table 5-6 and Table 5-7 indicate the lack of financial 
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expert CEOs (EXP = 0) in share-financed acquirers is associated with an 
increase in abnormal accruals and abnormal cash flow in year t-1 (one year prior 
to the merger announcement) and this increase is statistically significant. In other 
words, the presence of financial expert CEOs (EXP = 1) is correlated with a 
reduction in abnormal accruals and abnormal cash flow in year t-1. This evidence 
is consistent with H5.1. 
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Table 5-6: Financial expertise of CEOs and accrual-based earnings management of share-
financed acquirers 
 ATA_JM AWCA_JM ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
Intercept  0.019 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.017 *** 
t-statistic 3.16   2.62   2.99   2.57   
EXPi,t−1 0.004  0.003  0.004  0.003  
t-statistic 1.31   0.85   1.23   0.86   
EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.063 * -0.072 * -0.070 ** -0.073 * 
t-statistic -1.8   -1.83   -2.01   -1.89   
SMAi,t 0.045 ** 0.043 ** 0.039 ** 0.036 * 
t-statistic 2.32   2   2.02   1.67   
MTBi,t−2 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 
t-statistic 2.83   2.33   3.1   2.36   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** 
t-statistic -11.21   -11.72   -11.3   -11.7   
ROAi,t−1 0.190 *** 0.197 *** 0.195 *** 0.201 *** 
t-statistic 39.59   36.92   41.34   38.33   
LEVi,t−2 0.045 *** 0.049 *** 0.044 *** 0.049 *** 
t-statistic 5.63   5.58   5.64   5.62   
SEOi,t−1 0.001  -0.003  0.003  -0.001  
t-statistic 0.16   -0.79   0.96   -0.33   
NOAi,t−2 -0.062 *** -0.068 *** -0.062 *** -0.067 *** 
t-statistic -10.24   -9.99   -10.38   -10   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.23  0.21  0.24  0.22  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 19 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with financial expertise out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The regression is as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽9(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (Equation 5-1). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, ATA_MJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is placed 
by EXPi,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. The 
independent variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-7: Financial expertise of CEOs and real earnings management of share-financed 
acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
Intercept  -0.006  -0.009  0.037 ** -0.017  
t-statistic -1.32   -1.26   2.17   -2.28   
EXPi,t−1 0.004 
 -0.014  -0.014 ** -0.010  
t-statistic 0.55   -1.17   -1.99   -0.74   
EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.186 ** 0.006 
 -0.056  -0.145  
t-statistic -2.42   0.05   -0.74   -1.04   
SMAi,t 0.141 *** 0.010 
 0.043  0.161 ** 
t-statistic 3.3   0.15   1.04   2.22   
MTBi,t−2 0.000 
 -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 ** 
t-statistic 0.3   -3.22   -4.06   -1.98   
SIZEi,t−2 0.001 
 -0.006 *** 0.003 ** -0.009 *** 
t-statistic 0.65   -2.98   2.1   -3.97   
ROAi,t−1 -0.183 *** 0.140 *** -0.119 *** -0.067 *** 
t-statistic -17.77   8.32   -11.23   -3.66   
LEVi,t−2 0.045 *** 0.066 ** 0.039 ** 0.094 *** 
t-statistic 2.62   2.37   2.28   3.11   
SEOi,t−1 0.056 *** -0.028 ** 0.020 *** 0.027 ** 
t-statistic 7.34   -2.25   2.67   1.96   
Year Fixed Effects Yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.15  0.19  0.05  0.13  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 19 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with financial expertise out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The regression is 
as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (Equation 5-2). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is placed by EXPi,t−1. 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. The independent 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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5.5.3.4 CEO tenure and earnings management of share-financed acquirers 
Table 5-8 presents the results of main Equation 5-1, with TENURE used in the 
model, and abnormal total and working capital accruals were used. The 
coefficients of TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are negative and statistically significant at the 
5% and 1% levels (coefficients of ATA_JMi,t−1 and AWCA_JMi,t−1 are -0.105 and -
0.130, respectively). Similarly, the findings of Equation 5-1 where abnormal total 
and working capital accruals estimated using the modified Jones model were 
used (ATA_MJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1). The coefficient of TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t 
are also negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels (coefficients 
of ATA_MJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1  are -0.101 and -0.123, respectively). In 
general, the results indicate CEOs with short tenure (TENURE = 0) in share-
financed acquirers is associated with an increase in abnormal accruals in year t-
1 (one year prior to the merger announcement), and this increase is statistically 
significant.  
For real earnings management, Table 5-9 presents the results of Equation 5-2, 
with TENURE used in the model for year t-1 and with different measures of real 
earnings management used as substitutes in the model. The evidence shows 
that the coefficients of TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are insignificantly mixed (coefficients 
of ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 are -0.045, -0.085, 0.091 and 
-0.206, respectively). In general, the results of Table 5-8 and Table 5-9 indicate 
CEOs with short tenure (TENURE = 0) in share-financed acquirers is associated 
with an increase in abnormal accruals in year t-1 and this increase is statistically 
significant. This evidence is consistent with H5.2. 
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Table 5-8: CEO tenure and accrual-based earnings management of share-financed acquirers 
 ATA_JM AWCA_JM ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
Intercept 0.019 *** 0.017 ** 0.017 *** 0.016 ** 
t-statistic 3.09   2.45   2.88   2.34   
TENUREi,t−1 0.004  0.004  0.002  0.002  
t-statistic 1.1   1.06   0.63   0.44   
TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.105 ** -0.130 *** -0.101 ** -0.123 *** 
t-statistic -2.54   -2.83   -2.48   -2.76   
SMAi,t 0.046 ** 0.046 ** 0.045 ** 0.046 ** 
t-statistic 2.55   2.3   2.55   2.36   
MTBi,t−2 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 
t-statistic 2.92   2.41   2.8   2.1   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic -11.37   -11.81   -10.46   -10.39   
ROAi,t−1 0.189 *** 0.196 *** 0.180 *** 0.188 *** 
t-statistic 39.46   36.79   38.38   36.22   
LEVi,t−2 0.045 *** 0.050 *** 0.024 *** 0.020 ** 
t-statistic 5.66   5.63   3.11   2.38   
SEOi,t−1 0.000  -0.003  -0.002  -0.007  
t-statistic 0.12   -0.84   -0.57   -1.83   
NOAi,t−2 -0.062 *** -0.068 *** -0.057 *** -0.061 *** 
t-statistic -10.23   -9.97   -9.64   -9.34   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.23  0.22  0.19  0.18  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 13 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with long tenure out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The regression is as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽9(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (Equation 5-1). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, ATA_MJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is 
placed by TENUREi,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively. The independent variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
  
266 
 
Table 5-9: CEO tenure and real earnings management of share-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
Intercept -0.004  -0.004  0.041 ** -0.008  
t-statistic -0.8   -0.56   2.46   -1.15   
TENUREi,t−1 -0.014 * -0.033 ** -0.027 *** -0.052 *** 
t-statistic -1.75   -2.54   -3.56   -3.69   
TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.045  -0.085  0.091  -0.206  
t-statistic -0.5   -0.6   1.01   -1.33   
SMAi,t 0.092 ** 0.029  0.009  0.163 ** 
t-statistic 2.33   0.45   0.23   2.35   
MTBi,t−2 0.000  -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 * 
t-statistic 0.4   -3.18   -4.04   -1.88   
SIZEi,t−2 0.000  -0.006 *** 0.002 ** -0.010 *** 
t-statistic 0.36   -3.11   2.02   -4.32   
ROAi,t−1 -0.182 *** 0.142 *** -0.118 *** -0.063 *** 
t-statistic -17.61   8.44   -11.06   -3.44   
LEVi,t−2 0.043 ** 0.062 ** 0.037 ** 0.087 *** 
t-statistic 2.48   2.25   2.13   2.9   
SEOi,t−1 0.055 *** -0.029 ** 0.019 ** 0.024 * 
t-statistic 7.24   -2.35   2.57   1.81   
Year Fixed Effects Yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.15  0.19  0.05  0.14  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 13 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with long tenure out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The regression is as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (Equation 5-2). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is placed by 
TENUREi,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. The 
independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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5.5.3.5 Reputation of CEOs and earnings management of share-financed 
acquirers 
Table 5-10 presents the results of the estimations of Equation 5-1, with PRESS2 
used in the model. The coefficients of PRESS2i,t−1 ∗  SMAi,t are negative and 
significant at the 10% level when abnormal total and working capital accruals are 
estimated under the original Jones model (coefficients of ATA_JMi,t−1 and 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 are -0.060 and -0.061, respectively). The coefficients of 
PRESS2i,t−1 ∗  SMAi,t are also negative and significant at the 5% and 10% levels 
when abnormal total and working capital accruals are estimated using the 
modified Jones models (the coefficient of ATA_MJMi,t−1 is -0.077 and 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 is -0.075). The results are in line with H5.3 (that CEOs with high 
reputation (PRESS2=1) are less likely to be involved in earnings management in 
one year prior to the merger announcement).  
For real earnings management, Table 5-11 presents the results of the estimation 
of Equation 5-2, with PRESS2 used in the model for year t-1 and with different 
measures of real earnings management used as substitutes in the model. The 
evidence shows that the coefficients of PRESS2i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are mix and 
insignificant (coefficients of ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 are -
0.061, 0.126, 0.121 and 0.013, respectively). In general, the results of Table 5-10 
and Table 5-11 indicate the low reputation CEOs (PRESS2 = 0) in share-financed 
acquirers are associated with an increase in abnormal accruals in year t-1 and 
this increase is statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with H5.3. 
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Table 5-10: PRESS2 coverage reputation of CEOs and accrual-based earnings 
management of share-financed acquirers 
 ATA_JM AWCA_JM ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
Intercept 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 
t-statistic 3.49   2.92   3.31   2.86   
PRESS2i,t−1 -0.002  -0.004  -0.001  -0.004  
t-statistic -0.45   -0.89   -0.36   -0.86   
PRESS2i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.060 * -0.061 * -0.077 ** -0.075 * 
t-statistic -1.61   -1.47   -2.1   -1.82   
SMAi,t 0.041 ** 0.037 * 0.037 ** 0.033  
t-statistic 2.2   1.78   2.01   1.59   
MTBi,t−2 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 
t-statistic 2.94   2.43   3.21   2.47   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** 
t-statistic -11.54   -11.96   -11.62   -11.93   
ROAi,t−1 0.190 *** 0.197 *** 0.195 *** 0.202 *** 
t-statistic 39.64   36.97   41.39   38.38   
LEVi,t−2 0.044 *** 0.049 *** 0.044 *** 0.049 *** 
t-statistic 5.57   5.55   5.58   5.58   
SEOi,t−1 0.000  -0.003  0.003  -0.002  
t-statistic 0.1   -0.87   0.89   -0.41   
NOAi,t−2 -0.062 *** -0.068 *** -0.062 *** -0.067 *** 
t-statistic -10.25   -10.01   -10.39   -10.02   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.23  0.21  0.24  0.22  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 19 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with high PRESS2 coverage reputation out of 62 share-financed deal observations. 
The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽9(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (Equation 5-1). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, ATA_MJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is 
placed by PRESS2i,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-11: PRESS2 coverage reputation of CEOs and real earnings management 
of share-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
Intercept -0.005  -0.008  0.029 * -0.015 * 
t-statistic -1.07   -1.23   1.76   -2.2   
PRESS2i,t−1 0.000  -0.023 * -0.014 * -0.023  
t-statistic -0.06   -1.68   -1.77   -1.51   
PRESS2i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.061  0.126  0.121  0.013  
t-statistic -0.75   0.93   1.5   0.09   
SMAi,t 0.099 ** -0.015  -0.003  0.121 * 
t-statistic 2.42   -0.23   -0.07   1.71   
MTBi,t−2 0.000  -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 * 
t-statistic 0.36   -3.2   -4.08   -1.94   
SIZEi,t−2 0.001  -0.006 *** 0.003 ** -0.008 *** 
t-statistic 0.56   -2.77   2.51   -3.85   
ROAi,t−1 -0.183 *** 0.140 *** -0.119 *** -0.067 *** 
t-statistic -17.75   8.33   -11.25   -3.65   
LEVi,t−2 0.045 *** 0.068 ** 0.042 ** 0.095 *** 
t-statistic 2.63   2.45   2.46   3.17   
SEOi,t−1 0.056 *** -0.029 ** 0.020 *** 0.026 * 
t-statistic 7.3   -2.3   2.62   1.91   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.15  0.19  0.05  0.13  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 16 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with high PRESS2 coverage reputation out of 62 share-financed deal observations. 
The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (Equation 5-2). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is placed by 
PRESS2i,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. The 
independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-12 presents the results of the estimations of Equation 5-1, with PRESS3 
used in the model. The coefficients of PRESS3i,t−1 ∗  SMAi,t are negative and 
significant at the 10% level when abnormal total and working capital accruals are 
estimated using the original Jones model (coefficients of ATA_JMi,t−1 and 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 are -0.061 and -0.059, respectively). The coefficients of 
PRESS3i,t−1 ∗  SMAi,t are also negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 
10% levels when abnormal total and working capital accruals are estimated using 
the modified Jones models (the coefficient of ATA_MJMi,t−1 is -0.078 and 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 are -0.072). The results are in line with H5.3 (CEOs with high 
reputation (PRESS3=1) are less likely to be involved in earnings management in 
one year prior to the merger announcement). 
For real earnings management, Table 5-13 presents the results of the estimations 
of Equation 5-2, with PRESS3 used in the model for year t-1 and where different 
measures of real earnings management used as substitutes in the model. The 
evidence shows that the coefficients of PRESS3i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are mix and 
insignificant (coefficients of ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1 are -
0.060, 0.122, 0.100 and 0.014, respectively). In general, the results in Table 5-12 
and Table 5-13 indicate the low reputation CEOs (PRESS3 = 0) in share-financed 
acquirers is associated with an increase in abnormal accruals in year t-1 and this 
increase is statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with H5.3. 
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Table 5-12: PRESS3 coverage reputation of CEOs and accrual-based earnings management 
of share-financed acquirers 
 ATA_JM AWCA_JM ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
Intercept 0.021 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 
t-statistic 3.46   2.89   3.28   2.83   
PRESS3i,t−1 -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003  
t-statistic -0.35   -0.79   -0.18   -0.67   
PRESS3i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.061 * -0.059 * -0.078 ** -0.072 * 
t-statistic -1.67   -1.46   -2.16   -1.8   
SMAi,t 0.043 ** 0.038 * 0.039 ** 0.033  
t-statistic 2.24   1.78   2.06   1.6   
MTBi,t−2 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 
t-statistic 2.93   2.42   3.2   2.46   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** 
t-statistic -11.54   -11.97   -11.62   -11.95   
ROAi,t−1 0.190 *** 0.197 *** 0.195 *** 0.202 *** 
t-statistic 39.64   36.97   41.39   38.38   
LEVi,t−2 0.044 *** 0.049 *** 0.044 *** 0.049 *** 
t-statistic 5.56   5.54   5.57   5.58   
SEOi,t−1 0.000  -0.003  0.003  -0.002  
t-statistic 0.11   -0.85   0.91   -0.39   
NOAi,t−2 -0.062 *** -0.068 *** -0.062 *** -0.067 *** 
t-statistic -10.25   -10   -10.39   -10.01   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.23  0.21  0.24  0.22  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 17 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with high PRESS3 coverage reputation out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The 
regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽9(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (Equation 5-1). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, ATA_MJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is 
placed by PRESS3i,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-13: PRESS3 coverage reputation of CEOs and real earnings management 
of share-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
Intercept -0.004  -0.009  0.030 * -0.015 * 
t-statistic -0.84   -1.36   1.79   -2.18   
PRESS3i,t−1 -0.003 
 -0.020  -0.016 ** -0.024  
t-statistic -0.43   -1.49   -2.02   -1.62   
PRESS3i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.060 
 0.122  0.100  0.014  
t-statistic -0.75   0.9   1.27   0.09   
SMAi,t 0.100 ** -0.015 
 0.001  0.121 * 
t-statistic 2.42   -0.23   0.02   1.7   
MTBi,t−2 0.000 
 -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 * 
t-statistic 0.37   -3.21   -4.07   -1.94   
SIZEi,t−2 0.001 
 -0.006 *** 0.003 ** -0.009 *** 
t-statistic 0.58   -2.8   2.5   -3.86   
ROAi,t−1 -0.183 *** 0.140 *** -0.119 *** -0.067 *** 
t-statistic -17.74   8.32   -11.25   -3.65   
LEVi,t−2 0.045 *** 0.067 ** 0.042 ** 0.095 *** 
t-statistic 2.63   2.44   2.44   3.16   
SEOi,t−1 0.056 *** -0.028 ** 0.020 *** 0.026 * 
t-statistic 7.29   -2.28   2.61   1.91   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.15  0.19  0.05  0.13  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 17 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with high PRESS3 coverage reputation out of 62 share-financed deal observations. 
The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (Equation 5-2). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACFi,t−1, ADEXPi,t−1, APRODi,t−1 and ATREMi,t−1.. Xi,t−1 is placed by 
PRESS3i,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. The 
independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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5.5.4 Propensity score matching: two samples t-test. 
Similar to sections 3.5.4 and 4.5.4, this chapter employs propensity score 
matching to deal with the misspecification by employing the regression 
framework to investigate the correlation between CEO characteristics and 
earnings management of share-financed acquirers prior to the merger 
announcement. Similar to sections 3.5.4 and 4.5.4, the study tests two samples 
t-test to control for differences in firm characteristics between (1) M&A deals 
sample and (2) the rest of the sample by using the propensity score matching 
method to match the five nearest observations based on ROA or basic 
characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB) of the rest of the sample and share-financed 
deals. The sampling process is as described in section 3.5.4. Consequently, 
matching samples are obtained of 372 firm-year observations which consist 62 
M&A deal observations and 310 firms in the performance (ROA) control sample 
and 310 firms in the characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB) control sample. For the 
62 M&A deal observations, the sample includes 19 and 43 share-financed 
acquirer observations with and without financial expertise, 13 and 49 share-
financed acquirer observations with long and short tenure,16 and 46 share-
financed acquirer observations with high and low reputation (PRESS2) and 17 
and 45 share-financed acquirer observations with high and low reputation 
(PRESS3). For the 310 firm performance (ROA) and 310 firm characteristics 
(SIZE, LEV and MTB) control samples, 95 and 215 firm-year observations have 
ROA or firm characteristics matched to with the share-financed acquirer 
observations with and without financial expertise. The sample includes 65 and 
245 firm-year observations with ROA or firm characteristics matched with the 
share-financed acquirer observations with long and short tenure respectively. 
The sample also includes 80 and 230 firm-year observations with ROA or firm 
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characteristics matched with the share-financed acquirer observations with high 
and low reputation (PRESS2) and 85 and 225 firm-year observations with ROA 
or firm characteristics matched with the share-financed acquirer observations 
with high and low reputation (PRESS3) respectively.  
5.5.4.1 ROA matching 
Table 5-14 reports the differences in mean abnormal accrual-based and real 
earnings managements for high and low levels of each CEO characteristic of 
M&A firms and the ROA matched sample. Panel A reports the differences in 
mean earnings management of CEOs with financial expertise (EXP = 1) and the 
ROA matching sample and the differences in mean earnings management of 
CEOs without financial expertise (EXP = 0) and the ROA matched sample. The 
results show that the differences in mean abnormal accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1, 
AWCA_JMi,t−1, ATA_NJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1) are positive and significant at 
the 5% and 10% levels for EXP = 0 and are positive but insignificant for EXP = 1. 
For abnormal real earnings management, only the difference in mean abnormal 
cash flow (ACFi,t−1) is positive and significant at the 10% level for EXP = 0. These 
results are consistent with H5.1, indicating that CEOs with financial expertise are 
associated with lower earnings management in the first year prior to the merger 
announcement. 
Panel A in Table 5-14 also reports the differences in mean earnings management 
of CEOs with long tenure (TENURE = 1) and the ROA matched sample and the 
differences in mean earnings management of CEOs with short tenure (TENURE 
= 0) and the ROA matched sample. The results show that the differences in mean 
abnormal accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, ATA_NJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1) 
are positive and significant at the 1% and 5% levels for TENURE = 0 and are 
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negative and insignificant for TENURE = 0. For abnormal real earnings 
management, the differences in mean abnormal real earnings management are 
mixed and insignificant. These results indicate that CEOs with long tenure are 
associated with lower accrual-based earnings management in the first year prior 
to the merger announcement. The results are also consistent with H5.2. 
Panel B in Table 5-14 reports the differences in the mean earnings management 
of CEOs with high reputation (PRESS2 = 1) and the ROA matched sample and the 
differences in mean earnings management of CEOs with low reputation (PRESS2 
= 0) and the ROA matched sample. The results show that the differences in mean 
abnormal accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, ATA_NJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1) 
are positive for PRESS2 = 0 and PRESS2 = 1, but only ATA_JMi,t−1 and 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 are significant for PRESS2 = 0. For abnormal real earnings 
management, the differences in mean abnormal real earnings management for 
PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS2 = 0 are mixed and insignificant.  
Panel B in Table 5-14 also reports the differences in the mean earnings 
management of CEOs with high reputation (PRESS3 = 1) and the ROA matched 
sample and the differences in the mean earnings management of CEOs with low 
reputation (PRESS3 = 0) and the ROA matched sample. The results show that the 
differences in mean abnormal accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, ATA_NJMi,t−1 
and AWCA_MJMi,t−1) are positive for PRESS3 = 0 and PRESS3 = 1, but there are 
ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1 and ATA_MJMi,t−1 which are significant for PRESS3 = 0. 
For abnormal real earnings management, the differences in mean abnormal real 
earnings management for PRESS3 = 1 and PRESS3 = 0 are mixed and insignificant. 
These results indicate that CEOs with high reputation for both the PRESS2 and 
PRESS3 proxies are associated with lower accrual-based earnings management 
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in the first year prior to the merger announcement. The results are consistent with 
H5.3. 
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Table 5-14: The difference in mean earnings management of share-financed acquirers with CEOs 'characteristics and the propensity score matching 
approach with ROA matching sample 
Panel A: Financial expertise and tenure 
  Difference in mean Difference in mean 
  𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 1  𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 0 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 1  𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 0 
ATA_JMi,t−1 0.028  0.054 ** -0.067  0.076 ** 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 0.032  0.069 ** -0.087  0.096 *** 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 0.014  0.047 * -0.065  0.064 ** 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 0.022  0.058 ** -0.082  0.081 ** 
ACFi,t−1 -0.105  0.072 * -0.073  0.042  
APRODi,t−1 -0.044  -0.004  0.044  -0.032  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.114  0.029  -0.017  -0.015  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.095   0.075   -0.079   0.050   
Panel B: Reputation (Press2 coverage and press3 coverage) 
  Difference in mean Difference in mean 
  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 1  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 0 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 1  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 0 
ATA_JMi,t−1 0.065  0.040 * 0.057  0.042 * 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 0.083  0.048 * 0.073  0.051 * 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 0.043  0.035  0.037  0.037 * 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 0.065  0.040  0.056  0.043  
ACFi,t−1 0.033  0.012  0.036  0.011  
APRODi,t−1 0.055  -0.041  0.051  -0.042  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.009  -0.018  -0.008  -0.018  
ATREMi,t−1 0.053  0.012  0.050  0.012  
Note: The table reports the difference in mean earnings management for the share-financed acquirers with CEO characteristics and propensity score 
matching approach with the ROA matched sample in the UK sample from 2007 and 2012. The matching sample consists of 372 firm-year observations 
which consist 62 M&A deal observations and 310 the firm performance (ROA) matched observations. EXP = 1 and EXP = 0 are CEOs with and without 
financial expertise. TENURE = 1 and TENURE = 0 are CEOs with long and short tenure. PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS2 = 0 are CEOs with high and low press2 
coverage. PRESS3 = 1 and PRESS3 = 0 are CEOs with high and low press3 coverage. Significance is based on two samples t-tests for the difference in 
mean. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. Please see the Appendix for variable descriptions. 
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5.5.4.2 Characteristic matching 
Table 5-15 reports the differences in mean abnormal accrual-based and real 
earnings managements for high and low levels of each CEO characteristic of 
M&A firms and the firm characteristic matched sample. Panel A reports the 
differences in the mean earnings management of CEOs with financial expertise 
(EXP = 1) and the firm characteristic matched sample and the differences in mean 
earnings management of CEOs without financial expertise (EXP = 0) and the firm 
characteristic matched sample. The results show that the differences in mean 
abnormal accruals are positive and significant at the 5% level for EXP = 0 and are 
negative and insignificant for EXP = 1. For abnormal real earnings management, 
there is the difference in mean abnormal cash flow (ACFi,t−1) and abnormal total 
real earnings management (ATREMi,t−1) are positive and significant. These 
results are consistent with section 5.5.4.1 and with H5.1. 
Panel A in Table 5-15 also reports the differences in the mean earnings 
management of CEOs with long tenure (TENURE = 1) and the firm characteristic 
matched sample and the differences in mean earnings management of CEOs 
with short tenure (TENURE = 0) and the firm characteristic matched sample. The 
results show that the differences in mean abnormal accruals are positive and 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels for TENURE = 0 and are negative and 
insignificant for TENURE = 1. For abnormal real earnings management, there is 
the difference in mean abnormal real earnings management are mix and 
insignificant. The results are also consistent with section 5.5.4.1 and with H5.2. 
Panel B in Table 5-15 reports the differences in the mean earnings management 
of CEOs with high reputation (PRESS2 = 1) and the firm characteristic matched 
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sample and the differences in the mean earnings management of CEOs with low 
reputation (PRESS2 = 0) and the firm characteristic matched sample. The results 
show that the differences in mean abnormal accruals (ATA_JMi,t−1, AWCA_JMi,t−1, 
ATA_NJMi,t−1 and AWCA_MJMi,t−1) are positive and significant for PRESS2 = 0 at 
the 5% and 10% levels, but insignificant for PRESS2 = 1. For abnormal real 
earnings management, the differences in the mean abnormal real earnings 
management for PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS2 = 0 are mix and insignificant.  
Panel B in Table 5-15 also reports the differences in the mean earnings 
management of CEOs with high reputation (PRESS3 = 1) and the firm 
characteristic matched sample and the differences in the mean earnings 
management of CEOs with low reputation (PRESS3 = 0) and the firm characteristic 
matched sample. The results show that the differences in the mean abnormal 
accruals is positive and significant for PRESS3 = 0 at the 1% and 5% levels, but 
insignificant for PRESS3 = 1. For abnormal real earnings management, the 
differences in the mean abnormal real earnings management for PRESS3 = 1 and 
PRESS3 = 0 are mix and insignificant. These results of Panel B in Table 5.5 
indicate that CEOs with high reputation in both PRESS2 and PRESS3 proxies are 
associated with lower accrual-based earnings management in the first year prior 
to the merger announcement. The results are consistent with section 5.5.4.1 and 
with H5.3. 
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Table 5-15: The difference in mean earnings management of share-financed acquirers with CEOs 'characteristics and the propensity score matching 
approach with the characteristics matching sample 
Panel A: Financial expertise and tenure 
  Difference in mean Difference in mean 
  𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 1  𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇 = 0 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 1  𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 0 
ATA_JMi,t−1 -0.021  0.069 ** -0.094  0.077 *** 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 -0.027  0.073 ** -0.115  0.084 *** 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.037  0.070 ** -0.088  0.070 ** 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.039  0.069 ** -0.108  0.074 ** 
ACFi,t−1 -0.108  0.101 ** -0.075  0.066  
APRODi,t−1 -0.058  0.161  0.163  0.074  
ADEXPi,t−1 -0.007  0.128  0.115  0.081  
ATREMi,t−1 -0.107  0.323 ** 0.146  0.205  
Panel B: Reputation (Press2 coverage and press3 coverage) 
  Difference in mean Difference in mean 
  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 1  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆2 = 0 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 1  𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆3 = 0 
ATA_JMi,t−1 0.008  0.053 * 0.005  0.059 ** 
AWCA_JMi,t−1 0.011  0.053 * 0.008  0.061 ** 
ATA_MJMi,t−1 -0.014  0.055 ** -0.020  0.058 *** 
AWCA_MJMi,t−1 -0.007  0.051 * -0.013  0.059 ** 
ACFi,t−1 0.027  0.070  -0.049  0.088  
APRODi,t−1 0.248  0.041  0.229  0.034  
ADEXPi,t−1 0.076  0.093  0.066  0.024  
ATREMi,t−1 0.218  0.183  0.212  0.170  
Note: The table reports the difference in mean earnings management for the share-financed acquirers with CEO characteristics and propensity score matching approach 
with the firm characteristic matched sample in the UK sample from 2007 and 2012. The matched sample consists of 372 firm-year observations which consist 62 M&A 
deal observations and 310 the firm characteristic matched observations. The sample consist of  EXP = 1 and EXP = 0 are CEOs with and without financial expertise. 
TENURE = 1 and TENURE = 0 are CEOs with long and short tenure. PRESS2 = 1 and PRESS2 = 0 are CEOs with high and low press2 coverage. PRESS3 = 1 and PRESS3 =
0 are CEOs with high and low press3 coverage. Significance is based on two samples t-tests for the difference in mean. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance respectively. Please see the Appendix for variable descriptions. 
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5.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Similar to Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter applies the performance control 
approach (Kothari et al. 2005) to control for the effect of firm performance on 
accrual-based and real earnings management as a first robustness test. As 
previously described in section 3.6.1 in Chapter 3, in this process, ROA is added 
to the Jones and modified Jones models and the real earnings management 
models as a regressor to control for firm performance. Hence, the four abnormal 
accrual proxies estimated by the Jones and modified Jones models under the 
performance control approach with the intercept are ATA_JM_PCi,t−1, 
AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1, ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1, and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and the four abnormal 
real earnings management proxies are ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, 
APROD_PCi,t−1, and ATREM_PCi,t−1. A regression is run with excluding the ROA 
control variables to investigate the effect of financial expertise, tenure and 
reputation of CEOs on accrual-based earnings management prior to the merger 
announcement. The regression is as follows. 
Equation 5-3 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1_𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2)
+ 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by abnormal total accruals estimated using the Jones and 
modified Jones models under the cash flow approach (ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 and  
ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1) and abnormal working capital estimated by the Jones and 
modified Jones models under the cash flow approach (AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1 and 
AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1). Other variables are as explained in section 5.4.3. 
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In addition, a regression is run excluding both ROA and NOA for real earnings 
management, because previous research has shown that there is insignificant 
correlation between NOA and real earnings management. The regression is as 
follows: 
Equation 5-4 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2)
+ 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 
Yi,t−1 is replaced with ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 and 
ATREM_PCi,t−1. Other variables are explained in section 5.4.3 and the Appendix. 
5.6.1 The financial expertise of CEOs and earnings management of share-
financed acquirers 
For accrual-based earnings management, Table 5-16 presents the results of the 
estimations of Equation 5-3, in which EXP is used in the model for year t-1 and 
different measures of accrual-based earnings management (ATA_JM_PCi,t−1, 
AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1, ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1) are used as 
substitutes. When abnormal total and working capital accruals were used 
(ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1) in Equation 5-3. The evidence shows that 
the coefficients of EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level (coefficients of ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1 are -0.068 and -
0.074, respectively). Similarly, when abnormal total and working capital accruals 
(ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1) are used in Equation 5-3, the 
coefficients of EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are also negative and statistically significant at the 
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5% and 10% levels (coefficients of ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1 are -
0.063 and -0.065, respectively).  
In terms of real earnings management, Table 5-17 presents the results of the 
estimations of Equation 5-4, in which EXP is used in the model for year t-1 and 
different measures of real earnings management are used as substitutes. When 
abnormal real earnings management (ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 
and ATREM_PCi,t−1) are used in Equation 5-4, the evidence shows that the 
coefficients of EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are negative (coefficients of ACF_PCi,t−1, 
ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 and ATREM_PCi,t−1 are -0.078, -0.211, -0.084 and 
-0.191, respectively). However, only the coefficients of ACFi,t−1 are significantly 
negative. Therefore, there is no significant change from the main findings in this 
chapter. 
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Table 5-16: Financial expertise of CEOs and accrual-based earnings management under 
performance control approach of share-financed acquirers 
 ATA_JM AWCA_JM ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
Intercept 0.071 *** 0.074 *** 0.072 *** 0.073 *** 
t-statistic 10.08   9.16   10.21   9.15   
EXPi,t−1 0.002 
 0.001  0.002  0.001  
t-statistic 0.64   0.26   0.61   0.25   
EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.068 ** -0.074 ** -0.063 ** -0.065 * 
t-statistic -2.16   -2.09   -2   -1.85   
SMAi,t 0.046 *** 0.047 ** 0.040 ** 0.039 ** 
t-statistic 2.65   2.38   2.27   1.99   
MTBi,t−2 0.000 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  
t-statistic 0.22   -0.31   0.45   -0.25   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** 
t-statistic -5.71   -6.62   -5.52   -6.5   
LEVi,t−2 0.026 *** 0.029 *** 0.026 *** 0.030 *** 
t-statistic 3.68   3.63   3.67   3.75   
SEOi,t−1 0.003 
 0.001  0.004  0.001  
t-statistic 0.99   0.27   1.22   0.27   
NOAi,t−2 -0.028 *** -0.030 *** -0.027 *** -0.031 *** 
t-statistic -5.08   -5.01   -5.07   -5.12   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.06  0.07  0.05  0.06  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 19 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with financial expertise out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The regression is 
as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 5-3). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ATA_JM_PCi,t−1, AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1, ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and 
AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is placed by EXPi,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
of significance respectively. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-17: Financial expertise of CEOs and real earnings management under 
performance control approach of share-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
Intercept -0.030 *** 0.003  -0.050 *** -0.031 *** 
t-statistic -7.36   0.4   -3.28   -4.25   
EXPi,t−1 -0.006 
 -0.013  -0.017 ** -0.023 * 
t-statistic -0.74   -1.06   -2.16   -1.74   
EXPi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.078 * -0.211 
 -0.084  -0.191  
t-statistic -0.89   -1.46   -0.99   -1.22   
SMAi,t 0.046 
 0.046  0.051  0.112  
t-statistic 0.89   0.6   1.09   1.37   
MTBi,t−2 0.002 *** -0.008 *** -0.002 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic 3.06   -9.51   -2.92   -6.23   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.014 *** 0.014 *** -0.005 *** -0.002 
 
t-statistic -10.56   7.17   -3.62   -0.93   
LEVi,t−2 0.076 *** 0.052 * 0.050 *** 0.109 *** 
t-statistic 4.08   1.88   2.63   3.61   
SEOi,t−1 0.071 *** -0.056 *** 0.038 *** 0.013 
 
t-statistic 8.29   -4.3   4.54   0.94   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.24  0.22  0.14  0.14  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 19 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with high financial expertise out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The regression 
is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
(Equation 5-4). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 and ATREM_PCi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is 
placed by EXPi,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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5.6.2 CEO tenure and earnings management of share-financed acquirers 
Table 5-18 presents the results of the estimations of Equation 5-3, in which 
TENURE is used in the model, and abnormal total and working capital accruals 
estimated by the Jones and modified Jones models under performance control 
approach were used. The coefficients of TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels (coefficients of ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 
and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1 are -0.071 and -0.086, respectively). When abnormal total 
and working capital accruals estimated using the modified Jones model 
(ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1), the coefficient of TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t 
are also negative and statistically significant at the 10% level (coefficients of 
ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1  are -0.063 and -0.078, respectively).  
For real earnings management, Table 5-19 presents the results of Equation 5-4, 
where TENURE was used in the model for year t-1. The evidence shows that the 
coefficients of TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are mix and insignificant when the dependent 
variable from Equation 5.4 replaced by ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 
and ATREM_PCi,t−1. In general, the results of Table 5-18 and Table 5-19 are 
consistent with the main test of this chapter. 
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Table 5-18: CEO tenure and accrual-based earnings management under the 
performance control approach of share-financed acquirers 
 ATA_JM AWCA_JM ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
Intercept 0.072 *** 0.072 *** 0.072 *** 0.071 *** 
t-statistic 10.12   9.07   10.21   9.02   
TENUREi,t−1 0.004 
 0.004  0.004  0.004  
t-statistic 1.09   0.98   1.17   1.14   
TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.071 * -0.086 ** -0.063 * -0.078 * 
t-statistic -1.91   -2.05   -1.69   -1.89   
SMAi,t 0.039 ** 0.041 ** 0.032 ** 0.034 * 
t-statistic 2.41   2.22   2.01   1.87   
MTBi,t−2 0.000 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  
t-statistic 0.29   -0.25   0.51   -0.2   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** 
t-statistic -5.76   -6.63   -5.55   -6.48   
LEVi,t−2 0.027 *** 0.030 *** 0.027 *** 0.031 *** 
t-statistic 3.77   3.73   3.76   3.86   
SEOi,t−1 0.003 
 0.001  0.004  0.001  
t-statistic 0.98   0.26   1.22   0.27   
NOAi,t−2 -0.027 *** -0.030 *** -0.027 *** -0.031 *** 
t-statistic -5.07   -5   -5.07   -5.12   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.06  0.07  0.05  0.06  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 13 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with long tenure out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The regression is as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 5-3). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ATA_JM_PCi,t−1, AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1, ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and 
AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is placed by TENUREi,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance respectively. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-19: CEO tenure and real earnings management under performance control 
approach of share-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
Intercept -0.026 *** 0.007  -0.047 *** -0.021 *** 
t-statistic -6.38   1   -3.1   -2.99   
TENUREi,t−1 -0.025 *** -0.036 *** -0.037 *** -0.066 *** 
t-statistic -3.1   -2.81   -4.41   -4.86   
TENUREi,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t 0.035 
 0.034  0.087  0.058  
t-statistic 0.36   0.23   0.87   0.36   
SMAi,t 0.011 
 -0.020  0.008  0.048  
t-statistic 0.22   -0.27   0.19   0.59   
MTBi,t−2 0.002 *** -0.008 *** -0.002 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic 3.05   -9.52   -2.89   -6.26   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.014 *** 0.014 *** -0.005 *** -0.003 
 
t-statistic -10.9   7.11   -3.76   -1.22   
LEVi,t−2 0.072 *** 0.049 * 0.046 ** 0.102 *** 
t-statistic 3.89   1.77   2.41   3.41   
SEOi,t−1 0.070 *** -0.057 *** 0.037 *** 0.011 
 
t-statistic 8.18   -4.39   4.37   0.79   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  Yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.24  0.23  0.15  0.15  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 13 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with long tenure out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The regression is as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
(Equation 5-4). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 and ATREM_PCi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is 
placed by TENUREi,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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5.6.3 Reputation of CEOs and earnings management of share-financed 
acquirers 
Table 5-20 presents the results of the estimations of Equation 5-3, where PRESS2 
is used in the model. The results show that the coefficients of PRESS2i,t−1 ∗  SMAi,t 
are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level when abnormal total and 
working capital accruals are estimated under the original Jones model 
(coefficients of ATA_JM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1 are -0.023 and -0.012, 
respectively). The coefficients of PRESS2i,t−1 ∗  SMAi,t are also negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level when abnormal total and working capital 
accruals are estimated under the modified Jones model (the coefficient of 
ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 is -0.025 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1 are -0.013). For real earnings 
management, Table 5-21 presents the results of Equation 5-4, where PRESS2 was 
used in the model for year t-1 and where different measures of real earnings 
management are used as substitutes in the model. The evidence shows that the 
coefficients of PRESS2i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t are mix and insignificant when the dependent 
variable from Equation 5-4 replaced by ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 
and ATREM_PCi,t−1.  
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Table 5-20: PRESS2 coverage reputation of CEOs and accrual-based earnings 
management under performance control approach of share-financed acquirers 
 ATA_JM AWCA_JM ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
Intercept 0.075 *** 0.076 *** 0.075 *** -0.075 *** 
t-statistic 10.8   9.81   10.93   9.82   
PRESS2i,t−1 0.000 
 -0.002  0.000  -0.002  
t-statistic 0   -0.45   0.02   -0.45   
PRESS2i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.023 * -0.012 * -0.025 * -0.013 * 
t-statistic -0.67   -0.33   -0.75   -0.35   
SMAi,t 0.031 * 0.027 
 0.027  0.022  
t-statistic 1.85   1.44   1.59   1.18   
MTBi,t−2 0.000 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  
t-statistic 0.29   -0.24   0.52   -0.19   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** 
t-statistic -5.89   -6.73   -5.69   -6.6   
LEVi,t−2 0.026 *** 0.029 *** 0.026 *** 0.030 *** 
t-statistic 3.68   3.66   3.67   3.78   
SEOi,t−1 0.003 
 0.001  0.004  0.001  
t-statistic 0.97   0.23   1.19   0.23   
NOAi,t−2 -0.028 *** -0.031 *** -0.027 *** -0.031 *** 
t-statistic -5.08   -5.01   -5.07   -5.13   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.06  0.07  0.05  0.06  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 16 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with high PRESS2 coverage reputation out of 62 share-financed deal observations. 
The regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 5-3). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ATA_JM_PCi,t−1, AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1, ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and 
AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is placed by PRESS2i,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance respectively. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-21: PRESS2 coverage reputation of CEOs and real earnings management 
under performance control approach of share-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
Intercept -0.030 *** 0.006  -0.056 *** -0.002 *** 
t-statistic -7.49   0.88   -3.84   -3.14   
PRESS2i,t−1 -0.012 
 -0.018  -0.017 * -0.029 ** 
t-statistic -1.34   -1.31   -1.88   -1.98   
PRESS2i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.070 
 0.185  0.075  0.019  
t-statistic -0.73   1.16   0.84   0.11   
SMAi,t 0.038 
 -0.050  0.008  0.059  
t-statistic 0.79   -0.69   0.18   0.74   
MTBi,t−2 0.002 *** -0.008 *** -0.002 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic 3.09   -9.51   -2.93   -6.22   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.013 *** 0.015 *** -0.004 *** -0.001 
 
t-statistic -10.53   7.56   -3.23   -0.52   
LEVi,t−2 0.077 *** 0.055 ** 0.054 *** 0.112 *** 
t-statistic 4.15   1.97   2.82   3.74   
SEOi,t−1 0.070 *** -0.057 *** 0.037 *** 0.012 
 
t-statistic 8.23   -4.35   4.47   0.87   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.24  0.22  0.14  0.14  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 16 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with PRESS2 coverage reputation out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The 
regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
(Equation 5-4). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 and ATREM_PCi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is 
placed by PRESS2i,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-22 and Table 5-23 present the results of Equation 5-3 and Equation 5-4, 
where PRESS3 is used in the models. The results are similar to the results of Table 
5-20 and Table 5-21 when PRESS3 is used in the Equation 5.3 and Equation 5.4.  
In general, the results of Table 5-20, Table 5-21, Table 5-22 and Table 5-23 
indicate the CEOs with low reputation (PRESS3 = 0) in share-financed acquirers 
is associated with an increase in abnormal accruals in year t-1 (one year prior to 
the merger announcement) and this increase is statistically significant. Therefore, 
the conclusions from the main section remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
  
293 
 
Table 5-22: PRESS3 coverage reputation of CEOs and accrual-based earnings 
management under performance control approach of share-financed acquirers 
 ATA_JM AWCA_JM ATA_MJM AWCA_MJM 
Intercept 0.075 *** 0.076 *** 0.074 *** -0.075 *** 
t-statistic 10.77   9.79   10.9   -9.79   
PRESS3i,t−1 0.000 
 -0.001  0.001  -0.001  
t-statistic 0.11   -0.3   0.21   -0.21   
PRESS3i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.024 * -0.011 * -0.026 * -0.012 * 
t-statistic -0.72   -0.31   -0.8   -0.33   
SMAi,t 0.032 * 0.027 
 0.027  0.022  
t-statistic 1.86   1.42   1.61   1.16   
MTBi,t−2 0.000 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  
t-statistic 0.29   -0.25   0.51   -0.19   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** 
t-statistic -5.9   -6.74   -5.69   -6.62   
LEVi,t−2 0.026 *** 0.029 *** 0.026 *** 0.030 *** 
t-statistic 3.68   3.65   3.67   3.78   
SEOi,t−1 0.003 
 0.001  0.004  0.001  
t-statistic 0.97   0.24   1.2   0.24   
NOAi,t−2 -0.028 *** -0.031 *** -0.027 *** -0.031 *** 
t-statistic -5.07   -5.01   -5.07   -5.12   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.06  0.07  0.05  0.06  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 17 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with high PRESS3 coverage reputation out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The 
regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑁𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽9(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 (Equation 5-3). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ATA_JM_PCi,t−1, AWCA_JM_PCi,t−1, ATA_MJM_PCi,t−1 and AWCA_MJM_PCi,t−1. 
Xi,t−1 is placed by PRESS3i,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-23: PRESS3 coverage reputation of CEOs and accrual-based earnings 
management under performance control approach of share-financed acquirers 
  ACF ADEXP APROD ATREM 
Intercept -0.029 *** 0.005  -0.056 *** -0.027 *** 
t-statistic -7.28   0.8   -3.8   -3.79   
PRESS3i,t−1 -0.015 * -0.015 
 -0.018 ** -0.030 ** 
t-statistic -1.82   -1.13   -2.03   -2.13   
PRESS3i,t−1 ∗ SMAi,t -0.076 
 0.182  0.051  0.021  
t-statistic -0.83   1.15   0.58   0.12   
SMAi,t 0.043 
 -0.050  0.013  0.058  
t-statistic 0.86   -0.69   0.29   0.74   
MTBi,t−2 0.002 *** -0.008 *** -0.002 *** -0.006 *** 
t-statistic 3.09   -9.52   -2.92   -6.22   
SIZEi,t−2 -0.013 *** 0.014 *** -0.004 *** -0.001 
 
t-statistic -10.53   7.55   -3.24   -0.54   
LEVi,t−2 0.077 *** 0.055 ** 0.054 *** 0.112 *** 
t-statistic 4.13   1.96   2.8   3.72   
SEOi,t−1 0.070 *** -0.057 *** 0.037 *** 0.012 
 
t-statistic 8.23   -4.34   4.46   0.87   
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adjusted. R2 0.24  0.22  0.14  0.14  
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regression over the period from 2007 to 2012. The 
total sample includes 7,727 observations, including 17 share-financed deal observations for 
CEOs with PRESS3 coverage reputation out of 62 share-financed deal observations. The 
regression is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡)+𝛽3(𝑆𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) +
𝛽6(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑘 
(Equation 5-4). 
Yi,t−1 is replaced by ACF_PCi,t−1, ADEXP_PCi,t−1, APROD_PCi,t−1 and ATREM_PCi,t−1. Xi,t−1 is 
placed by PRESS3i,t−1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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5.7 SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTION 
5.7.1 Summary 
This chapter hypothesized that CEO characteristics affect the prevalence of 
earnings management behaviour in share-financed acquirers prior to the merger 
announcement. Using a sample of 7,727 firm-year observations of UK companies 
from 2007 to 2012 (62 observations with share-financed deals), there is 
consistent evidence that in the one year prior to deal announcement, the financial 
expertise, tenure and reputation of CEOs are associated with a reduction in 
abnormal accruals, which is used as a proxy for earnings management. However, 
when the proxy of earnings management is real earnings management, only the 
financial expertise of CEOs is associated with a reduction in abnormal cash flow. 
The correlations are statistically significant. The findings are robust as abnormal 
accruals and real earnings activities are measured in various ways.  
5.7.2 Contribution 
In general, the evidence contributes to the existing literature by providing new 
evidence on the relationship between CEO characteristics and earnings 
management in M&A deals. The findings also have some implications for 
practitioners. 
5.7.2.1 Contribution to literature 
The findings contribute to the growing literature investigating how CEO 
characteristics influence earnings management of acquirers prior to a merger 
announcement, while previous research has only focused on whether or not 
acquirers and targets engage in earnings management prior to the merger 
announcement (Louis 2004; Botsari and Meeks 2008).  
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Although financial expertise, tenure and reputation dimensions have been 
already found to affect earnings management. However, the effect of some CEO 
characteristics is mix. For example, Hirshleifer (1993) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2009) suggests that managers are motivated to affect corporate investment in a 
way that builds up their reputation rather than the wealth of shareholders. 
Therefore, they suggest that CEOs opportunistically inflate their firms’ earnings. 
In contrast, Francis et al. (2008) also find that firms engaging in significant 
earnings management are more likely to hire CEOs with high reputations so that 
these CEOs can help to reduce earnings management in subsequent periods. 
The evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between the 
reputation of CEOs and earnings management. Therefore, investigating how 
CEO characteristics affect earnings management in the M&A context giving a 
significant contribution. However, this thesis only investigates financial expertise, 
tenure and reputation dimensions while other dimensions such as age, gender, 
overconfidence, or power are not investigated because of constrained by data 
availability. 
5.7.2.2 Contribution to practitioners 
The evidence could also be useful for investors and auditors. For investors, they 
should be prudential when investing in acquirers with CEOs of low reputation, 
short tenure and without financial expertise because those managers are more 
likely to engage in earnings management in the first year prior to the merger 
announcement. Similarly, regarding auditors, they should be cautious when 
auditing financial statements of acquirers with CEOs of low reputation, short 
tenure and without financial expertise because the probable earnings 
management are high in the first year prior to the merger announcement. 
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6 CHAPTER 6: THESIS CONCLUSION 
Blair (1995) stated that “Maximizing shareholder wealth has increasingly become 
the most important objective of corporate management, especially in an age of 
aggressive corporate acquisitions and the rising power of institutional investors”. 
To maximize earnings, the managers of the company may make “managerial 
decisions that result in not reporting the short-term”(Ronen and Yaari 2008), but 
these decisions do not violate any accounting standards. Therefore, knowledge 
of earnings management is important for market participants to help them in 
making decisions. 
The last two decades have seen rapid development in the literature on earnings 
management. However, there are many areas of earnings management that are 
still considerably under-researched. This thesis contributes to the earnings 
management literature in three main areas: earnings management prior to a 
merger announcement, the effect of board connections on earnings management 
prior to a merger announcement and the effect of CEO characteristics on 
earnings management prior to a merger announcement. This chapter 
summarizes the results and contributions of each chapter, discusses the 
limitations of the thesis and suggests some possible future lines of research. 
6.1 THE MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 2 shows that share-financed acquiring firms have the motivation to inflate 
their earnings prior to a merger announcement to increase their share market 
price because the higher the share price prior to the merger announcement, the 
lower the share exchange rate. Hence, acquiring firms may purchase the target 
firms a lower cost by issuing fewer shares to swap with the target firms’ shares. 
The literature review in Chapter 2 also shows the models used to estimate 
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accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. The Jones 
model and modified Jones model are extensively used to estimate the proxies of 
accrual-based earnings management. However, most models have 
misspecifications in estimating abnormal accruals. 
Chapter 3 introduces the Benford’s Law approach to detect earnings 
management. Following the Benford’s Law method, the study estimates (1) 
FSD_SCORE which is the mean absolute deviation between the distribution of 
the first digits of reported figures in financial reports and the theoretical 
distribution from Benford’s Law and (2) KSMAX which is the maximum of 
cumulative absolute deviations between the distribution of the first digits of 
reported figures in financial reports and the theoretical distribution from Benford’s 
Law. A firm-year has a significantly high FSD_SCORE and/ or KSMAX than zero 
which mean that firm-year has errors in the financial statement in that firm-year 
and that firm engages in earnings management in that year. 
Chapter 3 estimates the errors in financial statements, the abnormal accruals to 
detect accrual-based earnings management and the abnormal real earnings 
management to detect real earnings management for the 295 M&A deals from 
public UK acquirers in the period 2007 to 2012. The results in Chapter 3 show 
that share-financed acquiring firms inflate both accruals and real earnings 
activities prior to the merger announcement. However, there is no evidence that 
cash-financed acquiring firms inflate their accounting earnings prior to the merger 
announcement. 
The findings of Chapter 3 document whether acquirers inflate their earnings prior 
to a merger announcement or whether this is just the result of measurement 
errors by examining errors in financial reports based on Benford’s Law, assessing 
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both abnormal total and working capital accruals using the Jones and modified 
Jones models and investigating abnormal real earnings management. The 
research contributes to the literature on earnings management prior to the merger 
announcement by demonstrating that Benford’s Law is a reliable and effective 
method for detecting earnings management. Market participants could use this 
easily implementable approach for assessing errors in financial statements and 
detecting acquiring firms’ earnings management. 
Chapter 4 extends Chapter 3 by investigating the effect of board connections 
between acquirers and target firms on earnings management prior to the merger 
announcement. Previous research has revealed that the certainty of deal 
completion will increase if the acquirer has board connections with the target firm. 
The reason is that board connections help to improve information flow and 
decrease information asymmetry between the acquirer and target. Therefore, 
compared with acquirers without board connections, acquirers with board 
connections are more certain about deal completion than acquirers without board 
connection due to lower information asymmetry. Besides, previous research 
suggests that the successful rate of deal completion is negatively affected by 
earnings management acquirers and targets (Chen et al. 2011b; Marquardt and 
Zur 2015). Thus, acquirers with board connections may be more conservative 
than acquirers without board connections in engaging in earnings management 
if they are less certain about the deal completion.  
Previous research has shown that acquiring firms have the motivation to choose 
strategically the time at which to engage in earnings management; if acquiring 
firms engage in extreme abnormal earnings management, they may face 
litigation and regulatory risk (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Gong et al. 2008). 
Therefore, acquiring firms may engage in earnings management earlier prior to 
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the merger announcement. Previous research also reveals that acquirers with 
board connections have a stronger bargaining position in the negotiations than 
acquirers without board connections. Hence, acquirers with board connections 
may use their advantage in negotiations to convince the target to accept the time 
and payment for the M&A deal which help acquiring firms strategically time their 
earnings manipulation to reduce the regulatory risk and potential litigation. In 
contrast to acquirers with board connections, those without board connections 
may manipulate real earnings activities instead of inflating accruals to reduce the 
regulatory risk potential for litigation. 
Investigating the sample of 295 M&A deals in the UK from 2007 to 2012, it is 
apparent that share-financed acquirers with board connections engage in 
accounting of earnings in both the first and second years prior to a merger 
announcement, while share-financed acquirers without direct networks engage 
in real earnings management mainly in the first year prior to the merger 
announcement. However, there is no evidence concerning the effect of board 
connections on earnings management among cash-financed acquirers prior to 
the merger announcement. This study suggests that share-financed acquirers 
with board connections strategically choose the time of earnings management 
and are less conservative in doing so, while share-financed acquirers without 
board connections shift from accrual-based earnings management to real 
earnings management. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by extending 
previous research on the effect of board connections on earnings management 
prior to the merger announcement as a new measure to estimate the effect of 
professional connections in corporate investments, while previous studies have 
paid attention to investigating value creation and destruction after M&A or 
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announcement returns to estimate the effect of connections on corporate 
investments. 
Chapter 5 investigates the effect of CEO characteristics on earnings 
management prior to a merger announcement by examining the CEOs’ 
reputation, tenure and financial expertise as proxies of CEO characteristics. 
Previous studies have shown that there is a correlation between CEOs’ reputation 
and earnings management, but the effects are mixed. On the one hand, CEOs 
with high reputation prioritize their reputation instead of attempting to increase 
the wealth of shareholders (Hirshleifer 1993; Malmendier and Tate 2009). On the 
other hand, CEOs with high reputation are hired by firms with high earnings 
management to reduce this in subsequent periods (Francis et al. 2008). This 
evidence indicates that earnings management is negatively correlated with 
CEOs’ reputation.  
Previous research also shows that firms with CEOs with financial expertise are 
more likely to have higher outcomes. Custódio and Metzger (2014) show that 
CEOs with financial expertise have an ability to access external funds in difficult 
credit situations and have flexible financial policies. In addition, Aier et al. (2005) 
show that the financial expertise of CFOs is negatively correlated with accounting 
restatement, while Custódio and Metzger (2013) show that CEOs with financial 
expertise have a better position in M&A negotiations. Therefore, acquirers might 
purchase targets at a lower price. 
Regarding CEOs’ tenure proxy, previous research shows that earnings 
management is greater in the earlier than later years of CEOs’ service (Ali and 
Zhang 2015). The reason is that CEOs with long tenure are perceived as more 
talented than CEOs with short tenure. With a longer period in the role, CEOs with 
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long tenure establish a reputation for managerial ability. Therefore, a long-
tenured CEO will be less likely to engage in earnings management to protect their 
reputation (Ali and Zhang 2015). In contrast, CEOs with short tenure have 
incentives to avoid being judged as having low ability, which could lead to their 
dismissal or negatively affect their autonomy and future compensation (Kuang et 
al. 2014; Ali and Zhang 2015). Therefore, CEOs with short tenure are more likely 
to engage in earnings management.  
By examining the sample of 62 share-financed M&A deals from 2007 to 2012, 
the study finds that share-financed acquirers which have CEOs with financial 
expertise, long tenure and high reputation inflate their earnings less than those 
which have CEOs without financial expertise and with low reputation. Chapter 5 
contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the effects of CEO 
characteristics on earnings management prior to the merger announcement, 
which will also be useful for practitioners such as investors and auditors. Investors 
should be cautions when using information related to M&A announcements of 
acquirers with CEOs of a lower reputation, short tenure and lacking financial 
expertise because earnings are more likely to be manipulated in the first year 
before the merger announcement. Similarly, when auditing financial statements, 
auditors should particularly pay attention to firms in which the CEOs have less of 
a reputation, short tenure and a lack of financial expertise because the risks of 
earnings management are high in the first year before M&A. 
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6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
In examining the earnings management of acquiring firms prior to a merger 
announcement (Chapter 3), the effect of board connections on earnings 
management prior to a merger announcement (Chapter 4) and the effect of CEO 
characteristics on earnings management prior to a merger announcement 
(Chapter 5), the study has controlled for the main factors, such as firm size, firm 
leverage, growth opportunities, firm profitability, net operating assets, equity 
issuance, and industry and year effects. These could affect earnings 
management, as evidenced in the existing literature. However, there was no 
control for corporate governance factors, such as board size and CEO or 
chairman, because of the small M&A deal sample and limitation of the data 
resource. This limitation in controlling for possible factors is similar to other 
empirical research: it is impossible to control for all factors that could affect 
earnings management. However, future research investigating a larger M&A 
sample and including corporate governance factors could potentially enhance the 
quality of the findings. 
In Chapter 4, board connections are affected by the network data constraints. 
Chapter 4 only investigates the board network sample, in which the directors of 
acquirers/targets are used to working or not for targets/acquirers prior to a merger 
announcement because of network data restrictions, while the social networks of 
directors also affect M&A activities. For example, Ishii and Xuan (2014) reveal 
that acquisitions are more likely to take place between two firms that are well 
connected to each other through social ties. Another board network data 
constraint of Chapter 4 lies in networks that are built on affiliations in terms of 
education (university), professional clubs or sports clubs. These networks could 
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also build board director networks and affect earnings management prior to a 
merger announcement. Therefore, future research is invited to cover social 
networks, educational networks and professional and sports club networks of 
board directors, which might help to capture the deeper impact of board networks 
on earnings management prior to a merger announcement.  
The main limitation of Chapter 5 is the lack of investigating of the role played by 
the CEOs’ internal power and their personalities and aspects such as age, which 
can be considered CEO characteristics, due to the lack of quality data and the 
small M&A sample investigated. With regard to CEOs’ internal power, Feng et al. 
(2011) find that powerful CEOs have the ability to collude with other executives 
or even force them to engage in earnings management. This is also consistent 
with other studies showing that the power of CEOs is a determinant of earnings 
management (Dechow et al. 1996a; Beneish 1997; Beneish 1999). For CEO age, 
previous research has shown that there is an effect of age of CEOs on earnings 
management. Huang et al. (2012), Serfling (2014) and Yim (2013) demonstrate 
that younger CEOs are less likely to engage in earnings managements than older 
CEOs. Therefore, future research including CEOs’ internal power and age as 
proxies for the effect of CEO characteristics on earnings management prior to a 
merger announcement could broadly capture the effects of all such aspects.  
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
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), denotes abnormal 
total accruals under the cash flow approach using the Jones model for firm i in 
year t. ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?3 are the estimated coefficients from the following 
regression, which is run in each industry-year with at least 6 observations: 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
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=
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) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where TAi,t denotes total accruals 
calculated under the cash flow approach for firm i in year t, which is equal to the 
difference between net income before extraordinary items (NIi,t) as reported in 
the cash flow statement and cash flow from operation (CFi,t); Ai,t−1 comprises the 
total assets of firm i at the end of year t–1; ∆REVi,t is the changes in sales from 
year t–1 to year t of firm i; PPEi,t is gross plant, property and equipment of firm i 
at the end of year t. 
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estimates the abnormal total accruals using the modified Jones model for firm i 
in year t. ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2 𝑎𝑛𝑑  ?̂?3 are the estimated coefficients from the following 
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)], estimates the 
abnormal working capital accruals under the cash flow approach using the Jones 
model of firm i in year t. ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2 𝑎𝑛𝑑  ?̂?3 are the estimated coefficients from the 
following regression, which is run in each industry-year with at least 6 
observations: 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where WCAi,t 
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denotes working capital accruals calculated under the cash flow approach for firm 
i in year t, which are equal to the difference between net income before 
extraordinary items (NIi,t) as reported in the cash flow statement and operating 
cash flow which excludes depreciation and amortization (CFi,t - D&Ai,t). 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴_𝑀𝐽𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
)], estimates 
the abnormal working capital accruals using the modified Jones model for firm i 
in year t. ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?3 are the estimated coefficients from the following 
regression, which is run in each industry-year with at least 6 observations:    
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
ACFi,t denotes abnormal cash flow, which is the actual cash flow minus the normal 
cash flow calculated using the estimated coefficients from regression: CF𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
=
𝛼0 + β1
1
A𝑡−1
+  β2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ β3
ΔREV𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ ε𝑖𝑡, and multiplied by -1. 
ADEXPi,t denotes abnormal discretionary expense, i.e. the actual DEXP minus the 
normal DEXP calculated using the estimated coefficients from 
regression:DISEXP𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + β1
1
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ β2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ ε𝑖𝑡, and multiplied by -1. 
APRODi,t represents the abnormal production costs, namely the actual PROD 
minus the normal PROD calculated using the estimated coefficients from 
regression:PROD𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + β1
1
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ β2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ β3
ΔREV𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ β4
ΔREV𝑖𝑡−1
A𝑖𝑡−1
 +  ε𝑖𝑡 
ATREMi,t is the sum of ACFi,t, ADEXPi,t and APRODi,t. 
𝐴𝑇𝐴_𝐽𝑀_𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡] 
estimates abnormal total accruals under the performance control approach using 
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the Jones model for firm i in year t. ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 and ?̂?4 are estimated from the 
following equation, which is run in each industry-year with at least 6 observations: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
𝐴𝑇𝐴_𝑀𝐽𝑀_𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +
?̂?4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡] estimates abnormal total accruals under the performance control 
approach using the modified Jones model for firm i in year t. ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 and ?̂?4 
are estimated from the following equation, which is run in each industry-year with 
at least 6 observations: 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +
𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴_𝐽𝑀_𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡] 
estimates the abnormal working capital accruals under the performance control 
approach using the Jones model for firm i in year t. ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 and ?̂?4 estimated 
from the following equation, which is run in each industry-year with at least 6 
observations: 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴_𝑀𝐽𝑀_𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− [?̂? + ?̂?1 (
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3  (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +
?̂?4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡] estimates the abnormal working capital accruals under the performance 
control approach using the modified Jones model for firm i in year t. ?̂?, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 
and ?̂?4 estimated from the following equation, which is run in each industry-year 
with at least 6 observations: 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +
𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
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ACF_PCi,t denotes the abnormal cash flow under the performance control 
approach, which is the actual cash flow minus the normal cash flow calculated 
using the estimated coefficients from regression: CF_PC𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
A𝑡−1
+
 β1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ β2
ΔREV𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ ROA𝑖,𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 .  , and multiplied by -1. 
ADEXP_PCi,t is abnormal DEXP under the performance control approach, which 
is the actual DEXP minus the normal DEXP_PC calculated using the estimated 
coefficients from regression: DISEXP_PC𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + β1
1
A𝑖𝑡−1
+  β2
REV𝑖𝑡−1
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
ε𝑖𝑡, and multiplied by -1. 
APROD_PCi,t is abnormal PROD under the performance control approach, which 
is the actual PROD minus the normal PROD_PC calculated using the estimated 
coefficients from regression: PROD_PC𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + β1
1
A𝑖𝑡−1
+  β2
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
+ β3
ΔREV𝑖𝑡
A𝑖𝑡−1
+
β4
ΔREV𝑖𝑡−1
A𝑖𝑡−1
 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ε𝑖𝑡   
ATREM_PCi,t is the sum of ACF_PCi,t, ADEXP_PCi,t and APROD_PCi,t. 
SIZEi,t−1 is defined as the market value of equity of firm i at the end of year t-1.  
MTBi,t−1 is the market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value of equity of firm 
i at the end of year t-1 divided by the book value of equity of firm i at the end of 
year t-1. 
LEVi,t−1 is defined as the total of long-term and short-term debts of firm i at the 
end of year t-1 divided by the total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
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NOAi,t−1 is defined as the total of book value of equity, long-term and short-term 
debts, cash and equivalents of firm i at the end of year t-1, all divided by the sales 
of firm i in year t-1. 
SEOi,t takes the value of 1 if the firm engaged in an SEO in year t, and zero 
otherwise. An SEO is identified when (1) the number of common shares 
outstanding increases by more than 5%, and (2) the proceeds from sale/issuing 
stocks are positive.  
ROAi,t is calculated as profit before extraordinary items for firm i in year t divided 
by the total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
SMAi,t is a dummy which is set to 1 for share-financed acquiring firms i in year t, 
zero otherwise. 
CMAi,t is a dummy which is set to 1 for cash-financed acquiring firms i in year t, 
zero otherwise. 
SMA_WOBCi,t is a dummy which takes the value 1 if share-financed acquiring firm 
i has no board connections in year t, zero otherwise. 
SMA_WBCi,t is a dummy which takes the value 1 if share-financed acquiring firm i 
has board connections in year t, zero otherwise. 
CMA_WOBCi,t is a dummy which takes the value 1 if cash-financed acquiring firm 
i has no board connections in year t, zero otherwise. 
CMA_WBCi,t is a dummy which takes the value 1 if cash-financed acquiring firm i 
has board connections in year t, zero otherwise. 
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EXPi,t is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the CEO of firm i in year t 
had a Master of Business Administration degree or a Chartered Accountant 
certification accredited by the FRC (2016) or equivalent, or had worked as a CFO 
in the past, zero otherwise. 
TENUREi,t is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the years of tenure in 
the role for the CEO of firm i in year t is higher than average of years in the role 
of other CEOs in the same industry, zero otherwise. 
PRESS2i,t is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the number of news stories 
covering the CEO’s name and firm i in year t-1 and year t is higher than the 
average for those in the same industry, zero otherwise. 
PRESS3i,t is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the number of news stories 
covering the CEO’s name and firm i in years t-2, t-1 and t are higher than the 
average for those in the same industry, zero otherwise. 
 
